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Dissertation Abstract 
 Feminist philosophers of science identify sexist and androcentric science and develop alternate 
practices to address science’s empirical limitations and its contributions to social oppression. However, 
some scholars have questioned the impact of feminist epistemology on scientific practice. In my 
dissertation, I advance the project of feminist philosophy of science by articulating a method to connect 
it to scientific practice. I develop a feminist philosophy of cognitive neuroscience using feminist 
standpoint empiricism that is informed by the specifics of practice.  
In chapter one, I establish the gap between feminist theory and feminist practice of science. I 
claim that feminist philosophy of science has the tools to effect change in scientific practice, but it must 
be articulated in a way that engages scientists. In order to make it relevant to scientists, feminist 
philosophy of science must be tailored to the specifics of a particular discipline of science. I defend 
feminist standpoint empiricism (Intemann 2010) for its potential to connect to scientific practice, and I 
identify the considerations for translating feminist standpoint empiricism to a specific science.  
In chapter two, I introduce the theory of sex/gender differences in the brain, the two 
neuroimaging case studies, and my critical approach: assessing the research on empirical grounds as 
well as through the feminist standpoint. 
The next two chapters are case studies on the neuroimaging of human sex or gender 
differences. Chapter three investigates structural differences in the corpus callosum, the white matter 
tract connecting the two hemispheres of the brain. The corpus callosum is thought to be larger and 
more bulbous in women. Chapter four investigates functional differences in a visuospatial task, mental 
rotation, a task in which men supposedly excel. Although many studies find sex or gender differences in 
the corpus callosum or in mental rotation activation, there are no consistent findings across studies. I 
conclude for both questions that there is no evidence for sex or gender differences. In analyzing the 
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methods and the assumptions, I uncover sex essentialism throughout the research process. Sex 
essentialism is the view that men and women are essentially different due to their sex.  
 In chapter five, I use the findings from the two case studies to demonstrate the limitations of 
cognitive neuroscience grounded in traditional epistemology. I propose a new framework based on 
feminist standpoint empiricism and integrated with the specifics of practice in cognitive neuroimaging. 
For the question of sex or gender differences in cognitive neuroscience, the framework involves 
initiating inquiry from the perspective of women’s lives, reflecting on the differences between men’s 
lives and women’s lives, and incorporating the interests of women in the research, which involves 
understanding the difference between sex and gender. Since this approach was built through close 
consideration of scientific practice, it is in the form of tangible changes practicing scientists can 
incorporate into their research. A philosophy of cognitive neuroscience from the feminist standpoint 
yields a practice of science that is better grounded epistemologically and that is more socially and 
morally responsible. 
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Chapter 1 
Establishing the case for discipline-specific feminist philosophy of science 
 
Introduction 
 Neuroethics is an emerging field examining the implications of neuroscience research on our 
understandings of self and society, the ethical issues regarding the execution of neuroscientific 
experiments and the development of neuroscientific technologies, and the neural correlates of moral 
decision-making (Roskies 2002). An emerging subfield of neuroethics involves a feminist analysis of 
neuroscience and cognitive science. Peggy DesAutels (2010) identified the importance of a feminist 
critique of neuroscience, which she dubbed “feminist neuroethics,” through an assessment of the social 
and moral implications of sex or gender differences research. More recently, an edited volume has 
further developed critical feminist analyses of neuroscience and cognitive science (Bluhm, Jacobson, and 
Maibom 2012).  
Here I approach feminist neuroethics with an eye toward the popularity of cognitive 
neuroimaging. Cognitive neuroimaging, also called cognitive brain imaging, offers a deceptively clear 
and distinct window into the brain. Researchers instruct volunteer participants to complete cognitive 
tasks while undergoing a brain scan that records their neural activity. What cognitive neuroimaging 
seems to show is the “thinking brain in action.” Newspapers and popular press books sensationalize 
neuroscientific findings, which find their way into general society. In particular, I’m interested in the 
neuroimaging of sex or gender differences.1 The concern is that giving a biological explanation for 
                                                          
1 “Sex or gender” leaves open the interpretation of the difference – sex, gender, or a combination of 
both. Other gender studies scholars prefer gender/sex or sex/gender in order to display the confusion 
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differences between men and women can be used to justify stereotypes, prescribe certain social 
structures, and limit resources for individuals interested in pursuing non-gender-normative pursuits. For 
example, showing where in the brain the difference lies between men’s and women’s performance in 
mathematics could be used to limit resources for women interested in pursuing science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields. Although merely finding a difference in brain activity would 
not seem to be problematic in itself, coupled with cultural assumptions about sex and gender 
differences and boys’ and men’s historical superiority in mathematics, finding such differences can lead 
to the interpretation that the difference is “biological,” “natural,” or “essential.” Thus, it could be argued 
that extra resources to increase girls’ and women’s participation and success in the STEM fields would 
be a misuse of resources since they are naturally or biologically deficient. 
The key problem with sex or gender difference research involves the interpretation of the 
difference. Although the difference could be caused by sex-based, so-called “natural,” biological, 
genetic/hormonal factors, by gender-based, social factors, or by a combination of the two, it is often 
unclear or even impossible to sort out the main causal factor. Moreover, researchers’ inconsistent 
language adds to the confusion (Gentile 1993). Despite the ambiguity, sex or gender differences have 
historically been read as “natural,” biological, or essential rather than due to social and cultural factors. 
For example, Aristotle claimed that females are imperfect males (On the Generation of Animals, Book 1, 
chapter 19) and 19th century scientists used measures of skull volume and brain weight as support for 
the hypothesis that females were inferior to males (Fine 2010). Even now, some researchers continue to 
explain sex or gender differences in terms of nature: sociologist Steven Goldberg (1993) argues that 
                                                          
and complication of the two terms. The technical term, found in databases, is “sex differences,” which is 
problematic. It is worth noting that gender is commonly undertheorized or wrongly used in science. 
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males are biologically suited to dominate and that women are biologically suited to nurture. In 2005, 
Larry Summers, former president of Harvard University, famously rejected socialization as a barrier to 
women in STEM fields. He insinuated that males are naturally, biologically better at mathematics and 
spatial reasoning (Summers 2005). Mathematics and spatial reasoning are important for science careers. 
In contrast to the “natural,” biological interpretation of sex or gender differences, feminists and 
some marginalized research traditions in biology have criticized the reductive approach and instead 
have suggested social and genetic-environmental interactive explanations. Feminists especially are 
uneasy with biological explanations of sex or gender differences because the historical convention of 
using scientific findings to justify the oppression of women and their exclusion from politics, positions of 
leadership, and academics still continues today. Moreover, undue attention to the biological 
explanations for women’s secondary position and underachievement functions to obscure social and 
institutional factors that work against women’s success. As a result, research on sex or gender 
differences is a socially, politically, and ethically charged field. It has implications for the structure of 
society, disbursement of resources, and equal treatment, to name a few. 
Feminist epistemology and philosophy of science is a response to the standard tradition of 
epistemology and philosophy of science that has historically marginalized, misrepresented, and ignored 
women and minorities and their contributions to knowledge production. It has both a critical aspect and 
a constructive one: beyond critiquing science, for example, feminist philosophy of science offers 
alternate arrangements and frameworks for thinking about knowledge production that attempt to 
overcome the limitations of traditional philosophy of science. More than just an academic project, 
however, feminist epistemology and philosophy of science has an interest in changing the practice of 
science.  
One important question to consider is whether it has been effective in changing the practice of 
science. According to Subramaniam (2009), feminist critiques of science have had minimal impact on 
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science, due in part, she claims, to the fact that feminist science studies remains moored in the mode of 
science criticism rather than moving forward to offer positive recommendations for solving the 
problems it uncovers. But feminist philosophy of science is notable for its work on alternate approaches 
to science to overcome the problems of traditional science and philosophy of science. It is worth 
investigating, then, if feminist philosophy of science is making an impact on the practice of science. In 
other words, are scientists using feminist philosophy of science in their practice? A brief consideration of 
this question leads me to conclude that there is a gap between feminist theory and scientific practice. I 
use this assessment to motivate an investigation of what feminist philosophy of science suggests for 
practicing scientists. 
My overall project is to use the resources provided by feminist philosophy of science to critically 
interrogate current practice in the neuroimaging of sex or gender differences in order to provide a new 
framework for a feminist philosophy of cognitive neuroscience. But first I must assess the main 
approaches to feminist philosophy of science for their ability to prescribe actionable changes to 
scientific practice. In order for the theory to be effective, I argue, it must be closely tied to the specifics 
of a particular science, since different disciplines of science differ in terms of background assumptions, 
standards, techniques, instruments, analyses, models, theories, histories and language.  
The thesis of my first chapter is that feminist philosophy of science has the tools to effect 
change at the level of scientific practice when it directly engages with the science. Specifically, I argue 
for a feminist philosophy of science tailored to a specific science. This strain of feminist philosophy of a 
specific science exposes sexism and androcentrism (and possibly heterosexism, racism, and other 
prejudices) within a given scientific discipline as well as provides a foundation for a non-sexist, non-
androcentric practice in a way that scientists within that discipline can understand and apply.  
The outline of the chapter is as follows: I first assess the connection between feminist 
philosophy and scientific practice and one suggestion (Fehr 2012) for bridging that gap. In arguing for a 
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feminist philosophy of a specific science, I point to the shift in 20th century philosophy of science away 
from general approaches to philosophies of specific sciences. I use philosophy of biology as the model 
case. I then evaluate the major approaches to feminist philosophy of science – feminist empiricism, 
Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism (1990; 2002), and Sandra Harding’s standpoint theory (1986; 
1991; 1992) – for their ability to guide scientists to do better science. I argue for a hybrid view 
combining feminist empiricism and standpoint theory (Intemann 2010) that is tied to the specifics of 
scientific practice. In the final section, I propose four elements that connect theory and practice in order 
to construct a feminist framework of a particular science. 
 
The gap between theory and practice 
 In order to gauge the relationship between feminist theory and scientific practice, I review five 
accounts that broadly address feminist threads within science, scientists’ and science critics’ reflections 
on their work on gender issues, and scientists’ and science critics’ knowledge of and engagement with 
feminist theory. This is not intended to be a thorough review; instead it is meant to identify some of the 
issues relating to feminist theory and scientific practice. I find that there is a gap between feminist 
theory and scientific practice. In assessing the gap, and the approaches to feminist philosophy of 
science, I find that feminist philosophy of science as it is currently practiced fails to connect to the 
specifics of scientific practice in such a way as to assist scientists in improving their practice. 
The five accounts I review are the following. The Biology and Gender Study Group (1988) argue 
for the relevance of feminist critique in cell biology as an improvement to traditional practice. Kerr 
(1998) interviewed women scientists and critics of science to see how they reflect on and practice 
feminist science. She interviewed 30 women from the United Kingdom, United States and Canada from 
the fields of physics, chemistry and biology. Wylie (2001) and Conkey and Gero (1997) investigate the 
historical development of gendered research within archaeology. Eagly et al. (2012) conducted a 
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bibliometric analysis of all the articles in psychology from 1960-2009. They are interested in how 
feminist activism in association with the Second Wave of the 1960s affected research on women and 
gender.  
There are four lessons learned from these accounts. First, scientists see feminist criticism as 
controlling for sexist bias in science (The Biology and Gender Study Group and Kerr). Second, feminist 
theory is not central to the work of feminist science critics and women scientists doing feminist science2 
(Conkey and Gero, Wylie, Kerr, and Eagly et al.). Third, practitioners of feminist science do not explicitly 
label themselves or their work as feminist (Wylie and Eagly et al.). Finally, some women scientists feel 
attacked by feminist science critics (Kerr).  
The first point is the notion that bias limits knowledge, and feminist analysis can provide a 
method to control for and eliminate bias. For The Biology and Gender Study Group, feminist critique in 
cell biology functions as an experimental control:  
Feminist critique asks if there may be some assumptions that we haven’t checked concerning 
gender bias. In this way feminist critique should be part of normative science. Like any control, it 
seeks to provide critical rigor, and to ignore this critique is to ignore a possible source of error. 
(61-2) 
It is clear from this statement that what they view as feminist science is a “bias check” on conventional 
science. They illustrate that assumptions about social roles for men and women affected theorizing in 
                                                          
2 Note that feminist practitioners do not label their work as feminist. Thus, when I discuss “feminist 
science,” as in points 2 and 3 in this paragraph, and call them “feminist practitioners,” I am externally 
imposing upon them the label “feminist.” Another way of thinking about their work is “gender-
sensitive,” “gender-aware,” or just “gendered.” I prefer feminist for its communicative ease.  
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biology. For example, the male is assumed to be active, and so is the sperm; on the other hand, the 
female is assumed to be passive, and so is the egg. In some accounts, the heroic sperm survives the 
hazards of the hostile uterine environment. Moving beyond the social influence on the science revealed 
the active role that the egg plays: in conception, the egg’s microvilli grasp onto the sperm and pull it 
inside (Schatten and Schatten 1983). Although microvilli extending to the sperm had been known since 
1895, their role couldn’t be theorized under the “active sperm” assumption. New interpretations that 
broke away from traditional gender conventions were necessary to understand the more complex egg-
sperm interaction.  In this case, sexist theories regarding gender limited the science. Removing such 
limits, or biases, will produce better science, according to The Biology and Gender Study Group. 
 A similar thread arose in Kerr’s interviews with women scientists. Kerr notes: “From the 
perspective of feminist practitioners, when observing and theorizing scientists ought to be uncovering 
“biases” instead of deliberately using them to guide knowledge production” (Kerr 1998, 397). Thus, they 
see biases as a barrier to scientific knowledge. 
The second point is that women scientists are ignorant of feminist theory. Kerr quoted a 
physicist as saying:  
I don’t care [about feminist theories in some ways]…I read articles…there’s a whole issue about 
whether women think differently from men, whether they act differently, and whether there’s a 
feminist way, and somehow I don’t think I care. I want to be able to do science and I want other 
women to be able to do science – I don’t think they have to do it like me. (395) 
Such commentary suggests that the practice of feminist scientists is disconnected from feminist 
philosophy of science.  
Conkey and Gero (1997) and Wylie (2001) also found that gender studies research in 
archaeology in the 1980s and 1990s was developed without engagement with feminist theory. Conkey 
and Gero (1997) state:  
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However, subsequent archaeological studies of gender and more general critiques of the 
discipline have not always taken advantage of the well-established literature on gender theory 
and feminist critiques of science, especially as they bear on issues of interpreting human 
cultures and the organization of scientific practice. (425) 
Wylie (2001) states: “It is a striking feature of this growing literature on the archaeology of gender that 
relatively few contributors explicitly identify themselves or their research as feminist, and many make 
little use of the resources of feminist scholarship developed in neighboring fields” (26).   
 Eagly et al. (2012) also found that the research in psychology on women and gender was done 
without explicit mention of feminist theory. In their bibliometric analysis of psychology articles from 
1960-2009, they find that: “In most of the research that we discuss, authors have not explicitly 
addressed this gender equality goal, nor have they labeled their research as feminist” (212). Of all the 
articles on the psychology of women and gender during that 50-year period, they found that only 3.4% 
of the articles were explicitly engaging with or identifying as feminist (using the index terms “feminism,” 
“feminist psychology,” “feminist therapy,” or “women’s liberation movement”). Thus, Kerr’s interviews 
with women scientists, Conkey and Gero and Wylie’s historical account of the development of gender 
studies within archaeology, and Eagly et al.’s analysis of published articles in psychology demonstrate 
that women scientists and scientists interested in gendered analyses within their discipline are not 
centrally engaging with feminist theory. This evidence establishes that there is a gap between science 
and feminist philosophy of science. Moreover, for the accounts of archaeology and psychology, it 
establishes the gap between feminist practice and feminist theory. For archaeology, the surveyed 
individuals were interested in gender-aware archaeology, and for psychology, the number of women-
related articles increased in the late ‘70s with little mention of theory. Thus, gender-aware archaeology 
and psychology developed separate from feminist philosophy of science. 
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The third point these articles identify, illustrated by the quotes from Wylie and Eagly et al., is 
that practitioners of gendered approaches do not explicitly label themselves or their work as feminist. 
This is different from the point above in that, more than merely practicing science apart from feminist 
theory, the practitioners do not identify themselves or their work as feminist. Perhaps they view 
“feminist” as a derogatory term, or think that accepting the mantle of feminist will make their work less 
accepted by the scientific community.  
Finally, Kerr’s work suggests that the relationship between women scientists and feminist 
science critics may go beyond ignorance to something akin to hostility. Kerr hints that feminist critics 
may be hostile to women scientists trying to establish themselves in the scientific community. She 
states:  
Women in the natural sciences, who have struggled for so long to survive and create a positive 
environment for their younger colleagues, do not have any time for those feminist critics who 
characterize their practice as akin to some kind of false consciousness. (388) 
and “Women in science are accustomed to being told that they are out of place and the feminist analysis 
of masculinity and science can reinforce their sense of isolation” (388). Although Kerr merely describes 
this tension, it may be part of the reason that there remains a gap between feminist theory and feminist 
practice. More interviews would have to be conducted to explore this possibility. 
Thus, to characterize the gap between feminist theory and feminist practice of science, we see 
that 1) scientists see feminist criticism as controlling for sexist bias in science (The Biology and Gender 
Study Group and Kerr); 2) feminist theory is not central to the work of feminist science critics and 
women scientists doing feminist science (with “feminist science” externally imposed) (Conkey and Gero, 
Wylie, Kerr, and Eagly et al.); 3) practitioners of feminist science do not explicitly label themselves or 
their work as feminist (Wylie and Eagly et al.); and 4) some women scientists might feel attacked by 
feminist science critics (Kerr). Note that there is a tension between the first point and the other three. 
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Though scientists see a role for feminist criticism in science – controlling for sexist bias – they are 
ignorant of feminist theory, they are hesitant to call themselves or their work feminist, and they may 
even feel some hostility against feminist science critics. Though they see a role for feminist criticism, a 
number of barriers exist between their practice of science and feminist theory. 
The above assessment demonstrates that feminist philosophers of science aren’t reaching the 
scientists in order to make changes at the level of scientific practice. Whether it’s because of the 
tensions between feminist theorists and scientists that Kerr describes or other reasons discussed below, 
feminist scientists in different fields are constructing feminist practices in isolation. 
 
Bridging the gap 
Above I review the accounts of scientists and feminist science critics of the gap between 
feminist theory and the practice of science. Carla Fehr (2012) provides another account of the gap 
between feminist critics and science in the field of evolutionary psychology. However, she goes beyond 
merely assessing the gap to articulating steps for attempting to bridge the gap. Although I think Fehr is 
on the right track, I think the engagement she describes is only part of what’s needed.  
Fehr analyzes the gap between theory and practice in evolutionary psychology, though her case 
is slightly different from the cases I presented above. Whereas Kerr and Wylie engage with researchers 
interested in doing science that has feminist underpinnings – though those feminist principles may not 
be explicitly avowed by the researchers – the type of debate Fehr analyzes is between feminist critics of 
evolutionary psychology and evolutionary psychologists who are not interested in doing feminist 
science.  
Fehr’s approach for bridging the divide between feminist critiques and science is to analyze the 
communication hurdles between the two. She sees her work as aiding one of the goals of feminist 
science studies in terms of improving the practices and products of evolutionary psychology (55). So far, 
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feminist critiques have fallen on deaf ears in evolutionary psychology. She gives an example of a major 
evolutionary psychologist, David Buss, denigrating feminist criticism in one of his books. Instead of 
considering their criticisms, he discounts them as a group because of their motives. Fehr’s approach is to 
analyze the professional practices of feminist science scholars in order to facilitate productive discussion 
with the evolutionary psychology community. 
 Her first major point is that evolutionary psychology clings to the old value-free ideal of science. 
The value-free ideal of science holds that science should be pursued objectively, free of preconceived 
notions, desires, or interests. The Biology and Gender Study Group and some of Kerr’s interviewers 
shared this notion. Values, biases, interests, ideology, etc., are limitations on the objectivity of science 
and should be controlled for and eliminated. Feminists, however, along with anthropologists, 
sociologists, historians and philosophers of science, have demonstrated how values infuse scientific 
work and have argued that values are ineliminable from science. Some have even gone so far as to 
argue for a productive role for values in science. (I will go into more detail about different conceptions 
of the roles of values and bias in my evaluation of approaches to feminist philosophy of science below.) 
Regarding the conflict between feminist critics and evolutionary psychologists on the role of 
values in science, Fehr states:  
Critiques of the value-free ideal, especially in conjunction with fundamental critiques of a 
research program, face serious challenges in terms of getting uptake. These challenges may be 
particularly acute when the critic is seen as a hostile outsider to the research community. (58-9) 
So, not only do feminists critique the field, they have a fundamentally different idea of science from 
evolutionary psychologists. 
Her solution to the gap between feminist critics and practitioners of science is for feminist 
science critics to engage with scientists: 
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I think that a critic is well served by engaging with members of a scientific community on 
projects other than, or in addition to, the development of a specific criticism. Doing so can result 
in the development of relationships, as well as some shared assumptions, and perhaps shared 
perspectives, that can facilitate a scientist seeing a critic as a credible interlocutor. Another way 
to consider this possibility is that, by developing these relationships, one can establish credibility 
within a scientific community before setting out to critique the nature of that community’s 
practice. (59) 
She thinks that a feminist science critic who is also part of the scientific community can benefit by 
developing relationships with scientists and developing shared assumptions and perspectives that 
function to give the feminist critic scientific credibility as an interlocutor. I think what this amounts to is 
showing some members of the scientific community that the feminist critic is a reasonable person and 
that, through discussions, the feminist and the scientist can find a way to engage in the scientific 
discussion in a productive way. The other part of it is developing credibility – the feminist critic is not 
just an outsider who doesn’t know what he or she is talking about. 
Another problem is that feminist criticism stays within the community of feminist science 
studies. Her suggestion is for feminist critics to take their work to the conferences the scientists attend, 
publish in journals the scientists read, and tailor their writing to connect with scientists as a target 
audience. 
For Fehr, knowing the scientific literature is not enough for feminist critics. The goal of 
engagement is to create “a productive overlap among communities of philosophers and science studies 
scholars, and scientists” (61). This can be accomplished by feminist critics by 
developing collaborative relationships with scientists in terms of both research and pedagogy, 
participating in scientific lab groups, presenting our research in an accessible manner at 
conferences and in journals where the scientific activity is happening, or inquiring about how 
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our philosophical skills, for example, can be of use to practicing scientists. Activities such as 
these can foster a critic’s credibility within a research community. (61) 
Thus, the key to feminist influence in science is a productive dialogue between and among feminists and 
scientists, and in order for feminists to be recognized as worthy interlocutors, they need to gain 
credibility within the scientific community. She states: “Engagement can foster relationships among 
critics and scientists, with the result that scientists may come to view a critic as being credible. This sort 
of goodwill can facilitate the uptake of a critic’s concerns” (61). One way to go about doing this, Fehr 
suggests, is to find the right community – a group of practitioners who are open to discussing feminist 
concerns.  
 To gain credibility, the feminist critic has to initiate research or teaching collaborations with 
scientists or join a lab group, which has the effect of making it easier for the feminist critic to enter the 
community. What this appears to do is to establish a relationship with a scientist who can “vouch” for 
the feminist critic, who, in turn, gains scientific credibility. The feminist critic can then change the 
community from the inside. 
Fehr's assessment of the gap between evolutionary psychologists and feminist critics offers 
many helpful suggestions. First, though it isn’t part of her “engagement” solution, seeing what types of 
critiques aren’t listened to by the scientists is helpful in order for feminist critics to change tactics and 
find other types of approaches that scientists can understand or consider. Since the evolutionary 
psychologists claim they’re exercising value-neutral science, feminists should wield the accepted 
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standards of the science to show that the science isn’t value neutral.3 A second helpful suggestion is that 
feminist science critics present their work in venues where the scientific community will see it.  
However, I think there is a different type of engagement that is necessary before a feminist 
science critic can have Fehr’s type of engagement with a scientist. The engagement that Fehr describes 
is that of the feminist science critic with the scientific community via a relationship with a scientist. The 
type of engagement I have in mind is engaging with the science. This involves knowing how the results 
were found and talking to scientists in a language they understand. In order to make effective science 
criticism, you have to know what scientists do when they design experiments, think through problems, 
make adjustments, choose experimental design elements, control for confounding factors, negotiate 
criticism, and meet community-wide standards for acceptable science. In this way, feminist critics can 
direct their criticisms to specific aspects of practice and how those specifics relate to the larger problem 
or general concern. This involves, for example, pointing to specific types of analyses, highlighting 
assumptions regarding what should be controlled for, and questioning specific choices along the 
decision tree. By being able to talk the language, understand how all the parts relate to actual, as 
opposed to ideal, scientific practice, and point to specific aspects of practice, a feminist critic can enter 
into a productive dialogue with practitioners in a way that can immediately relate to their practice. To 
put it another way, it’s not “putting time in” to the community that is doing the work. It’s learning from 
the scientists, science, and community in order to make better, targeted criticism with possible 
implementable suggestions for change. 
                                                          
3 In other words, a feminist critic should adopt a feminist empiricist tactic in order to demonstrate on 
the scientists’ own terms the problems in the science. I will discuss feminist empiricism later. 
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Although Fehr mentions that engaging with a scientist on projects can result in some shared 
assumptions and even some shared perspectives (59), she doesn’t spell out what that means. Moreover, 
it is unclear if she intends what I’m suggesting – that the feminist critic is to learn about the practice, 
language and history of science – since the shared assumptions and shared perspectives are merely 
possible byproducts along the way to what is really intended, which is convincing a scientist that the 
feminist critic is a credible interlocutor (59). By focusing on gaining credibility with a scientist, Fehr 
leaves out what is necessary for a feminist critic’s critique to be useful to a scientist. 
Thus, I find Fehr’s suggestion – the feminist critic creating a relationship with a scientist in order 
to gain access to the scientific community – incomplete. First, the relationship with the scientist, though 
possibly resulting in some shared assumptions and shared perspectives, is for the purpose of entering 
the scientific community as a credible interlocutor. In this account, the scientist is merely a tool for the 
feminist critic to use to gain access to the community. Secondly, the feminist critic as characterized by 
Fehr doesn’t seem to be gaining understanding of the particular scientific problem, science in general, or 
the practice of science. In focusing on entering the scientific community, Fehr leaves out what the 
feminist critic can learn from a relationship with a scientist. This may give the impression that the 
feminist critic, not concerned with learning about the scientific process, is not an authentic interlocutor 
but there to push a feminist agenda. Thus, I feel that it is important to spell out what the feminist critic 
needs to do, which involves understanding the process of science and the specifics of a particular 
science, in order for her or him to be useful to practicing scientists. 
As I see it, a more productive engagement involves feminist critics learning the specifics of the 
science. When feminist critics know the methods, motivations, practices, language, and history of the 
field (which some practitioners may not know), they can then create critiques that scientists can 
understand. As I demonstrated above, my evaluation of the gap between scientists and feminist theory 
is that scientists don’t understand or find useful the feminist criticisms because the feminist criticisms 
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aren’t targeted to the specifics of scientific practice. By focusing on entering the scientific community, 
Fehr leaves out what the feminist critic can gain from learning about the process of science. What the 
feminist critic can gain, I suggest, is more specific, relevant suggestions that scientists can recognize as 
applicable to their practice.  
Some philosophers of science develop facility with a discipline by having a background in science 
and working in a lab at some point. Those without adequate scientific background do it by joining a lab 
or by forging relationships with scientists. Perhaps reading the scientific literature is enough in some 
cases, but scientific articles abstract away from the details of the practice. But there is an important 
limitation to developing facility with a specific science: sciences are different, so developing familiarity 
with one science will only partially overlap with other sciences, depending on how many assumptions, 
models, techniques, problems, analyses, etc., they share. In other words, familiarity with the 
particularities of a specific discipline will only partially transfer to other disciplines. 
Although Fehr’s analysis focused on a discipline marked by hostile interactions between feminist 
critics and scientists, I don’t think that’s the case for all of science. As indicated above, many scientists 
interested in doing what could be called feminist work are doing it independently of theory. However, I 
believe the type of interaction I describe above is also relevant to bridging the ignorance gap between 
theory and practice. 
Part of the ignorance gap has to do with feminists not bringing their criticisms to the parties that 
can make change – the scientists themselves. The other part is that the scientists don’t understand what 
the feminists are saying in such a way that they can see how it applies to their practice. Such hurdles 
could make it difficult for a scientist to see how the concerns could be related to their work. Many 
scientists could be turned off by bad science and inaccurate representations by feminist critics as a 
result of an insufficient understanding of the practice of science. A feminist critic, with an understanding 
of the practice of science, can explicitly demonstrate problematic assumptions and methods and 
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potentially provide possible alternatives. This removes concerns of the criticism being too abstract or 
oversimplified to be useful. 
 This, then, is the engagement I propose for feminist philosophy of science and a specific 
discipline of science. It is backed by the established body of feminist philosophy of science, it is tailored 
to a specific discipline, and it is informed by both the results and the “doings” of science. It is an 
empirically-engaged feminist philosophy of a specific science.  
  
Parallel case: History of philosophy of science 
The move I suggest from a general feminist philosophy of science to a feminist philosophy of a 
specific science is comparable to recent trends in the philosophy of science. I offer this brief history 
lesson in philosophy of science as an interesting parallel case where specializing in a particular science – 
in this case, biology – was chosen in order to bridge the gap between theory and scientific practice.  
Philosophy and science have been tightly related since at least ancient Greece. For instance, 
Aristotle was interested in the natural world and developed a methodology for how to go about 
investigating it. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, “natural philosophy” was the study of the 
natural world and its laws. Philosophy and science were not distinct disciplines but one. It wasn’t until 
the nineteenth century that natural philosophy started fracturing into the separate disciplines of science 
– physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics, and others – and breaking away from philosophy and 
theology (Cahan 2003). 
In the early twentieth century, science and philosophy reconnected, establishing philosophy of 
science as a distinct field within philosophy. Early philosophy of science was the product of 
philosophically-minded scientists interested in understanding the nature of scientific theories, the role 
of hypothesis and experiment, the justification of scientific claims, and the nature of explanation (Psillos 
and Curd 2008). The philosophical interest in philosophy of science was for a methodological 
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improvement to philosophy – to rely on formal methods to make philosophy more rigorous and to rid 
philosophy of meaningless metaphysics. The movement was known as logical positivism.  
A major thread of positivist philosophy of science was concerned with articulating a logic of 
science that cut across the different sciences. The goal was a unified science. They thought that this 
could be accomplished with the reduction of the special sciences to physics and then to a universal 
language of science. However, the abstractness and formality of logical positivism became its undoing: it 
was just not relevant to the science. By the 1960s, a number of critiques had been raised against the 
logical positivist approach. Kuhn (1962/1996), for example, raised questions regarding the progress of 
science by paying attention to history rather than the simplified and idealized “rational reconstructions” 
of scientific developments composed by the positivists. Most important for present purposes, however, 
are the critiques from the early philosophers of biology. The development of philosophy of biology as a 
distinct field within philosophy of science provided a model for the development of philosophies of the 
natural sciences. 
For example, in a 1965 presentation at the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, biologist Ernst Mayr complained that the philosophy of science books on his shelf were really 
just on the philosophy of physics, with “many physicist-philosophers naively assuming that what applies 
to physics will apply to any branch of science” (Mayr 1969, 197). He stated: 
 Unfortunately, many of the generalizations made in such philosophies of physics are irrelevant  
when applied to biology. More importantly, many of the generalizations derived from the 
physical sciences, and made the basis for a philosophy of science, are simply not true for 
biological phenomena. Finally, many phenomena and findings of the biological sciences have no 
equivalent in the physical sciences and are therefore omitted from philosophies of science that 
are based on physics. (197) 
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The problem that Mayr points out is the lessons learned from one science could not be applied to 
another. Specifically, he demonstrates the problems a philosophy based on physical sciences faces when 
attempting to accommodate the biological sciences. 
 What Mayr’s comment suggests and is echoed by others in the early stages of the development 
of philosophy of biology (see Byron 2007 for other examples) is that early philosophy of science was 
built from physics. But whether general philosophy of science was grounded in physics or if general 
philosophy of science “fit” physics better doesn’t matter. What does matter is that the problems of 
biology didn’t lend themselves well to general philosophy of science accounts. 
In Joseph Rouse’s (1998) account, after the decline of logical positivism in the United States 
there was a shift towards historically-oriented philosophy of science and philosophies of the various 
sciences, rather than ahistorical logical reconstruction and an exclusive focus on physics. He states:  
The most widely noted lesson the postpositivist historicists drew from the failure of positivism 
was the importance of attending to the details of particular sciences. They took the positivist 
tradition to have developed theories of confirmation and explanation that were inconsistent 
with the actual historical development of the sciences. Their response was to insist that 
scientific methodology was ‘domain specific’ and/or interdependent with a field’s theoretical 
commitments. (73) 
Thus, claims Rouse, an important component of post-positivist philosophy of science was the 
development of philosophical investigations of specific scientific fields as an alternative to continuing 
the program of general philosophy of science. Philosophy of biology was probably the domain that 
experienced the greatest attention and growth. An interdisciplinary community, consisting of 
philosophers of biology, biologists, historians, and sociologists, sprang up and established its own 
dedicated conferences and journals separate from those for general philosophy of science. 
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 The development of philosophy of biology was not a complete rejection of the general 
philosophy of science project. Instead, it developed piecemeal: the study of biology uncovered aspects 
that conflicted with the story as told in general philosophy of science. Two other movements at the time 
lent further support to reevaluating the formal structure, rational reconstructions, and ahistoricity of 
positivist philosophy of science. The sociology of scientific knowledge looked at the social interactions 
and influences that went into the production of scientific knowledge (Pickering 1992; Knorr-Cetina 1983; 
Barnes, Bloor and Henry 1996). The other aspect of the turn to practice was the interest in experiment – 
what goes on in the “doing” of science – rather than the previous focus on scientific theories (Hacking 
1983; Franklin 1986; Franklin 1990; Mayo 1996).  
 The history of the development of philosophy of biology is relevant to the suggestion I make 
regarding moving away from nonspecific feminist philosophy of science to feminist philosophy of 
science that is specific to a science. Although feminist philosophy of science hasn’t focused on physics, it 
has developed abstractly – apart from any particular science. In order to assess it as an improved 
epistemology for, say, cognitive neuroscience, it needs to be connected to the science. Through 
engagement with a science, modifications can be made to the theory to make it more applicable to the 
details of the practice of that science.  
 
Feminist philosophy of science 
 At this point, I have demonstrated the gap between feminist theory and feminist practice of 
science and found Carla Fehr’s notion of “engagement” insufficient to bridge the gap. I have argued that 
a better notion of engagement involves tailoring feminist philosophy of science to a scientific discipline 
through the specifics of that discipline’s practice – its theories, methods, background assumptions, 
models, analyses, standards, history, and language. Finally, I have shown that a similar movement has 
occurred in philosophy of science. What I propose to do next is to evaluate the three main approaches 
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to feminist philosophy of science to see what they suggest for a feminist practice of science. I find that a 
hybrid of feminist empiricism and feminist standpoint theory (Intemann 2010) is best suited for 
changing scientific practice. I end with a brief survey of feminist concerns in different disciplines in 
science (archaeology, physics, primatology, social psychology, and sociology) to show how one is to go 
from the general theory, feminist standpoint empiricism, to a feminist philosophy and practice of a 
specific science. 
 In assessing approaches to feminist philosophy of science, I’m looking for what guidance they 
give to practicing scientists to carry out feminist science. As I have argued in the section above on the 
development of philosophy of biology, science is not a monolithic enterprise but consists of many 
disciplines with many overlapping and contradictory theories, models and assumptions and various 
practices, analyses, instruments, etc. Thus, discipline-specific feminist philosophies of science are 
needed in order to connect to the practice of science so that practicing scientists can see the relevance 
of the feminist critiques and make changes to their research programs. My thesis is that feminist 
epistemology has the tools to effect change at the level of scientific practice when it directly engages 
with the science.  
 Anderson (2011) identifies three approaches to feminist epistemology: feminist standpoint 
theory, feminist postmodernism, and feminist empiricism. Harding (1992/2004) characterizes three 
classes of feminist philosophy of science: feminist empiricism, philosophical feminist empiricism, and 
standpoint theory. I use Harding’s classification because feminist empiricism, philosophical feminist 
empiricism (specifically Helen Longino), and standpoint theory are the most well-developed approaches 
to feminist philosophy of science. Feminist postmodern-influenced epistemology is best understood as a 
privilege check on the mostly white, middle-class, Western feminist theorizing. It criticizes the 
essentializing of “woman” and a global sisterhood and instead promotes knowledge from particular, 
embodied knowers situated in the intersecting power structures of society. 
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Feminist empiricism 
Kourany (2010) and Harding (Harding 1992/2004) claim that the early feminist-influenced 
analysis of science bubbled up from women scientists themselves. This spontaneous view has come to 
be known as “feminist empiricism.” Feminist empiricists believe that science is a good method of 
investigation for getting at the truth about nature, but they also think that “bad” science has been 
infected with personal interests, such as sexist or racist bias. In this view, if we only do better science, 
control for and rule out human prejudices, science won’t be sexist and will produce better results 
(Leckenby 2007). Harding (1992/2004) characterizes feminist empiricism as the view that “sexism and 
androcentrism could be eliminated from the results of research if scientists would just follow more 
rigorously and carefully the existing methods and norms of research – which, for practicing scientists, 
are fundamentally empiricist ones” (41). A good case study of such an approach is Elisabeth Lloyd’s work 
on the evolution of the female orgasm (Lloyd 1995). She investigates the evidence for the various 
evolutionary theories explaining the female orgasm and finds it lacking: the research does not attain the 
normal standards of evolutionary explanations. In other words, by using the standards scientists uphold, 
she finds that the science supporting the various accounts of the evolution of the female orgasm fail to 
reach their own standards for good science. This strain of feminist empiricism was discussed above in 
connection with The Biology and Gender Study Group and Kerr. For Kerr’s women scientists and the 
Biology and Gender Study Group, bias is something that should be identified and eliminated. 
However, Anderson (2011) has suggested that feminist empiricists have moved away from the 
ideal of value-free science and now argue for the inclusion of feminist values in science – as opposed to 
the previous harmful or sexist values that have been included. Feminist science critics have argued for 
the epistemological worth of feminist values. Although not a feminist empiricist, Evelyn Fox Keller (1983) 
argues that caring, an aspect of femininity, was integral to the success of Barbara McClintock’s genetic 
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work. Accepting this more nuanced role for values in science puts feminist empiricists into a difficult 
position to defend: some biases, namely feminist values, are good, whereas some biases are bad, 
namely sexist and androcentric values.  
Other feminists, such as Carolyn Merchant (1980) and Sandra Harding (1986), have argued that 
the problem with science goes beyond assumptions underlying particular research programs but is 
inherent in science itself. For example, some scientific discourse unreflectively uses sexist metaphors 
regarding controlling nature and forcing nature to reveal her secrets, drawing connections to 
assumptions about women being coy and suggesting that a strong hand is needed to control them. In 
addition, they point out that the definitions of masculinity and science have been co-described and 
placed in opposition to the definition of the feminine.   
As Harding points out in her later book (Harding 1991), feminist empiricism isn’t bad. It’s a good 
starting point for discussing values and bias in science. However, as noted above, bias is inadequately 
theorized: how do you determine which bias is bad and which is good? One good aspect of feminist 
empiricism is that it is directed at scientific practice: it’s concerned with what makes for good or bad 
scientific practice. I’ll return to feminist empiricism later. 
 
Philosophical feminist empiricism 
Other approaches to feminist philosophy of science were more radical in critiquing the tenets of 
science itself. Helen Longino (1990; 2002), for instance, criticizes the notion of objectivity as a product of 
individual scientists. Instead, she locates the agent of objectivity in the scientific community: through 
the communal work of evaluating science the scientific community approaches objectivity by the degree 
to which its practices admit of diverse viewpoints, community standards, recognized avenues of 
criticism, and the incorporation of self-correcting practices. Thus, objectivity for Longino is by degree 
and is assessed at the level of the scientific community.  
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Longino identifies two types of values in science. Constitutive values come from an 
understanding of the goals of science. They deal with what constitutes acceptable scientific practice or 
scientific methods.  These “values” are epistemic or cognitive standards that prescribe “good” science. 
Contextual values are the personal, social and cultural values that reflect the social and cultural 
environment in which science is done. Contextual values include the “good” feminist values the later 
feminist empiricists supported as well as the “bad” sexist values of a sexist society. Traditional 
philosophy of science concerned itself with constitutive values only, and referred to contextual values 
only when the science was inferior. However, for Longino, contextual values cannot be separated from 
the science. The early feminist empiricists would reject such contextual values as biases. But for Longino, 
values are an important part of science that are used to influence scientific practices, research 
questions, descriptions of data, specific assumptions related to the research question at hand, and 
global assumptions related to the entire field of research. And just like scientists debate the results and 
standards of scientific investigation, contextual values brought in by members of the scientific 
community should be debated as well. 
Whereas the later feminist empiricists were put into the difficult position of arguing for the 
inclusion of feminist values rather than sexist values, Longino doesn’t prescribe at the outset which 
values are preferable. She leaves that up to the scientific community to decide – which may result in the 
creation of different sub-communities with different and opposing values and standards. And this is 
where her vision of a diverse scientific community is important. By opening up the scientific community 
to more than just the traditional practitioners, more diverse values are brought into the community. A 
diverse community thus makes it less likely that one set of values monopolizes the community and its 
standards. 
Longino’s account has been criticized for its feasibility (Kourany 2010). However, I will be 
assessing it for its ability to change scientific practice. With its focus on scientific communities, Longino 
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doesn’t address prescriptions for the practice of science. Her approach is not at the level of scientific 
labs and individual researchers but at the level of scientific communities. Thus, Longino does not tell 
scientists how to include feminist values in science. All she can do is argue that the scientific community 
recognize and consider those values when they do come up. In other words, Longino’s philosophy of 
science has to do with creating a more inclusive, diverse scientific community, which will in turn lead to 
a broader range of values in science.  
Although a diverse community may come to be more accepting of diverse values, my interest is 
in providing scientists with suggestions prompted by feminist theory that they can use to change their 
practice. But a suggestion targeting my preferred level of analysis, the level of scientific practice, is not 
incompatible with a Longino-style community-level change. In fact, they might actually be 
complementary. For example, Lloyd (1995) pairs a practice-level, feminist empiricist approach to 
uncover biases in evolutionary biology with community-level, Longino-style changes to rid it of harmful 
or limiting background assumptions. But for my interest in changing scientific practice, Longino’s view is 
insufficient: top-down allowances for diverse values do not provide explicit recommendations to be 
implemented in scientific practice. 
 
Feminist standpoint theory 
Sandra Harding (1991; 1986; 1992/2004) defends a standpoint epistemology that can be applied 
at the level of scientific practice. For Harding, history has been dominated by white, Eurocentric, male 
interests, ideals and accomplishments – all under the guise of unbiased, objective science. The scientist, 
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according to the conventional view, can step outside of his4 skin and be a pure, unbiased, objective 
observer. His observations are what any rational person would observe. However, the perfect rationality 
of the scientist is a myth, as demonstrated by a number of examples from the sciences and theoretical 
critiques from sociologists, historians and philosophers of science, feminists and critical race theorists. 
Science is not unbiased and objective; it is a product of fallible humans. Worse, it is a product of only a 
portion of humans: namely white, Eurocentric, middle class, males. As such, the assumptions, 
techniques, research questions and interpretations are likely exclusive and racist, classist, and sexist.  
Her suggestion is to reconceive the starting point for knowledge-production processes. Instead 
of the starting from the impossible “view from nowhere,” which is the conventional view, Harding 
suggests that we start inquiry from the lives of women. She argues that starting from the lives of women 
will function to eliminate the institutionalized oppression that the conventional system has put in place, 
as well as lead to new avenues of investigation overlooked by the conventional system. A feminist 
science, then, starts inquiry from the point of view of the lives of women. Men can be blind to their 
position of privilege, and as a result they create a science that gives a partial and distorted picture of 
reality. Women can have a different standpoint, one that has developed through an awareness of their 
oppression. Their standpoint encompasses the male standpoint, because they must survive in a 
patriarchal world as well as in their position of oppression. Thus, the view from the lives of women is a 
less partial and distorted view of the world. Objectivity cannot be granted to the male perspective, since 
                                                          
4 It’s almost always a male scientist under the conventional account. Regardless, gender doesn’t matter 
because the scientist is not bound by his or her body or socio-cultural situation since the scientist 
transcends them. The scientific mindset is one of pure, objective reason. 
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it is so narrow. Women’s viewpoint better approaches objectivity. Harding (1992/2004) calls this new 
characterization of objectivity “strong objectivity.” 
Harding’s early work was criticized for gender essentialism – claiming that a woman’s special 
viewpoint comes from her being a woman (Kerr 1998). In her later work, she more clearly articulates the 
social grounding of her position, as opposed to the essentialism she was first interpreted as having. 
However, she still sees the patriarchy as grounding women as the starting point for inquiry, though she 
incorporates viewpoints of many non-white, non-Western women and argues for the importance of 
multiple women’s standpoints, depending on the issues, for a more complete picture of reality. A 
criticism with prioritizing the gender dimension is that there could be situations in which other 
standpoints (Latino rather than Latina, queer) are in the most oppressed position of interlocking power 
structures. Because standpoint theory provides an alternate epistemological framework for the practice 
of science, standpoint theory could serve my interest in creating a feminist practice of science – if, that 
is, it can overcome the essentialist critique and fully embrace the social structure of society as the 
determinant of the best viewpoint for initiating inquiry, instead of insisting on the standpoint of women 
to the exclusion of other standpoints.  
What a standpoint provides is a new starting point for inquiry with different considerations 
about how the world is compared with the traditional, supposedly objective stance. This provides 
opportunities for new questions to be asked, the development of different methods for investigation, 
and different assumptions. Starting from the lives of the oppressed and/or neglected is something that 
scientists can (theoretically) do when they think about research programs, research questions, designing 
experiments, and considering the implications of their research. Thus, feminist standpoint theory is 
something that can be implemented at the level of scientific practice, thereby benefiting over Longino’s 
community-level approach. Additionally, it radically reconceives the starting point for knowledge 
production. Its epistemological foundation unseats the idealization of the traditional objective knower. 
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A hybrid theory: feminist standpoint empiricism 
To recap the main shortcomings of applying feminist philosophy of science to scientific practice, 
early feminist empiricism is untenable because of its attempt to remove values from science, later 
feminist empiricism requires a defense of good, feminist values over bad, sexist values, and Longino’s 
project is at the wrong level for my interest for changing science at the level of practice. That leaves 
feminist standpoint theory. It operates at the right level for my interest – scientific practice.  
Kristen Intemann (2010) has argued for a feminist standpoint empiricism that combines the 
strengths of both feminist empiricism and feminist standpoint theory. What this view gains from 
feminist empiricism is empiricist criteria for theory choice. According to empiricism, scientific 
justification comes through sense experience, primarily observation and experiment. In addition, 
theories are assessed on two grounds: 1) they must be empirically successful and 2) they must satisfy 
cognitive values of theory choice better than alternative competing theories. Theory choice in science is 
problematic because of the problem of underdetermination. Multiple theories can be constructed that 
explain all the scientific evidence. In such cases, cognitive values enter into the consideration of which 
theory is preferred. Such values, such as simplicity, explanatory power, consistency, and fruitfulness, are 
used to argue for one theory over another. 
Empiricist criteria for theory choice explain science’s past successes that were guided by such 
standards (empirical success and meeting cognitive values). Specifically in connection with standpoint 
theory, empiricist criteria provide an explanation for past successful science that is not grounded in the 
feminist standpoint. It also provides a common ground for feminists to engage in discussions with 
scientists. Intemann explains: “Feminist philosophy of science has a better chance of gaining proponents 
when it can point out that considerations accepted by traditional empiricists better justify feminist 
alternatives” (219). 
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More importantly, adopting empiricist standards for theory choice is needed for individuals with 
different experiences to discuss and evaluate those experiences in order to develop a standpoint. As 
Intemann notes: “members of a standpoint must have some shared cognitive values, otherwise they will 
be unable to engage in critical discussions about their experiences or arrive at the kind of joint reflective 
consciousness that a standpoint requires” (219) and “There must be some shared standards for what 
counts as reason or evidence” (219). Of course, the cognitive values taken to be important within a 
community are themselves open for debate and consideration – and feminists have worked to expand 
the pool by lauding complexity over simplicity, for example. What standpoint feminism lacks is an 
explicit acknowledgment of shared standards in order to shape a standpoint, which Intemann shows 
could be gained through feminist empiricism’s view of theory justification. 
From standpoint feminism, the combined view gains the theoretical grounding necessary to 
justify the inclusion of feminist values over other values, resolving what Anderson (2011) calls the 
paradox of bias. It accomplishes this by lauding diversity of social locations or experiences rather than 
diversity of values and interests. Diversity of values means that racist and sexist bias is just as important 
as non-racist and feminist bias. Feminist empiricism has no way of championing some values over 
others. Feminist standpoint theory, however, links values to the experiences of bodies and social 
locations. Depending on the research question, some types of standpoints, and the values that are 
drawn out from them, are better than others. For example, taking a feminist standpoint to understand 
intimate partner violence will not be as sensitive to racial differences between women’s experiences as 
taking a black feminist standpoint would be (Crenshaw 2008). In this case, a black feminist standpoint 
admits scrutiny of multiple intersecting social dimensions rather than just gender. 
Finally, the combined view can benefit from feminist standpoint theory on the issue of “studying 
up,” which Intemann describes as a commitment to starting “from the lives and experiences of 
oppressed groups when such groups are affected by the research” (217), which involves “examining 
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power relations, institutions, policies, and technologies that perpetuate oppression from the perspective 
of the oppressed” (215). Feminist empiricism is consistent with abolishing oppression or supporting 
egalitarian aims, but does not explicate how this is to be done. Intemann suggests that feminist 
empiricists explicitly endorse the standpoint method of “studying up,” which functions to fulfill the 
political goal of feminist empiricism. 
Feminist standpoint empiricism avoids the postmodernist critique of essentializing “woman” 
and Harding’s insistence on starting from the lives of women by looking to social structure to determine 
the best standpoint for initiating inquiry. For each question, different social structures are more 
relevant, and different questions may necessitate different standpoints for the starting place of 
knowledge production. 
However, how is one to do science as a feminist standpoint empiricist? How does one start 
inquiry from the lives of the oppressed? Harding and Intemann and others have provided arguments for 
the epistemological legitimacy of standpoint approaches, but have not articulated how to translate their 
approach to scientific practice. They argue for the feminist standpoint as a less distorted epistemology, 
but they give no guidance as to how to implement their views. They don’t explain how to start from the 
lives of women to design an experiment on aggression, for example, or the effect of caffeine intake on 
cognitive performance, or the connection between stress levels and productivity in the workplace. More 
specifically for my interests on the neuroimaging of sex differences, Harding and Intemann don’t 
translate how starting from the lives of women affects the way we understand the different social 
rearing experiences of boys and girls, how socialization affects brain development, how cognitive tasks 
are labeled masculine or feminine, how stimuli chosen for testing are androcentric or sexist, how sexist 
theories are upheld despite scientific evidence against them. 
The concern is that standpoint theory, as articulated by Harding and Intemann, is nonspecific. As 
it stands, it is not in a format scientists can use. It is too underspecified for scientists to see how to apply 
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it to their disciplines. It is my view that in order for feminist standpoint theory to have a positive impact 
on the science, an expert in a given scientific discipline needs to apply it to the specific practices of that 
discipline. As I have demonstrated above, general philosophy of science fails to connect with the 
specifics of a given scientific discipline, prompting the move to philosophy of a specific science. 
Therefore, in order for feminist philosophy of science to meet its goal of eliminating androcentric and 
sexist science, it must engage with the particular practices of a particular science. Applying a feminist 
philosophy of science to the specific methods, models, goals, standards, assumptions and interests of a 
given science will more effectively identify problematic science and practices for scientists to consider. 
To be more applicable to practitioners of science, feminist philosophy of science must state its criticisms 
and suggestions in a way that scientists can appreciate. This means knowing the practice of a given 
scientific discipline. 
 
Feminist science 
In this section, I review some feminist accounts of science for two purposes: 1) to demonstrate 
that a pretheoretic notion of feminist standpoint theory underpinned the feminist approaches; and 2) to 
identify some of the elements involved in translating feminist standpoint theory to a particular science. 
The accounts I consider are Nancy Chodorow’s (1989) work in feminist social psychology, Londa 
Schiebinger’s (1999) account of the feminist influence on primatology, two accounts of feminist 
archaeology (Wylie 2001; Conkey and Gero 1997), an analysis of the masculine nature of science and 
physics (Keller 1977/2002; Merchant 1980; Easlea 2002), and Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw’s (1991/2008) 
intersectional sociological analysis of domestic violence. My investigation uncovers four elements that 
serve as a starting point to tailor feminist standpoint empiricism to a particular science. 
First, one must identify what the specific discipline, subdiscipline or research community has 
focused on and what has been neglected and how the science relates to systems of oppression. This has 
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to do with the content of the science. For example, Chodorow (1989) worked on a feminist social 
psychology after seeing a lack of discussion of the role of mothering and the mother-daughter 
relationship in traditional theory. Traditional psychoanalysis, psychology, and social psychology focused 
on the role of the male and the relationship of the female with the male. Chodorow takes the point of 
view of the woman and the child rather than the man and the role of home life rather than social and 
vocational life. Instead of focusing on the mother-son relationship, Chodorow focuses on the neglected 
mother-daughter relationship. Her theories situate the mother at the center. This is an example of re-
centering the focus of the theory away from the traditional androcentric bias. To put this in terms of 
feminist standpoint theory, Chodorow started from the oppressed or neglected viewpoint, in this case, 
women’s lives, to ground a new perspective that creates women-oriented theory as well as uncovering 
problems within traditional psychoanalytic-influenced theory in social psychology. 
Primatology is radically different from psychoanalysis in terms of subject matter and procedure. 
According to Schiebinger (1999), primatology is a field that has been impacted by feminism and a 
growing number of female primatologists. She states: “While few female primatologists call themselves 
feminists, most do not deny that much of their scholarship has been motivated by feminist concerns” 
(127). Early primatology (1950s-1970s) focused on baboons. The observed social structure was 
dominant males, females and juveniles, and peripheral males. “Primate society” was structured around 
male-male competition. As Schiebinger notes, what scientists choose to focus on determines the results 
of their studies. Because the focus was on the males, the “society” observed was seen as aggressive and 
male-dominant. It wasn’t until the 1960s that primatologists began paying attention to female 
nonhuman primates. As Schiebinger explains: 
Seeing the primate world ‘from the female monkey’s point of view’ (as the Berkeley zoologist 
Thelma Rowell has put it) called into question many fundamental assumptions about the 
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primate world. Primatologists questioned stereotypes of male aggression, dominance and 
alliance, and female compliance. (131) 
Thus, women in the field noticed a lack of theory on the role of females within non-human primate 
troops. At a time when the focus in primatology was on dominance hierarchies and aggression in male 
baboons, these women started investigating female and adolescent non-human primate behavior, 
telling a much more complex story of non-human primate relationships and culture. They did this by 
taking the point of view of the neglected females, which is what is proposed in feminist standpoint 
theory. 
 Wylie’s (2001) discussion of the development of gendered research in archaeology includes 
survey data from scientists and a review of the literature. She notes that one of the major changes due 
to gender analysis has been countering erasure, since too much emphasis has been placed on the male 
(elite) hunter. Her suggestion is to look for the missing woman. In standpoint theory terms, this consists 
of thinking what the life of the woman was like, rather than focusing on what the life of the man was 
like. 
 Across the three disciplines (social psychology, primatology and archaeology) what has been 
focused on is the role of males within society or the world of the male. What has been neglected is the 
role of females within society or the world of the female. Considering social power structures, the 
woman is oppressed and the female perspective is neglected in the three disciplines I discussed above. 
However, not all analyses of the content of the science and social oppression will draw out women’s 
perspective as neglected or oppressed. For example, in some cases, race, socioeconomic class, disability, 
age, or sexual orientation may be what has been neglected or oppressed. For both brevity and relevance 
with my interest in sex or gender differences, I have focused on the dimension of gender. 
 The second element is to be familiar with the specifics of the discipline in order to both 
understand the science and to communicate effectively with the scientists. This includes the discipline’s 
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instruments, methods, standards, assumptions, analyses, models, theories, history, and language. In the 
brief descriptions of social psychology and primatology above, widely different methods, standards, 
assumptions, instruments, analyses, models, and theories are used in the two disciplines. Social 
psychology’s study of self-identity through object relations theory and of the dynamics of public life as 
opposed to private life in humans is different from primatology’s study of the wild, dangerous, savage 
world of nonhuman primates trying to survive in nature. Wylie makes the point for archaeology in 
regards to countering unexamined stereotypes regarding the proper roles of men and women. She 
states:  
Whatever the subject or scale of analysis, the default assumption often seems to be that gender 
conventions familiar from contemporary (white, middle-class, Western) contexts can be 
projected onto the cultural past as if they were in some sense “natural,” a stable, universal 
substrate of social, cultural life. (32) 
The background theory or assumption is that white, middle-class, Western roles are stable, natural 
gender roles. Familiarity with the field involves knowing the implicit assumptions and background 
theories in order to identify them for analysis. 
Wylie also noted that the development of gender-conscious threads within archaeology 
involved the development of alternate methods, strategies and theories to broaden the archeological 
toolkit. For example, analyzing the “little pieces” from archeological sites – bone shards, fabrics, and the 
like – have been overlooked by male-realm fixation and offers new resources for archaeological theory 
in general and the life of women in particular. In primatology, for example, Jeanne Altmann introduced a 
new method for observing animal behavior that shifted focus from the high-drama behavior that often 
involved males to the low-drama, more common behavior that was more representative of all members 
of the group. The method is focal animal sampling, which involves attending to the behavior of one 
individual or group for a set time period (Fehr 2012). In both archaeology and primatology, one has to 
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be familiar with the methods used in order to identify where the methods fall short – what they’re 
missing. Abstract theoretical critiques may be less understandable to the scientists than being able to 
point to specific methodological failures. Such targeted criticism will aid in communicating with 
scientists. 
 Being familiar with the discipline’s methods, standards, assumptions, background theories, 
history, and language is necessary to understand how the science is done, what is assumed, and what is 
controlled for. The history is important because it shows where the research question came from and 
how it was framed. Often, scientists merely take for granted a certain scientific result, instrument, or 
method in order to produce new research. However, over time, the context of that result, instrument or 
method may be forgotten, resulting in its being misused or mischaracterized. 
Finally, understanding the language is important for communicating with the scientists as well as 
providing another aspect worth analyzing. For example, scientists’ use of terms such as sex, gender, 
nature, biology, etc., may be inconsistent, incorrect, or reveal causal assumptions (Gentile 1993). 
Rebecca Jordan-Young (2010) has pointed out that the terms used in animal sexuality are different from 
the terms used in human sexuality. For rodents, for example, a male that mounts another male is not 
thought of as “homosexual” – the mounted rodent is. As a matter of fact, the mounting rodent is 
thought of as extra masculine. However, in human cases, both males are considered “homosexual,” and 
neither is considered extra masculine.  
What this second element indicates, for translating feminist philosophy of science to a specific 
discipline, is that it will be different for each discipline depending on the specifics of the practice, the 
discipline’s language, and its history. 
 The third element is to identify the culture of the science: are there unquestioned norms within 
the community that make women and minorities feel unwelcome and bar their success? For example, 
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Brian Easlea (2002) and Evelyn Fox Keller (1977/2002) have argued that the culture of physics is 
masculine and unfriendly to women. Easlea states: 
Physicists often refer to their “pure” research as a kind of sexual exploration of the secrets of 
nature – a female nature that not only possesses great subtlety and beauty to be revealed only 
to her most skillful and determined admirers and lovers, but that is truly fearsome in her 
awesome powers. (104) 
A more graphic characterization Easlea presents of science in general is: 
It is striking how successful scientific research is frequently described in the language of sexual 
intercourse, birth, and claims to paternity in which science or the mind of man is ascribed the 
phallic role of penetrating or probing into the secrets of nature – with the supposed hardness of 
successful scientific method now acquiring an obvious phallic connotation. (105) 
Carolyn Merchant (1980) also identifies misogynistic language and metaphors in the history of Western 
science; Francis Bacon’s characterization of scientific investigation as rape is an infamous example. Such 
misogynistic sexual imagery creates an environment that is closed to women’s equal participation. From 
a feminist standpoint, the culture of such sciences is unfriendly and unwelcome to women. Some 
sciences have been more open for women’s full participation, but the “hardest” sciences, such as 
mathematics and physics remain predominately male. 
 The fourth element to begin to tailor feminist standpoint empiricism to a particular science has 
two steps. First one must identify if the research is disadvantaging others. Second, one must include the 
perspective of those most affected by the research in order for the science to be a liberatory project 
rather than an oppressive one. This is the notion of “studying up” Intemann (2010) discussed above. 
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw’s (1991/2008) research on violence against women of color is an example. 
Crenshaw’s approach, identified as intersectional, addresses how the intersection of racism and sexism 
results in a qualitatively different experience of racism for women of color than men of color and of 
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sexism for women of color than women who are white. Because of the intersection of systems of 
oppression, the understanding of domestic violence for white women does not extend to the 
experiences of women of color. A better approach for understanding domestic violence and helping 
those affected by it has to start from the experiences of women of color. A research project that ignores 
the intersectional effects of racism and sexism may reinforce stereotypes. From Crenshaw’s example 
above, an intersectional analysis undercuts the stereotype that men of color are prone to aggression 
and violence. 
 Thus, the four elements are as follows. First, one must identify what the specific discipline, 
subdiscipline or research community has focused on and what has been neglected and how the science 
relates to systems of oppression. This has to do with the content of the science. Second, one must be 
familiar with the specifics of the discipline in order to both understand the science and to communicate 
effectively with the scientists. This includes the discipline’s instruments, methods, standards, 
assumptions, analyses, models, theories, history, and language. This element has to do with the 
heterogeneous nature of science and the difficulties in applying a general theory to the diverse practices 
of science. Third, one must identify what the culture of the science is: are there unquestioned norms 
within the community that make women and minorities feel unwelcome and bar their success? Fourth, 
one must adopt a method of “studying up” in order for the science to be a liberatory project rather than 
an oppressive one. These four points are intended as a first step for tailoring feminist standpoint theory 
to a given science. Since the content, methods, history, language, culture, and implications differ across 
scientific disciplines, the way that a feminist standpoint of a given science is developed and articulated 
will differ as well. Making concrete connections from feminist theory to the specifics of the practice will 
make the theory more relevant to practicing scientists. 
 Finally, I wish to point out that a pretheoretic notion of feminist standpoint theory motivated 
feminist strands within science. Chodorow (1989) saw a lack of theory on women’s lives and experiences 
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in social psychology. The quote from Schiebinger (1999) regarding seeing the primate world ‘from the 
female monkey’s point of view’ is essentially what feminist standpoint theory advocates. Wylie (2001) 
notes the trend in archaeology to look for the missing woman, which involves thinking about what the 
lives of the women were like. Such cases demonstrate that a naïve feminist standpoint theory is already 
being used to instigate feminist science. Although they may not have known it, they were engaging in 
the type of investigation that is supported by feminist standpoint theory. Thus, feminist standpoint 
theory has already shown its ability to improve the practice of science by practicing scientists. In other 
words, it is something that scientists can appreciate and apply to their practice. The next step is making 
it available to them as a resource by tailoring it to the specifics of their discipline. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have characterized the gap between feminist theory and feminist practice of 
science. I have argued for a notion of engagement in which feminist philosophy of science is tailored to a 
scientific discipline through the specifics of that discipline’s practice – its theories, methods, background 
assumptions, models, analyses, standards, history, and language. I have compared this suggestion to the 
similar trend that has occurred in philosophy of science through the specific field of philosophy of 
biology. Through assessing the main approaches to feminist philosophy of science, I have argued for 
feminist standpoint empiricism (Intemann 2010) as the one best suited for changing scientific practice. 
Finally, through surveying feminist concerns in different disciplines in science, I articulate 4 elements 
that must be considered in order to translate the general theory, feminist standpoint empiricism, to a 
feminist philosophy and practice of a specific science.  
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Chapter 2 
Background and methodology 
 
Introduction 
In the first chapter, I argued for the need to tailor feminist philosophy of science to the specifics 
of a discipline of science in order to make it more relevant to practicing scientists. This goal is driven by 
the interest in feminist epistemology to change the practice of science. I argued for feminist standpoint 
empiricism as the best feminist approach to philosophy of science given my interest in providing a 
philosophy of science oriented toward researchers – an approach to science that they can implement in 
their research. Connecting theory and practice, I argued, involves an understanding of the discipline’s 
content, specific practices and history, culture, and the implementation of the method of “studying up.” 
Thus, in order to connect feminist standpoint empiricism with a specific discipline of science, one needs 
to be familiar with the questions the discipline has focused on (and neglected), its specific practices and 
history, its culture, and what groups hold the power and what groups are oppressed by the discipline. I 
will be applying this strategy to the field of cognitive neuroscience through an investigation of two case 
studies in the neuroimaging of sex or gender differences. 
I chose cognitive neuroscience and the specific tool of cognitive neuroimaging because I have a 
background in cognitive neuroimaging: I worked as a research assistant in a cognitive neuroimaging lab. 
Thus, I am already familiar with the instruments, analyses and protocols of Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(MRI) and functional MRI (fMRI). I chose the research question of sex and gender differences because of 
my interest as a feminist to critically interrogate science that has been used to oppress women. In 
addition, there is a rising interest in sexist neuroscience and cognitive science and its implications 
(DesAutels 2010; DesAutels 2015; Bluhm, Jacobson, and Maibom 2012; Bluhm 2013a; Bluhm 2013b; 
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Bluhm 2015; Fine 2010; Jordan-Young 2010; Fausto-Sterling 2000). Thus, feminist neuroethics or 
neurofeminism is an important, growing topic. 
This chapter functions as an introduction to cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neuroimaging 
using magnetic resonance imaging and the underlying view of sex/gender differences in cognitive 
neuroscience. I lay out the methodology I employ for constructing the two case studies and I introduce 
and explain the relevance of them. I also briefly review the social and ethical concerns related to 
research on sex/gender differences. 
 
Cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neuroimaging 
 Cognitive neuroscience is the study of the neural mechanisms of cognition through an 
interdisciplinary approach that calls upon the fields of psychology, linguistics, molecular and cellular 
neuroscience, and computation. As a field, it falls within the umbrella of cognitive science. Cognitive 
neuroscience is most interested in human cognition but it uses animal models and studies animal 
cognition in the service of accounting for human cognition. It uses animals for invasive research ethically 
unsuitable for humans and for understanding the evolutionary basis of cognition. Cognitive 
neuroscience employs a number of research tools, including electophysiological recordings of single 
neurons or multiple neurons in vivo, electroencephalograms (EEG), magnetoencephalography (MEG), 
Positron Emission Tomography (PET), Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and functional MRI (fMRI), 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), and Transcranial Direct-Current Stimulation (tDCS). These 
tools measure or manipulate electrical activity and blood flow, which are different measures of brain 
activity and structure. 
I will be focusing on MRI and fMRI. Magnetic resonance imaging uses magnetic pulses and the 
magnetic characteristic of water to construct three-dimensional images. Although MRI is used for a 
number of medical imaging purposes, focusing on its use in brain research, different tissues and 
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structures in the brain have different densities of water and behave differently when disturbed by 
magnetic currents. The different structures give different signals, which are constructed into a three-
dimensional image. MRI is used to investigate brain structure. Examples include the development of the 
brain across ages or differences between two groups, such as individuals with autism compared with 
non-autistic individuals. The corpus callosum case study is a case of structural MRI being used to 
investigate sex or gender differences in a specific area of the brain. 
Functional MRI (fMRI) is a technique that measures blood flow in the brain. Since MRI detects 
the magnetic properties of water, functional MRI makes use of the difference between the ways that 
oxygenated and deoxygenated blood behave in the presence of magnetic currents. The theory behind 
functional MRI is that an area of the brain that is more active requires more blood flow to sustain its 
activity than an area of the brain that is less active. Thus, areas of high blood flow are thought to be 
involved in the cognitive task the participant is doing. This measure is called the BOLD (blood-oxygen-
level dependent) signal.  
fMRI is used to study which areas of the brain are active on a given task, such as understanding 
metaphors versus literal statements or making moral decisions versus non-moral decisions. Thus, an 
important aspect of fMRI is the development of an experimental task and a control task. Although some 
groups assess what the brain is doing for a cognitive task compared with no task (a rest condition), most 
of the time, researchers are interested in a specific aspect of processing, such as the processing 
associated with understanding metaphoric language. In this case, a non-metaphorical reading task is 
used to control for brain areas involved in reading (language comprehension, stimulus processing and 
encoding). The areas of the brain that continue to be active in the metaphorical condition, once the 
activation in the literal control condition is ruled out, is thought to be involved in the understanding of 
metaphors. This procedure is called the subtraction method. An experimental task is created that differs 
on one theoretical aspect from a control task. Activation during the control task is subtracted from 
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activation during the experimental task, leaving only activation that is supposedly involved in the 
theoretical aspect under investigation. Subtraction comparisons are symbolized as “experiment-control” 
or “experiment > control.” 
fMRI has also been employed in the study of group differences, such as children who are good 
readers compared with children who are poor readers or the neural responses to food stimuli by obese 
individuals compared with individuals of a healthy weight. The subtraction method is again employed as 
the most common method to compare two groups. Once the control task activation is subtracted from 
the experimental task activation for each of the groups, the two groups are subtracted from each other. 
In long form, and using the example of women and men, this amounts to women (experiment > control) 
> men (experiment > control), signifying areas that women activated more than men, and men 
(experiment > control) > women (experiment > control), signifying areas that men activated more than 
women. The shorthand women > men and men > women is commonly employed. The mental rotation 
case study is a case of functional MRI being used to investigate sex or gender differences on the mental 
rotation cognitive task. 
In analyzing data from an experiment using fMRI, there are often two types of data: behavioral 
and activation or functional data. Behavioral data is collected from the cognitive task, such as accuracy 
or reaction time. For the mental rotation case, both accuracy and reaction time were usually reported. 
Activation or functional data is what is collected by the MRI scanner. 
Activation data is in the format of a matrix of numbers signifying voxel intensity. A voxel, 
standing for volume element, is a 3-dimensional pixel. Data from a participant is often co-registered 
onto that participant’s structural image to align the data. It is spatially and temporally smoothed in 
order to eliminate noise (most often head movement) and to control for the fact that different brain 
slices are imaged at different seconds. Once individual processing has occurred, group data are averaged 
and projected onto a standard brain, meaning that averaged group data are morphed to fit onto a 
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standard brain, usually one of the Montreal Neurological Institute’s (MNI) standard brains, a composite 
of many brains, which is included in the most common neuroimaging analysis software, SPM99. 
Additionally, areas of significant activation are reported using coordinates from a different standard 
brain, the Talairach atlas, based on a single human brain dissection. Beyond that, to compare groups, 
the data from the two groups are compared. 
Beyond the details of how MRI works, there are a number of behind-the-scene details that are 
either not reported in the literature or are only briefly mentioned. I will briefly overview the general 
neuroimaging procedure. Once a participant volunteers for a study, they are pre-screened based on 
various exclusion criteria, including claustrophobia, metal in the body, psychiatric diagnosis, left-
handedness,1 and body size (larger individuals may not fit inside the scanner). They are introduced to 
the behavioral tasks by an experimenter. Then the participant enters the scanner with the aid and 
supervision of an MRI technologist. Different methods are employed to minimize participant movement 
during the scan, but usually padding around the head is used. A few preliminary structural scans occur in 
order for researchers to position the pre-set brain slice parameters. The researchers may include 
additional structural scans for a more complete, higher resolution image of the whole brain. Then the 
functional scan occurs along with the presentation of the behavioral task (if it is an fMRI experiment). 
The functional pulse sequence is meant to identify areas of high blood flow. Most of the time, 
participant responses during the functional scan are recorded for behavioral analysis of accuracy and 
reaction time. Occasionally, a magnetic resonance scanner or research team does not have the 
equipment to collect behavioral data during the scan, so behavioral data is collected before or after the 
                                                          
1 Non-right-handed individuals may have different overall patterns of brain organization. This will be 
discussed more in the next section. 
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scan. A problem with this method is that if behavioral data is not collected during the scan, there is no 
way to verify if the participant were completing the task as instructed. After the scan, the participant 
may be invited to participate in a debriefing session to assess issues such as equipment malfunction, 
misunderstanding instructions, payment, or other issues related to the experiment. 
Following the scan, behavioral and activation data (if collected) and structural data are 
processed at the individual level and then combined with the group. 
 
Introduction to sex or gender differences in the brain 
 A major assumption for research into brain structure and function is that humans are 
structurally and functionally asymmetrical, meaning that some cognitive tasks are predominately 
processed in one of the two cerebral hemispheres and there is a structural difference between them. 
Specifically, for most right-handed individuals, language is mainly processed in the left hemisphere. 
Thus, language is functionally asymmetric, or left lateralized. Visuospatial processing was once thought 
to be right-lateralized, though as I discuss in chapter 4, this view may be in question. I prefer the term 
“lateralization hypothesis” to refer to the view that the normal human brain is structurally and 
functionally asymmetrical.  
 Note, however, that though this hypothesis is supposed to cover normal human brain structure 
and function, it is actually only the result of study on right-handed individuals. Non-right-handed 
individuals are less likely to have normally lateralized brains – often, their lateralization is the opposite 
of right-handers or are much less strongly lateralized (more bilateral) (Bryden 1982). 
However, early research on stroke and aphasia (language disruption) revealed a possible sex or 
gender difference in language recovery: women were often less disabled or recovered more quickly 
after strokes (McGlone 1980). This is one piece of evidence that contributed to the hypothesis that there 
are sex or gender differences in brain structure and function. Since women displayed less language loss 
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after stroke compared with men or recovered language functions after stroke faster than men did, 
women were thought to be less lateralized for language; in other words, women are less asymmetric, or 
more bilateral, in function. The main hypothesis driving research investigating sex or gender differences 
in the brain is the hypothesis that women are less lateralized or less asymmetric in structure and 
function than men. In other words, women are less typical in brain structure and function, because they 
are more symmetrical than men. The standard pattern is that of men, and women deviate from this 
standard.2 I call this the gendered lateralization hypothesis. 
 McGlone (1980) is a highly cited review article that is thought to establish differences in 
asymmetry between men and women. In her words: 
Functional brain asymmetry refers to the idea that, for most individuals, the left cerebral 
hemisphere is specialized for language function as well as for the execution of learned manual 
activities. By comparison, the right cerebral hemisphere is less involved in subserving speech 
functions but more critical than the left hemisphere for the perception, construction, and recall 
of stimuli that are difficult to verbalize. (215, references removed) 
Prior to this article, many had thought that the evidence suggested that males are better than females 
on visuospatial tasks, a so-called “right hemisphere” activity and that females are better than males on 
some language tasks, such as speed of articulation, fluency and grammar, but not verbal reasoning, 
which are thought of as “left hemisphere” activities. McGlone’s review suggests that there is some 
support for the view that males and females differ in the cerebral lateralization of verbal and spatial 
                                                          
2 Again, note that standard brain structure and function is defined as that of right-handed men. Women 
and non-right-handed men are atypical. 
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functions. “Most reviewers,” according to McGlone, believe that the male brain is more asymmetrical 
than the female brain for verbal functions, spatial functions, or both. 
 Although McGlone cautiously asserts that men may demonstrate more functional asymmetry, 
specifically for language tasks but possibly for spatial tasks as well. As she notes, her assertion does not 
imply that women show more bilateral activity nor does it mean that women show the opposite pattern 
of lateralization. It could mean that women are just more heterogeneous as a group. However, despite 
the cautious tone in McGlone’s review, it is now taken as fact that women are more functionally 
symmetric than men. Here are some examples.  
Bleier et al. (1986) state: “The dominant theory holds that males process visuospatial 
information predominately with the right hemisphere, and are thus said to be more lateralized, while 
females use both hemispheres, and are said to be less lateralized or more symmetrical than males” 
(391).  Davatzikos and Resnick (1998) state: “Evidence from several sources suggests that men have 
greater hemispheric specialization for both verbal and nonverbal abilities and that women are more 
likely to have bilateral representation of function” (635). One of the three sources Davatzkios and 
Resnick cite is McGlone (1980). Halari et al. (2006) suggest that behavioral differences on the mental 
rotation task and on verbal fluency tasks “relate to differences in brain lateralization, with men 
performing better than women on certain spatial tasks due to their greater lateralization for these tasks 
in the right hemisphere, and women performing better than men on some verbal tasks (verbal fluency) 
because those functions are bilaterally represented in the brain” (1). Again, of the two references cited 
for this hypothesis, McGlone (1980) is one. Thomsen et al. (2000) state that men’s performance 
advantage on mental rotation tasks “has been explained with reference to differences between the 
sexes in hemisphere functioning, with males performing better than females on typical right hemisphere 
processing tasks, or that females have a bilateral hemispheric representation for visuo-spatial 
processing” (1187). Witelson (1989) states that “many studies have indicated that females have greater 
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bilateral representation of cognitive functions” (800), although she notes that “some results are 
inconsistent” (800), citing one study. Witelson (1991) states: “In general, male subjects show greater 
functional asymmetry than female subjects” (134). 
Although some other articles are cited in support of the gendered lateralization hypothesis, 
McGlone (1980) is often cited as demonstrating the gendered lateralization hypothesis rather than as 
offering the gendered lateralization hypothesis. In other words, continuous re-citing of McGlone has 
turned the hypothesis from speculation into scientific fact – whether because of repetition or because 
younger generations fail to read the article or understand it within its historical context. 
 McGlone’s article was published along with commentaries from a number of authors. Reviews 
were mixed. Important for my purposes is that a number of commenters pointed out that social and 
environmental influences – rather than biological sex – may moderate the observed differences. For 
example, Kinsbourne (1980) writes: “It is surprising, in view of current intense research interest in the 
effects of sex stereotyping, that McGlone does not even mention the possibility that the outcomes of 
perceptual asymmetry studies could reflect such environmental, rather than brain-based, variation” 
(242). He continues: 
The study of sex differences is not like the rest of psychology. Under pressure from the 
gathering momentum of feminism, and perhaps in backlash to it, many investigators seem 
determined to discover that men and women “really” are different. It seems that if sex 
differences (e.g. in lateralization) do not exist, then they have to be invented. (242) 
Kinsbourne here hints at what I am calling sex essentialism, sometimes referred to as genetic 
essentialism. Sex essentialism is the view that there are two sexes, with separate essences, that are 
distinct. The assumption that Kinsbourne attributes to some researchers is that men and women 
“really” are different, meaning that men and women have separate, distinct, sex-differentiated 
essences. Such researchers think that biological traces of those essences can be uncovered, or, in 
48 
 
Kinsbourne’s more pessimistic sentiment, that those essences are being invented by biased researchers. 
Note that there are two ways that research can cause problems: by ignoring sex/gender differences that 
may exist and by overemphasizing sex/gender differences that may or may not exist. 
 The differential lateralization hypothesis, or gendered lateralization hypothesis, which is that 
women are less functionally asymmetric than men, is the main assumption underlying the two case 
studies I use. However, it is important to note that McGlone’s review used primarily right-handed 
individuals. Thus, the lateralization hypothesis is based on right-handers. Left-handed individuals may 
have opposite patterns of lateralization or may be more bilateral in function. Indeed, this becomes 
relevant in the corpus callosum case study. As is standard for functional neuroimaging, only right-
handed individuals are usually included in studies of normal cognition in order to rule out left-handers’ 
possibly abnormal lateralization. As such, the mental rotation chapter is almost exclusively comprised of 
right-handed participants. Immediately, a problem arises: the “standard” picture of brain organization, 
asymmetry of function, is based on right-handed men, and women and left-handed individuals deviate 
from this standard.  
 
Introduction to the two case studies 
 In order to identify the content, specific practices and culture of the cognitive neuroscience on 
the neuroimaging of sex or gender differences, and analyze the power structures at play in the research 
question, I constructed two case studies. The first investigates a widely-publicized purported structural 
difference between men’s and women’s brains, the corpus callosum. The second investigates a 
functional difference between men’s and women’s brains on is a cognitive task that is reported to 
reliably elicit a performance difference. The task is mental rotation, and it is thought that men 
outperform women on it. 
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 The corpus callosum is the white matter tract in the middle of the brain that connects the two 
hemispheres. In the 1980s, an article in Science proclaimed that women had a larger and more bulbous 
splenium (posterior portion of the corpus callosum) than men (de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway 
1982). de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway proclaimed that the corpus callosum was sexually dimorphic, 
meaning that it was a characteristic that differentiated the sexes. In their words, the finding of a “sex” 
difference in the shape of the splenium has “wide-ranging implications…for neuropsychologists in search 
of an anatomical basis for possible gender differences in the degree of cerebral lateralization” (1431). 
Bishop and Wahlsten (1997) and Fausto-Sterling (2000) both remarked on the sensationalization of this 
finding in the popular media – a Newsweek cover story, a Time magazine feature article, a mention by 
talk show host Phil Donahue. Many research articles investigated the topic in the following years.  
 To assess the acceptance of sex/gender differences in the corpus callosum, I looked at 7 
textbooks, 2 each in cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, neuroscience, and one in biology 
(comparative anatomy). The biology textbook and one cognitive neuroscience and one neuroscience 
textbook discussed sex/gender differences in the corpus callosum. The biology textbook stated that the 
human corpus callosum varies in size with “gender” (Hildebrand 1995, 357), the cognitive neuroscience 
textbook investigates evidence for and against de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway’s finding and 
concludes that there is no evidence for a difference in splenial size, though they support an extensive 
study by Witelson on postmortem brains, which found that women's isthmus is larger (Kolb and 
Whishaw 1996, 217), and the neuroscience textbook states that some studies find that the CC is larger in 
men and some studies find that the splenium is larger in women, but conclude that if sex/gender 
differences in the CC exist, they are small and there is considerable variation across brains (Bear, Connor 
and Paradiso 2007, 547). The other textbooks did not discuss sex/gender differences (Terry 2000; 
Willingham 2000; Schiffman 2000; Carlson 2002). 
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 As mentioned by de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway, a major motivation behind research on the 
corpus callosum is the interest in finding the anatomical basis for the gendered lateralization hypothesis. 
Unstated by de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway is the assumption that a larger corpus callosum 
translates to greater interhemispheric information transfer. A brain where information is processed 
primarily in one hemisphere at a time, such as in men, will not require as many interhemispheric 
connections as a brain that engages both hemispheres on cognitive tasks, as is proposed in women.  
 Anne Fausto-Sterling’s book, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality 
(2000), dedicated a chapter to the corpus callosum controversy. Fausto-Sterling reviewed the literature 
and concluded that there were no sex or gender differences in the size or shape of the corpus callosum, 
concurring with Bishop and Wahlsten’s (1997) meta-analysis. Fausto-Sterling stated: “That researchers 
continue to probe the corpus callosum in search of a definitive gender difference speaks to how 
entrenched their expectations about biological differences remain” (145). Despite Bishop and 
Wahlsten’s (1997) meta-analysis, an earlier meta-analysis by Driesen and Raz (1995), and Fausto-
Sterling’s (2000) review, research on sex or gender differences in the corpus callosum continue. New 
technology has been employed in the debate – magnetic resonance imaging. Thus, because of the 
history of research on this brain area, coupled with the continuing interest in it, the corpus callosum 
makes a good case study for investigating continuing trends in the investigation of sex/gender 
differences in the brain. Additionally, the corpus callosum makes a good case study because the feminist 
critique by Fausto-Sterling failed to make an impact on scientific practice. Her failure to make an impact 
on scientific practice also reveals the importance of the approach I advocate: a feminist philosophy of 
science that engages with the science, one that is targeted to the practitioners of science and is 
formulated in a way that they can apply in their work. 
 Whereas the corpus callosum is a brain structure, my second case study investigates brain 
function. Mental rotation is thought to be one of the largest sex or gender differences in cognition. 
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Mental rotation is a visuospatial task that involves comparing two or more shapes that are rotated to 
determine if they are the same shape or different shapes. According to Linn and Peterson (1985), 
“Differences between males and females in spatial ability are widely acknowledged” (1479). As such, 
when the new tool of functional magnetic resonance imaging began to be applied in experimental 
psychology, in addition to finding out what brain areas were active on standard cognitive psychology 
tasks, it was used to investigate differences between groups that differed on the cognitive tasks. Thus, 
as Bluhm (2013a) points out, in addition to learning about where in the brain a given cognitive task was 
processed, sex or gender differences were being investigated at the same time.  
 To further assess the acceptance of sex/gender differences in the visuospatial cognition, I looked 
at 6 textbooks, 2 each in cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and neuroscience. One textbook 
from each discipline discussed sex/gender differences in visuospatial cognition. The cognitive 
neuroscience and neuroscience textbooks both state that men are better at spatial tasks and women are 
better at language tasks (Kolb and Whishaw 1996, 221-223, 458-461; Bear, Connors, and Paradiso 2007, 
548). The cognitive psychology textbook states that the prevailing view used to be that men performed 
better on spatial tests and women on verbal but performance gaps on test scores seem to be decreasing 
in recent years (Terry 2000, 387). The other textbooks did not discuss sex/gender differences 
(Willingham 2000; Schiffman 2000; Carlson 2002). 
 There are many visuospatial cognitive tasks but not all of them consistently display sex or 
gender differences (Linn and Peterson 1985; Voyer, Voyer, and Bryden 1995). The large effect size for 
mental rotation made it a prime candidate for cognitive neuroscientists to use to investigate the neural 
underpinnings of sex/gender differences. I chose it because there were a number of studies 
investigating mental rotation, making it a well-defined, well-studied cognitive task. I was also interested 
in it because women’s low mental rotation performance is often cited as a reason for their 
underperformance or underrepresentation in STEM fields. Whereas the corpus callosum case study 
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received feminist attention through Fausto-Sterling’s (2000) book, as far as I am aware, mental rotation 
as a cognitive task as well as the neuroimaging of mental rotation has not been subjected to feminist 
critique. Given the interest in feminist science studies to increase the number of women in science and 
mental rotation’s purported link to science ability, mental rotation is an important case study for its 
potential application to address social and political barriers and assumptions regarding women’s 
underrepresentation in science. 
 An additional benefit of investigating both a structural and a functional case study is that the 
results may be more generalizable to cognitive neuroimaging and cognitive neuroscience as a whole 
rather than just problems that arise in functional neuroimaging. Structural and functional neuroimaging 
employ different approaches and assumptions, so investigating the differences and commonalities 
across the two combine for a more complete picture of cognitive neuroimaging and cognitive 
neuroscience.  
 
Case studies, the gendered lateralization hypothesis, and ethical considerations 
 Above I described the gendered lateralization hypothesis as the major hypothesis behind 
research on cognitive sex/gender differences in the brain. The two case studies are related to the 
gendered lateralization hypothesis. I indicated above that de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway made the 
connection between the corpus callosum size and shape and sex/gender difference in cerebral 
lateralization. Thomsen et al. (2000), the first fMRI study on sex or gender differences on mental 
rotation, link mental rotation with the gendered lateralization hypothesis:  
Based on behavioral responses (response accuracy) several studies have found males to perform 
better than females [on the mental rotation task]. This has been explained with reference to 
differences between the sexes in hemisphere functioning, with males performing better than 
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females on typical right hemisphere processing tasks, or that females have a bilateral 
hemispheric representation for visuo-spatial processing. (1187) 
Thus, each case study is actually investigating two hypotheses: (1) the specific research question 
regarding sex or gender differences in the size or shape of the corpus callosum or in the brain activation 
associated with mental rotation processing and (2) the more general hypothesis regarding sex/gender 
differences in brain lateralization (structure or function). However, as I noted above, McGlone’s 
gendered lateralization conclusions have been misinterpreted, and, through repetition and inadequate 
scrutiny, have become widely accepted, where they function as both an hypothesis and a background 
assumption. As an assumption, it shapes the research question and experimental design, so it should be 
no surprise when it is confirmed. There may indeed be something to the gendered lateralization 
hypothesis, but it needs to be clarified and independently confirmed rather than confirmed through 
rigged experiments. 
 Fausto-Sterling (2000) demonstrates the larger social and ethical problem with neuroimaging 
sex and gender differences. Here is her argument. Some psychologists think that men and women use 
their brains differently, with men using one hemisphere for visuospatial processing and women using 
both hemispheres.3 An additional assumption is that greater lateralization implies greater skill capacity. 
Note that putting these two claims together implies that men’s style of processing is better. However, 
                                                          
3 In the section of the text where she lays out the argument, she incorrectly says that men use the left 
hemisphere for visuospatial processing, but the table on page 120 says that the current view is that 
visuospatial processing occurs in the right hemisphere. The current prevailing view, though disputed, is 
that the right hemisphere processes visuospatial information, in accordance with what is presented in 
the table. 
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whereas greater lateralization is associated with greater skill capacity for the domain of visuospatial 
cognition, it is not associated with greater skill capacity with regards to language, a domain in which 
women are thought to excel compared with men. In other words, men’s greater lateralization is taken to 
be a boon when it comes to visuospatial processing, but women’s greater bilateralization is neutral 
when it comes to language processing. These two apparently contradictory claims are inadequately 
supported both theoretically and empirically; they are insufficiently investigated.  
In addition to the assumption that men are functionally asymmetric whereas women are 
symmetric and the assumption that functional asymmetry is related to greater skill capacity is the 
(contested) evidence that men tend to perform better on spatial tasks. Thus, men’s perceived 
superiority on spatial tasks is thought to be explained by men’s functional asymmetry. Going further, an 
additional assumption links men’s facility on spatial tasks with their superior performance in math and 
science. If one buys this story, says Fausto-Sterling, and one assumes the proposed functional 
differences are “inborn,” then it is folly to waste resources trying to increase women’s participation in 
science, since they’re not wired that way (118). In other words, the gendered lateralization hypothesis, 
the assumption that greater lateralization implies greater skill capacity, men’s supposed superiority on 
visuospatial tasks, and the supposed importance of visuospatial tasks for math and science can be 
interpreted that women are unsuitable for math and science given their differently wired brain 
(assuming that men’s and women’s brains are essentially different, which, as I will demonstrate, is 
widely accepted in cognitive neuroimaging). 
 According to Fausto-Sterling, the social and ethical consideration in sex or gender differences 
relates to equality. Should resources be spent increasing the representation of women and minorities in 
STEM fields? If there is scientific evidence that they’re not “wired” that way, then those resources would 
be wasted. However, the concern goes beyond the current state of society. Sex or gender differences 
have been used for centuries to argue against women holding positions of leadership in society, getting 
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an education, voting, etc. Thus, there is a long history of science being used to deny women 
opportunities. 
 
Case study methodology 
In order to connect feminist standpoint empiricism to a specific discipline of science, one must 
be familiar with that science. To investigate the content, specifics, culture, and analysis of power 
structures in cognitive neuroscience, I construct two case studies on the neuroimaging of sex or gender 
differences. In investigating the two case studies, I am doing two things: learning about the content, 
practices, culture, and power structure of the discipline and applying a critical eye. In learning about the 
discipline, I am learning about the background assumptions and theories employed, the methods of data 
collection, the specific tools used (MRI and fMRI), the analyses of behavioral, functional, and structural 
data, the language employed, the history of the questions asked and the behavioral tasks used, the 
social interest in the research, and the implications of the research.  
In applying a critical eye, I employed a two-prong critical stance. The first prong was assessing 
the science based on its own empirical standards in order to formulate an internal critique. Are there sex 
or gender differences in the size or shape of the corpus callosum or in the brain activation associated 
with mental rotation processing? Does the research on sex or gender differences uphold the standards 
of science in cognitive neuroscience? What about standards from other related sciences (cognitive 
psychology, social psychology, neuroscience)? This approach is similar to the approach advocated by the 
early feminist empiricists.  
The second prong was assessing the science based on feminist concerns aided by my assuming 
the feminist standpoint in order to formulate an external critique. How are women’s lives different from 
men’s lives and how does that affect the development of the corpus callosum or performance on the 
mental rotation task? How does research in this domain add to the oppression experienced by women? 
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Are there other possibilities, other than sex, that may better explain differences, if differences are 
found? Were the researchers making a distinction between sex and gender? Between nature and 
nurture? What language is used to report results? Is there sexism in the field? Is it explicit or implicit? I 
looked at the content of the science, the practices, the culture, and the power structures at play to 
identify what the research was focusing on and neglecting, theories, background assumptions, analyses, 
and language, and the implications of the research. 
Although I explicitly identify them here, in reality, the two prongs actually lie on a continuum. 
For example, looking to nearby scientific disciplines plays a role in both prongs: while it functions to 
assess the quality of the science in this discipline given the standards of science, I also use it to 
empirically support points revealed through the feminist standpoint. In assessing the mental rotation 
case study, for example, I look to other nearby fields, such as cognitive psychology and social 
psychology, to see if cognitive neuroimaging research incorporates their results. I also look to cognitive 
psychology and social psychology to empirically support the feminist standpoint, which reveals 
differences between women’s lives and experiences and men’s lives and experiences. In some cases, 
looking at what nearby scientific disciplines were doing and taking into consideration led to interesting 
feminist critiques and possibilities. 
 
Overall argument preview 
In the first chapter, I argued for the need to tailor feminist philosophy of science to the specifics 
of a discipline of science in order to make it more relevant to practicing scientists. Connecting theory 
and practice, I argued, involves an understanding of the discipline’s content, specific practices and 
history, culture, and the implementation of the method of “studying up.” I will be applying this strategy 
to the field of cognitive neuroscience through an investigation of two case studies in the neuroimaging 
of sex or gender differences. The methodology I employ for constructing the two case studies involve an 
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internal critique wherein I assess research in this domain according to the standards of science as well as 
an external critique wherein I assess the research based on feminist concerns through the feminist 
standpoint. In the final chapter, I combine my critiques across the two case studies with feminist 
standpoint empiricism and present a philosophy of cognitive neuroscience from the feminist standpoint. 
This philosophy of cognitive neuroscience carries positive recommendations for changes to scientific 
practice in a format that scientists can apply in their work. 
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Chapter 3 
Corpus callosum case study 
 
Introduction 
Since the 1980s, a portion of the brain called the corpus callosum has been a trendy locus for 
studying sex or gender differences. The corpus callosum (CC) is a bundle of nerve fibers that connects 
the left and right halves of the brain (figure 3.1). The assumption behind research on the size and shape 
of the CC is that it can be used as a proxy for testing the gendered lateralization hypothesis, which holds 
that women are global thinkers, bilaterally activating both hemispheres in cognitive tasks, and that men 
are focused thinkers, activating only one hemisphere (Kimura 2002). The pattern of activation is 
assumed to be reflected in the size and shape of the corpus callosum. However, two meta-analyses 
(Driesen and Raz 1995; Bishop and Wahlsten 1997) and a review (Fausto-Sterling 2000) contradict the 
1982 article by de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway that ignited the current interest. As I demonstrate 
later in the chapter, the meta-analyses and review failed to make an impact in the research domain. 
Thus, the dominant view, that there are sex or gender differences in the size or shape of the corpus 
callosum, persists, and researchers continue to publish articles investigating sex or gender differences in 
the corpus callosum. Fausto-Sterling asserted: “That researchers continue to probe the corpus callosum 
in search of a definitive gender difference speaks to how entrenched their expectations about biological 
differences remain” (145). In other words, sex essentialism is driving continued research on this 
question. 
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Figure 3.1. (Top) An MRI image of a midsagittal slice of the human head.  The corpus callosum is 
predominately myelinated axons, which show up as white on the scan (from Fausto-Sterling 2000, 126). 
(Bottom) Colorized image of the three-dimensional corpus callosum including fiber tracts using a specific 
type of MRI scan, diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) (from Hofer and Frahm 2006, 991). 
 
Sex or gender differences in the corpus callosum are still being studied. This is ethically 
problematic because finding sex or gender differences and assuming they are natural within a gendered 
power system contributes to the harm experienced by women – and science is complicit in this harm. 
Since Driesen and Raz (1995), Bishop and Wahlsten (1997), and Fausto-Sterling (2000) all included both 
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cadaver brains – which could be diseased, old, or poorly preserved – and brain scans of living 
participants, I update the story using only neuroimaging articles. In addition, I add a gendered dimension 
to the analysis using resources in feminist philosophy of science.  
In reviewing the literature, I used a two-pronged approach. The first prong was assessing the 
science based on its own empirical standards in order to formulate an internal critique. This involved 
assessing the empirical findings and the methodology. Are there sex or gender differences in the size or 
shape of the corpus callosum?  Does the research on sex or gender differences uphold the standards of 
science in cognitive neuroscience or other related sciences?  
The second prong was assessing the science based on feminist concerns aided by my assuming 
the feminist standpoint in order to formulate an external critique. How are women’s lives different from 
men’s lives and how does that affect the development of the corpus callosum? How does research in 
this domain add to the oppression experienced by women? Are there other possibilities, other than sex, 
that may better explain differences, if differences are found? Were the researchers making a distinction 
between sex and gender? Between nature and nurture? What language is used to report results? Is 
there sexism in the field? Is it explicit or implicit? I looked at the content of the science, the practices, 
the culture, and the power structures at play to identify what the research was focusing on and 
neglecting, theories, background assumptions, analyses, and language, and the implications of the 
research. 
To briefly preview my findings, I find no evidence of sex or gender differences in the corpus 
callosum. Moreover, researchers’ expectation of difference drives continued research in the area, 
despite the disconfirming meta-analyses, which are only rarely cited. Researchers are sloppy regarding 
their use of sex and gender terms, often using them interchangeably. They do not describe how they 
created their groups. They do not routinely engage in blind data analysis procedures, possibly permitting 
expectations to affect results. They assume their results generalize for all humans, despite mostly 
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testing relatively well-educated individuals from a few industrialized, Western countries. Researchers 
fail to consider the role of social and environmental factors on corpus callosum development, betraying 
a bias for biological-based explanations rather than experience-based. Behind many of these problems 
lies the problematic assumption of sex essentialism, the view that men and women are essentially 
distinct due to their different natural, biological, sex-based essences.  
In sum, I find that despite failing for over a hundred years to find sex or gender differences in 
the CC, current practice continues to search for them in order to affirm the expectation of a neurological 
substrate for sex or gender differences. I conclude that current practice in the neuroimaging of sex or 
gender differences in the CC is methodologically and theoretically flawed and contributes to the 
reduction of sex or gender differences to nature. It is sex-essentialist and socially and ethically 
irresponsible.  
Looking ahead, in the final chapter, I combine the specifics of practice in cognitive neuroimaging 
from this chapter and the next chapter on mental rotation with feminist standpoint empiricism to 
construct a philosophy and practice of cognitive neuroimaging that overcomes the problems I identify. 
But first, I present the history of sex or gender differences research on the corpus callosum. 
 
History 
The 1982 de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway article was not the first to investigate sex or 
gender differences in the corpus callosum. It turns out that the interest in brain-based sex or gender 
differences, as well as in racial differences, goes as far back as the early 20th century. In this section, I 
introduce the earlier work on sex/gender differences in the corpus callosum and the recent 1982 de 
Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway article that re-sparked the debate as well as review the meta-analyses 
(Driesen and Raz 1995; Bishop and Wahlsten 1997) and review (Fausto-Sterling 2000) on the issue. 
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In 1906 Robert Bennett Bean published his measurements on the brains of African-Americans 
and Caucasians. He found that African-Americans had a larger posterior portion of the corpus callosum 
than Caucasians and that Caucasians had a larger anterior portion. At that time, the anterior part of the 
brain was thought to be involved in higher functions – such as ethical decision making, self-control, and 
aesthetic appreciation – and the posterior part of the brain was thought to be where lower, more 
primitive functions were housed (Fausto-Sterling 2000). In addition to the racial differences, Bean found 
sex or gender differences. As expected, the anterior part of the corpus callosum was larger for men than 
for women. Also, women had smaller posterior parts of their corpora callosa than the men of their race, 
with Caucasian women having the smallest of all groups. The significance of this finding is rooted in the 
cultural assumptions of the time – that (white) women were chaste, refined, and not sexually 
promiscuous (Fausto-Sterling 2000). Disputing Bean’s findings, Franklin P. Mall published a study in 1909 
finding no sex/gender or racial differences. Importantly, he implemented the experimental control of 
performing the measurements blind to race and sex/gender:  
In order to exclude my own personal equation, which is an item of considerable importance in a 
study like this, all the tracings as well as the measurements of all the areas were made without 
my knowing the race or sex of any of the individuals from which the brains were taken. (9) 
 The question of “sex” differences in the corpus callosum (CC) was resurrected in 1982 with the 
publication of an article finding that women had a larger, more bulbous splenium (the posterior portion) 
than men (de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway 1982). This is the opposite finding from Bean’s 1906 
study. Notably, the prevailing view of brain function in the 1980s, the new cultural assumption, is the 
gendered lateralization hypothesis. In de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway’s words, the finding of a “sex” 
difference in the shape of the splenium has “wide-ranging implications…for neuropsychologists in search 
of an anatomical basis for possible gender differences in the degree of cerebral lateralization” (1431). 
Fuelled by the sensationalism of the popular press, brain scanning technologies, and the growing 
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interest in the brain sciences, the hunt was on for sex or gender differences in the structure and function 
of the brain. 
The de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway (1982) was a 2-page Science article. Their abstract reads 
as follows: 
Preliminary observations suggest a sex difference in the shape and surface area of the human 
corpus callosum. The sexual dimorphism is striking in the splenium, the caudal or posterior 
portion of the corpus callosum. The female splenium is both more bulbous and larger than the 
male counterpart. Since peristriate, parietal, and superior temporal fibers course through the 
splenium, this finding could be related to possible gender differences in the degree of 
lateralization for visuospatial functions. (1431) 
Thus, they label the corpus callosum sexually dimorphic due to the difference in the size and shape of 
the splenium, which is the posterior end of the CC. Sexual dimorphism is a term given to a characteristic 
that differentiates the sexes, such as coloration in cardinals and guppies, ornamentation in peacocks, or 
the genitals of many species. Additionally, they connect their structural finding to a possible functional-
behavioral outcome: purported sex or gender differences in the lateralization of visuospatial processes. 
However, they do note that their findings are preliminary, probably because of the small sample size. 
Later papers by de Lacoste-Utamsing, Holloway and colleagues confirmed these preliminary findings. 
In the 1982 article, de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway investigated 9 “male” and 5 “female1” 
normal cadaver brains. Brains were hemisected and photographed with a ruler for scale, projected onto 
                                                          
1 “Male” and “female” are in quotation marks because that was the language they used. However, they 
did not mention how they determined sex/gender of brains: genetic sex, hormonal sex, genital sex, or 
65 
 
paper at 1.7 to 2.2 times magnification and the corpus callosum was traced by hand. They measured 
length and maximum splenial width (defined as a line drawn at the thickest portion perpendicular to 
parallel lines delineating the dorsal and ventral limits of the splenium), and used a computer planimetric 
program to measure whole CC area, the posterior fifth, posterior fourth, and posterior third. They 
reported that researchers were blind to individual demographic information (sex, age, brain weight, for 
example). However, their footnote (6) read: “Although the partial surface areas were computed after we 
had noted the sex difference, all of the drawings and calculations of the total callosal surface area were 
completed before we suspected the existence of such a difference” (1432). Thus, they completed the 
tracings and measured the CC area blind to sex or gender, then they noticed the difference, and 
subdivided the CC to measure its parts, including the splenial width, with the hypothesis in mind. This 
suggests that the splenial width and posterior third, fourth and fifth measurements could have been 
influenced by investigator expectations regarding the participant’s sex or gender. 
 They had three impartial observers sort the drawings based upon a description of a bulbous 
splenium for females and a tubular splenium for males. All drawings were correctly sorted using this 
method. Using t-tests, they found that maximum splenium width differed significantly for males and 
females. They described their data as “a nearly bimodal distribution for males and females” (1431). The 
CC length did not differ between men and women. They report the posterior fifth to be larger in women, 
though the p value was 0.08 (the standard p value for a significant finding is 0.05, meaning that their 
finding was not significant according to discipline-wide standards). Relative to brain weight, women had 
a larger CC. Finally, they state, “A discriminant analysis using total callosal area, maximum splenial 
                                                          
sex/gender as assigned by medical examiner at time of autopsy if the postmortem brains had already 
been removed from the cadaver. 
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width, and surface areas of the posterior fifth and third as variables classified the callosa as male or 
female with 100 percent accuracy” (1432). Thus, they take their “preliminary observations” as strong 
evidence for sex or gender differences in the shape of the splenium. However, they temper their 
enthusiasm by concluding that their results need to be replicated in a larger sample as well as 
supplemented with microscopic investigations of CC fiber composition.  
 De Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway (1982) launched a number of investigations, which were 
followed by reviews and meta-analyses synthesizing results of the many individual studies. The first 
meta-analysis of findings was Driesen and Raz (1995). They begin by clarifying the hypothesis driving 
research into sex or gender differences in the corpus callosum. The early view, not specifically stated by 
de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway, assumed that a larger CC means more fibers and less lateralization. 
This is the greater interhemispheric communication or “facilitation” view. Others have suggested that 
the larger CC inhibits interhemispheric transfer of information, functionally shielding the hemispheres 
from each other. This is the reduced interhemispheric communication or “inhibition” view (Driesen and 
Raz 1995; Welcome et al. 2009). An alternative has to do with the size difference between men’s and 
women’s heads – and the resulting difference in the sizes of their brains. Since men’s heads and brains 
are bigger than women’s, and corpus callosum size only modestly correlates with brain size, Driesen and 
Raz (1995) point out that “sex differences in CC area may imply the need to connect greater areas of 
cortex rather than differences in brain laterality or interhemispheric transfer” (241). In other words, it 
might be an engineering or architecture problem.  
 Driesen and Raz’s (1995) meta-analysis investigated the CC literature on the question of sex or 
gender, age, and handedness. There were 43 studies in their meta-analysis: 11 postmortem and 32 MRI. 
They found a mean effect size for total CC area of d = .27 with a 95% confidence interval (CI95%) from 
.19 to .36, with men having a larger absolute whole CC area. They note, “This effect size indicates that 
approximately 21% of the combined distribution of men and women is nonoverlapping” (242), which 
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means that there is considerable overlap in CC size between men and women. They found no difference 
in effect sizes between MRI studies and postmortem studies. There were 11 studies that controlled for 
brain size. The effect size for relative CCs was d = -.27 (CI95% -.43 to -.08), which means that when brain 
size is controlled for, women have a larger CC relative to brain size than men.  
 Twenty-one studies investigated splenial area, finding an effect size of .20. They found de 
Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway (1982) to be an outlier, so they removed it from further analyses. This 
resulted in an effect size of .21. They state: “This average effect size indicates that splenial area, like 
overall CC area, is larger in men than in women” (243). The 95% confidence interval for the splenium is 
.09-.34. They report that approximately 14.7% of the distribution of splenial size is non-overlapping. 
Driesen and Raz take their results to indicate that the sex or gender difference in splenium size is smaller 
than the sex or gender difference in overall CC size. There were not enough studies looking at relative 
splenium size to analyze. 
 They point out an interesting problem with using ratios, which is the most common method of 
controlling for brain size – CC size is divided by brain size. CC measures are less than a tenth of the size 
of whole brain measures (length or area). When dividing a small number by a large number, the 
denominator “dominates the magnitude of the ratio” in Driesen and Raz’s terms. Continuing,  
In this situation, the smaller ratio variable will be the one whose numerator is divided by the 
largest quantity. Therefore, men, simply by virtue of their larger brains, would appear to have 
smaller CCs than women, when ratio indices are used. (244) 
They suggest using the analysis of covariance instead:  
In this approach, men and women’s average CC area would be compared after adjustment for 
the correlation between brain and CC size in the entire sample. This statistical technique would 
be valid only if the relationship between brain and CC measures is similar in men and women – 
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in other words, if there is no statistically significant interaction between gender and brain size. 
(244) 
 The Driesen and Raz meta-analysis was overlooked by the research community. It is rarely cited 
in the subsequent CC articles. The Bishop and Walhsten (1997) meta-analysis is more widely known. 
Bishop and Wahlsten (1997) open their meta-analysis by stating: “IF men and women think differently, 
their brains must also differ in some way. This holds true, even if the difference emanates largely from 
experience, because experience changes the brain” (581). Through this statement, they avoid sex 
essentialism because they indicate that if there are differences, the differences aren’t necessarily due to 
sex (biology, nature). They spend their meta-analysis examining if there are sex or gender differences 
and do not further speculate as to how or why sex or gender differences arise. They included 49 studies 
– both postmortem and MRI – in their meta-analysis. 
 They found that, on average, men had significantly larger brains than women, as assessed by 
brain weight, which isn’t surprising because men are usually larger than women. Also, men had 
significantly larger corpora callosa, as measured by area, presumably because they have larger brains. 
This concurs with Driesen and Raz (1995). Where the effect size for brain weight was large (d+=1.20), the 
effect size for corpus callosum area was small (d+=0.21). They note that sex difference accounts for only 
1.0% of the total variance in human CC size (586). There are many ways to control for men’s larger 
brains by assessing relative corpus callosum size to overall brain size. Bishop and Wahlsten conclude 
that the many ways all generally show that there is no relative sex or gender difference in corpus 
callosum size between men and women. This finding contradicts Drisen and Raz, which concluded that 
women have a larger CC size relative to brain size than men. 
 Regarding the splenium, Bishop and Wahlsten found that there was no sex or gender difference 
in absolute splenium size and relative splenium size. This contradicts Driesen and Raz’s finding that men 
have a larger splenium than women. As for the splenium’s reported “bulbosity” in females, Bishop and 
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Wahlsten found a small positive effect, but the sample was heterogeneous.  Investigating the 
heterogeneity of the sample revealed that there were only 5 studies that showed a large difference, and 
the 5 studies were by the same group of researchers – M. C. de Lacoste, C. de Lacoste-Utamsing, and 
Holloway. When the 5 studies were removed from the analyses, there was no effect of sex or gender for 
splenium bulbosity. Bishop and Walhsten conclude: “Altogether, the 44 studies that searched for some 
kind of sex difference in the splenium of the corpus callosum provide little or no grounds for the belief in 
any ‘sexual dimorphism’” (589). In other words, one cannot tell the “sex” of a brain by looking at the 
splenium of the CC – it is not sexually dimorphic as claimed by de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway 
(1982). 
 Finding no publication bias in the scientific community regarding sex or gender differences in 
the corpus callosum, Bishop and Wahlsten point out the problem of sensationalized findings in popular 
science media. For example, 
Kimura [in a Scientific American article] emphasized the claims of de Lacoste-Utamsing and 
Holloway by name, mentioning that they had been “both refuted and confirmed” by anonymous 
persons, and “most recently” replicated by Allen et al., which gives a definite impression that 
the weight of the literature favors a sex difference when, as we have shown, the complete 
literature does not. LeVay also mentioned that several studies failed to replicate the 1982 report 
but then proclaimed that Allen et al. used “advanced imaging techniques…[to]…confirm the 
original report”, despite the fact that 12 previous MRI studies had not confirmed it. (592) 
What this indicates is a preference by authors writing for the popular press to downplay negative 
findings, leaving the impression that there are in fact sex or gender differences. 
 Moreover, Bishop and Walsten point out the problem with effect sizes, sample sizes and power. 
The average sample size of studies included in their meta-analysis was 30 per gender. They state, “This 
sample size is sufficient to detect a moderate effect size of δ = 0.75 with a statistical power of 80%” 
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(593). However, with an effect size of δ = 0.2 with 80% power, a two-tailed t-test, and α = 0.05, the 
sample size for each group would have to be 395. Thus, according to Bishop and Wahlsten, “Because all 
the sample sizes reported in the literature on sex differences in the corpus callosum are considerably 
less than 400 of each sex, we suspect that our colleagues are really not very interested in finding such 
small effects” (593). Continuing, they state, “It would be unwise to engage in further research on this 
topic unless a large enough sample is used in a single study to make the test sufficiently sensitive to the 
small effects that prevail in this domain” (593). 
 Finally, Fausto-Sterling’s review is from her book Sexing the Body (2000). She investigates the 
effect of social processes on the science of sex, gender and sexuality. One chapter is a review of the 
corpus callosum question. Fausto-Sterling sets up the social and ethical problem with neuroimaging sex 
and gender differences this way: Some psychologists think that men and women use their brains 
differently, with men using one hemisphere for visuospatial processing and women using both 
hemispheres.2 An additional assumption is that greater lateralization implies greater skill capacity. (Note 
that putting these two claims together implies that men’s style of processing is better.3) In addition to 
                                                          
2 In the section of the text where she lays out the argument, she incorrectly says that men use the left 
hemisphere for visuospatial processing, but the table on page 120 says that the current view is that 
visuospatial processing occurs in the right hemisphere. The current prevailing view, though disputed, is 
that the right hemisphere processes visuospatial information, in accordance with what is presented in 
the table. 
3 Note also that greater lateralization is not associated with greater skill capacity with regards to 
language, a domain that women are thought to excel at compared to men. In other words, men’s 
71 
 
these two assumptions is the (contested) evidence that men tend to perform better on spatial tasks. 
Moreover, an additional assumption links men’s facility on spatial tasks with their superior performance 
in math and science. If one buys this story, says Fausto-Sterling, and one assumes the proposed 
functional differences are “inborn,” then it is folly to waste resources trying to increase women’s 
participation in science, since they’re not wired that way (118). 
 Fausto-Sterling (2000) looked at 34 papers examining the corpus callosum for sex or gender 
differences written between 1982 and 1997. The studies included both cadavers and MRIs. She found no 
consistent sex or gender differences across studies.  She had three foci to her analysis.  First, she pointed 
out the difficulties with measuring a 3-D structure – both in cadavers and in MRI images.  Second, she 
enumerated the problems with cadaver studies, such as different preservation protocols, the effect of 
preservative on the structural integrity of brain matter, and possible confounds with neurological 
problems.  Third, she criticized the way statistics have been used to erase individual differences.  Thus, 
her critiques are scientific-methodological rather than gendered.   
Thus, the two meta-analyses and review contradict de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway’s (1982) 
finding. However, the view presented in de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway remains the dominant view.  
 
Case study 
Method 
 On April 14, 2012, I searched PsycINFO for the keywords “corpus callosum” and “human sex 
differences.” Additional articles were found by checking the references section of the papers I found.  I 
                                                          
greater lateralization is a boon when it comes to visuospatial processing, but women’s greater 
bilateralization is neutral when it comes to language processing. 
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located 45 articles, which are marked in the bibliography with a single asterisk. One is a “Viewpoint” 
article of unpublished data (Bleier, Houston, and Byne 1986) later published (Byne, Bleier, and Houston 
1988). Four are reanalyses: Jäncke et al. (1997) is a reanalysis of Steinmetz et al. (1995); Denenberg et al. 
(1991) and Cowell et al. (1993) are both reanalyses of Kertesz et al. (1987); and Luders et al. (2006b) is a 
reanalysis of Luders et al. (2006a). One article (Zaidel, Aboitiz, and Clarke 1995) integrates data from 
another article (Clarke and Zaidel 1994) with postmortem data. Two studies use the exact same data 
and results: Weis et al. (1988) has more introduction and discussion than Weis et al. (1989).4 That left 38 
studies from 1986-2012. 
I read the papers with an eye to the following: (1) the theoretical framework within which the 
authors situated their research (introduction and discussion sections); (2) subjects: sample size, the 
choice of participants, participants’ demographic information, and participant recruitment procedures; 
(3) measurement and analysis procedures; (4) additional factors considered: age, handedness, etc.; and 
(5) the authors’ interpretation of the data, which is connected to their theoretical framework (1). 
Most studies were actively investigating the question of sex or gender differences in the corpus 
callosum. Some were looking for sex/gender interactions with handedness or development. Only 6 of 
the 38 studies were not centrally asking the question of sex or gender differences. O’Kusky et al. (1988) 
were investigating CC size and functional lateralization. Hayakawa et al. (1989) were investigating the 
development of the CC and 3 other brain structures across the lifespan. Emory et al. (1991) were 
investigating the brains of “normals” with those of transsexuals. Pujol et al. (1993) were evaluating CC 
change across development. Clarke and Zaidel (1994) and Zaidel et al. (1995) were investigating 
behavioral correlations with CC size to investigate laterality. Peterson et al. (2001) did a factor analysis 
                                                          
4 Bishop and Wahlsten notice this and use the earlier publication. 
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of the morphological features of the CC contour for a better (less arbitrary) CC division scheme. These 6 
studies did a sex/gender analysis even though they were not interested in sex or gender differences. 
Below I summarize the general neuroimaging procedure. 
Some early MRI studies used brain scans on file from medical centers. Some took pains to 
exclude clinical diagnoses or medications that could affect brain structure. Some later studies recruited 
participants from a hospital, university or the general population. Some studies interested in the 
development of the CC over the lifespan included participants enrolled in longitudinal studies of aging.  
Early studies used a printed film of the midsagittal image (figure 3.1). Tracing paper was 
overlaid, and the corpus callosum was traced by hand. A computerized planimeter was used to measure 
the areas. One study cut out the traced CC outlines and weighed them instead of using a planimeter to 
measure area (Morton and Rafto 2006). Later studies traced the corpus callosum by hand using a 
computer mouse or trackball on a computer screen and used an automated program to make the 
measurements. A few later studies bypassed a human tracer altogether by using a computer program 
that delineated the corpus callosum based on the light/dark contrast in the digital image.  
There were a number of methods for subdividing the corpus callosum (figure 3.2). Generally, 
measurements consisted of: CC cross-sectional area, subareas, CC length, CC width, and ratio of CC to a 
measure of whole brain area or volume. (See figure 3.3 for a diagram of the standard CC divisions.) 
Men’s and women’s measurements were compared using t-tests, ANOVAs, or regression analyses for 
the most part. 
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Figure 3.2. Four main methods of partitioning the CC: A, straight-line; B, curved line; C, bent-line; and D, 
radial gravity (from Bishop and Wahlsten 1997, 583). 
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Figure 3.3. A standard scheme for segmenting the CC. Divisions: 1) rostrum; 2) genu; 3) rostral body; 4) 
anterior midbody; 5) posterior midbody; 6) isthmus; 7) splenium. ACC- PCC line indicates CC length, M-
M1 indicates width at midpoint, and S-S1 indicates maximum splenial width (from Witelson 1989, 805). 
 
I discuss the results of my investigation in two parts. First, I address the empirical question: are 
there sex or gender differences in the corpus callosum? Second, I analyze the studies based on feminist 
and methodological considerations. 
 
Results 
1. Empirical 
Eighteen out of the 38 studies found sex or gender differences in some part of the CC. Table 3.1 
summarizes the findings for the area of the whole corpus callosum. Although it appears that men have 
larger raw corpus callosum area measurements, when corrected for brain size, that difference goes 
away or favors women. However, note that there were many different measures for brain size, such as 
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height, head size, midsagittal surface area, forebrain volume, or brain volume. Thus, few findings were 
replicated and many were discrepant. A possible explanation for the conflicting results is the large 
variability in corpus callosum size and shape, noted early on by Bleier et al. (1986) and Byne et al. (1988) 
and Bishop and Wahlsten (1997), amongst others. 
When taken in context, there were 30 studies that assessed sex or gender differences in the 
whole CC uncorrected for brain size, and 5 found that boys or men have larger CCs than girls or women, 
suggesting that there are no sex or gender differences in uncorrected CC size. Regarding correcting for 
brain size, there were 9 studies that assessed sex or gender differences in the CC while controlling for 
brain size. Three found that women have larger CCs, 1 found that men do, and 5 found no differences. 
Thus, I conclude that there is no evidence for sex or gender differences in CC size, both corrected and 
uncorrected for brain size. My findings contradict those of Driesen and Raz (1995) and Bishop and 
Wahlsten (1997). Driesen and Raz found that men had larger uncorrected CC areas and that women had 
larger corrected CC areas. Bishop and Wahlsten found that men had larger uncorrected CC areas, but 
that there was no difference when brain size was controlled for.  
 
Table 3.1. Sex or gender differences in the area of the whole corpus callosum. 
Corrected or 
uncorrected 
for brain size 
Larger in 
men or 
women 
Finding Studies Samplea 
Uncorrected Men Men have a larger CC. Davatzikos and 
Resnick (1998) 
Sullivan et al. (2001) 
Westerhausen et al. 
(2004) 
68 M, 46 W 
 
51 M, 41 W 
32 M, 35 W 
Men have a larger CC, but 
when corrected for brain size, 
there is no difference.b 
Rauch and Jinkins 
(1994) 
56 M, 61 W 
20 B, 25 G 
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Boys have a larger CC, but 
when corrected total cerebral 
volume, there is no difference. 
Giedd et al. (1999) 85 B, 54 G 
Corrected Men Men have a larger CC when 
brain size is controlled for.c 
Sullivan et al. (2001) 51 M, 41 W 
Women Women have a larger CC when 
midsagittal brain area is 
controlled for. 
Elster et al. (1990) 60 M, 60 W 
Women have a larger CC when 
forebrain volume is controlled 
for. 
Steinmetz et al. 
(1995) and Jäncke et 
al. (1997) 
71 M, 49 W 
Women have a larger CC when 
brain volume is controlled for, 
but not when midsagittal 
surface area is controlled for. 
Johnson et al. (1994) 100 M, 100 
W 
aM=Men; W=Women; B=Boys; G=Girls 
bRauch and Jinkins’ brain size measure was the average of the cerebral area in the sagittal and axial 
planes. 
cSullivan et al. found differences using three statistical methods (covariate, residualized, and ratio) and 
two measures of brain size (intracranial volume and midsagittal intracranial area). The only statistical 
method-brain size measure combination that did not result in differences was expressing the ratio of the 
CC area to intracranial volume. 
 
In addition, 3 studies found that men have longer corpora callosa than women (Elster, DiPersio, 
and Moody 1990; Hopper et al. 1994; Suganthy et al. 2003) but 6 other studies find no sex or gender 
effects on CC length (Bleier, Houston, and Byne 1986 and Byne, Bleier, and Houston 1988; Weis et al. 
1988 and Weis et al. 1989; Clarke et al. 1989; Allen et al. 1991; Kertesz et al. 1987, Denenberg et al. 
1991, and Cowell et al. 1993; and Burke and Yeo 1994). 
The next set of results involve the subareas of the CC (table 3.2), with the exception of the 
splenium, which I discuss separately below. Many studies found differences, but few findings were 
replicated and many were discrepant. A possible explanation for the discrepancy is that there are many 
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methods for dividing up the corpus callosum. Bishop and Wahlsten (1997) and Fausto-Sterling (2000) 
discuss this problem (see figure 3.2).  
 
Table 3.2. Sex or gender differences in the subareas of the corpus callosum (excluding the splenium). 
Subarea Larger in men 
or women 
Finding Studies Samplea 
Rostrum Women Women have a larger 
rostrum. 
Burke and Yeo (1994) 38 M, 59 W 
Genu No differences    
Rostral 
body 
Men Men have a larger rostral 
body. 
Constant and Ruther 
(1996) 
56 M, 48 W 
Men have larger callosal 
thicknesses in the anterior 
third. 
Luders et al. (2006a; 
2006b) 
30 M, 30 W 
Women Men have a thinner and 
more arched anterior body 
than women. 
Peterson et al. (2001) 70 M, 60 W 
133 B, 62 G 
Midbody Men Men have larger callosal 
thicknesses between the 
anterior and posterior 
midbody. 
Luders et al. (2006a; 
2006b) 
30 M, 30 W 
Isthmus Men Men have larger callosal 
thicknesses in the isthmus. 
Luders et al. (2006a; 
2006b) 
30 M, 30 W 
Women Women have a larger 
isthmus proportional to CC 
area. 
Steinmetz et al. (1992) 26 M, 26 W 
Women have a larger 
normalized isthmus. 
Clarke and Zaidel 
(1994) and Zaidel et al. 
(1995) 
30 M, 30 W 
aM=Men; W=Women; B=Boys; G=Girls. 
 
Additionally, two studies found that women have a larger minimum body width (Byne, Bleier, 
and Houston 1988; Clarke and Zaidel 1994 and Zaidel et al. 1995). Unusual measurements included one 
study that found that women have more circular CCs (Denenberg, Kertesz, and Cowell 1991) and 
another study that found that men have a larger first quartile and middle 55% of the corpus callosum 
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uncorrected for brain size and corrected using intracranial volume for two different statistical 
approaches (residualized and ratio values, Sullivan et al. 2001). 
As for the splenium, 10 out of the 38 studies found a sex or gender difference; 8 found 
differences with regard to size and 2 found differences with regard to shape. I catalog the size (area) 
findings in table 3.3. Two additional studies found “tendencies” that did not reach statistical 
significance: women tended to have larger splenia relative to genu and body (Müller-Oehring et al. 
2007) and women tended to have more bulbous splenia (Emory et al. 1991). 
 
Table 3.3. Sex or gender differences in the splenium. 
Corrected or 
uncorrected 
for brain size 
Larger in 
men or 
women 
Findinga Studies Sampleb 
Uncorrected Men Men have larger splenia 
(area). 
Peterson et al. (2001) 
 
Sullivan et al. (2001) 
Luders et al. (2006a; 
2006b) 
70 M, 60 W 
133 B, 62 G 
51 M, 41 W 
30 M, 30 W 
Women Right-handed women have 
larger splenia (area) than 
right-handed men. 
Hopper et al. (1994) 59 M, 58 W 
Corrected Men Men have larger splenia 
(area) when intracranial 
volume is controlled for via 
the residualized method 
but not the ratio method. 
Sullivan et al. (2001) 51 M, 41 W 
 
Women Women have larger splenia 
(area) when head size is 
controlled for. 
Salat et al. (1997) 31 M, 45 W 
Women have larger splenia 
(area) when CC size is 
controlled for. 
Steinmetz et al. (1995) 
and Jäncke et al. (1997) 
Davatzikos and Resnick 
(1998) 
71 M, 49 W 
 
68 M, 46 W 
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aFor most studies, the splenium was defined as the posterior fifth of the CC, though some studies used 
straight-line and others used radial-arm methods to divide the CC. Peterson et al. (2001) did not define 
their splenium method. Hopper et al. (1994) defined the splenium as the posterior fourth of the CC. 
bM=Men; W=Women; B=Boys; G=Girls. 
 
Some studies show that men have larger splenia. Others show that women do. Those that 
correct for brain size use different measures of brain size. Again, few findings were replicated, and some 
were discrepant. One size finding is not included on the table because it is an atypical measurement: 
Elster et al. (1990) found that the splenial width-CC length ratio and splenial width-midsagittal brain 
length ratio were larger in women, but there was no difference in splenial size. 
Looking at the whole set of studies, there were 20 studies that investigated sex or gender 
differences in the splenium without correcting for brain or CC size: 3 found that men have larger splenia 
and 1 found that right-handed women have larger splenia than right-handed men. The other 16 studies 
found no differences between men and women in raw splenial area. There were 7 studies that corrected 
for brain size: one found that men have larger splenia (area) when intracranial volume is controlled for 
via one statistical method but not another; one found that women have larger splenia (area) when head 
size is controlled for; and two found that women have larger splenia (area) when CC size is controlled 
for. Note again that brain size is defined in many ways. Though there are a few studies that find 
differences, the findings are not replicated and often conflict. As I noted before, both Bishop and 
Wahlsten (1997) and Fausto-Sterling (2000) offer a possible explanation for the discrepancy: there are 
many methods of subdividing the corpus callosum and defining the splenium. My findings regarding no 
evidence for sex or gender differences in the splenium concur with Bishop and Wahlsten. However, my 
findings disagree with Driesen and Raz (1995), which found that men have slightly larger splenia 
(uncorrected) than women. 
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 Regarding shape, one study found that women have a more bulbous splenium (Allen et al. 1991) 
whereas another study found the contradictory result that some women, those who are consistently 
right-handed, have a less bulbous splenium (Habib et al. 1991). 
Thus, there is no evidence for sex or gender differences in the whole CC or its subareas, there is 
no evidence of differences in absolute or relative splenium size, and there is no evidence that the 
splenium is more bulbous in women. In other words, there is no evidence supporting the sexual 
dimorphism of the CC. 
 
2. Feminist and methodological critiques 
A. Persistence of the question 
Of the 18 studies published after 1995, only two mentioned Driesen and Raz (1995), which 
concluded that men’s splenia were marginally larger than women’s – a finding that contradicts the 
standard assumption. Of the 15 papers after 1997, only 8 cited Bishop and Wahlsten (1997). Bishop and 
Wahlsten found no sex or gender differences in the splenium. Of the 12 papers after 2000, none 
mentioned Fausto-Sterling (2000). Thus, findings that challenge the assumption are not absorbed within 
the research community.5 
                                                          
5 More worrying is that, for the most part, studies only cited a subset of the whole body of neuroimaging 
literature on sex/gender differences in the corpus callosum. In other words, they didn’t perform a 
thorough literature search before, during, or after doing their experiment. Perhaps the question might 
have been resolved years ago if they had been more thorough in reviewing the literature before 
conducting an experiment. 
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Despite the review and meta-analyses, a number of studies have continued to pursue the 
question of sex or gender differences in the CC. The fact that research has continued indicates how 
entrenched is the expectation of difference. This suggests that researchers’ conviction for the 
assumption of difference overrode empirical evidence to the contrary; bias overrode rationality. The 
expectation of difference reveals the assumption of sex essentialism (sometimes termed biological 
essentialism): men and women are essentially different based on biological, natural, sex-differentiated 
essences. 
 
B. Language 
Thirty-three out of the 38 studies mixed sex and gender terms. Two studies used the word 
“man” to mean “humans” (Weis et al. 1988 and Weis et al. 1989; Clarke 1989). Here is an example of sex 
and gender being used interchangeably. I indicate gender terms in italics and sex terms in bold. 
The results of the sex analysis (no baseline differences but greater growth rate in men from 
teenage years onward) suggest that the corpus callosum in women matures earlier, but 
differences were weak and our series had nonequal sex distribution (61 women, 29 men). 
Because the study was not designed for a gender analysis, we interpret these results with 
caution. (Pujol et al. 1993, 74) 
Note specifically that they use sex analysis and gender analysis synonymously.  
Failing to differentiate or define sex and gender is problematic because readers may interpret 
the researchers as saying that differences were due to “sex” factors – biology, nature, genetics, 
hormones, essences – or “gender” factors – culturally-contingent, socially constructed and enforced 
roles for men and women and boys and girls. As it stands, it is unclear whether researchers choose their 
words carefully and mean natural, biological differences when they say “sex differences” or whether 
they are ignorant of the different connotations of sex versus gender (Gentile 1993). Science’s long 
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history of “proving” the biological inferiority of women has taught the importance of differentiating 
“sex” and “gender” and identifying researchers’ assumptions regarding the causes of difference. 
Additionally, sloppy language may be related to an assumption of sex essentialism: since the sexes are 
essentially different, there is no need for social or environmental factors. Finally, this research is morally 
irresponsible since scientific results are taken up by society and have been used to argue against 
women’s equal participation in society. 
“Sexual dimorphism” is still being used. Recall that it is refers to a trait that differentiates the 
sexes. However, as I illustrate above, the CC does not differentiate men and women. One cannot look at 
the corpus callosum and tell whether it is a woman’s or a man’s. I did not include this until late in my 
investigation, so I do not have a full count of the use of the term, but there are at least 11 studies that 
use it after de Lacoste-Utamsing and Holloway (1982) did: Clarke et al. (1989); Elster et al. (1990); 
Hopper et al. (1994); Zaidel et al. (1995); Constant and Ruther (1996); Jäncke et al. (1997); Giedd et al. 
(1999); Sullivan et al. (2001); Suganthy et al. (2003); Luders et al. (2006b); and Menzler et al. (2011). 
An important thing to keep in mind in regards to language is that the scientific or technical term 
for sex or gender differences in humans is “human sex differences.” That is the keyword search term in 
the databases and that is how the research is cataloged. Thus, my suggestion of theorizing sex and 
gender would involve a major ontological overhaul not just of theory but also of the research databases. 
 
C. Creating groups 
 Researchers did not disclose how they assigned participants to groups. Studies using images on 
file in databases presumably used the sex or gender of the patient as recorded by the medical 
professional who scanned them. The other studies recruited participants from the hospital, university, 
or general population. In such situations, there are two ways that sex or gender may have been assigned 
to participants. First, sex or gender could have been disclosed by the participant by filling out a 
84 
 
demographic form. However, a participant might have chosen differently depending on whether the 
question item was “sex” or “gender.” In other words, a trans person might be biologically male, but 
living as a woman, so she might have answered “male” if the question asked for sex and “female” or 
“woman” if the question asked for gender.6 Intersex individuals and those with other hormonal or 
chromosomal disorders may not be aware of their condition and might answer their sex based on what 
the medical professionals or their parents assigned them even if it is technically not the most accurate 
description. In this first case, the form of the question might make a difference. Second, sex or gender 
might have been assigned to an individual by the researcher based on his or her name or gender 
presentation (hairstyle, clothing, voice, mannerisms). Again, because sex and gender are not identical, 
transgender or genderqueer individuals or individuals with hormonal or chromosomal disorders may 
have been miscategorized by researchers. 
 Problems with categorization stem from researchers’ not having a theory of sex/gender. As they 
do not recognize the difference, they fail to notice how their practices obscure sex and gender. In other 
words, by not making a distinction, they fall back upon the standard sex dichotomy and assume that 
those who present as women or girls are female. This assumption belies their sex essentialism: men and 
women have different sex-differentiated essences and sex and gender are not separate. 
 
D. Blind measurement and analysis procedures and expectation effects 
Studies are still not standardly employing blind measurement and analysis procedures: 17 out of 
the 38 (45%) did not. When blind procedures are not followed, researchers’ expectations regarding what 
                                                          
6 Many surveys that use “gender” instead of “sex” still offer the sex-terms “male” and “female” as the 
two options. 
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should be found could affect the way they see and interpret their data. Specifically, sex-essentialist 
assumptions may affect the way they see and interpret a given corpus callosum outline if they are aware 
of the brain’s sex or gender. Indeed, Mall (1909) accused Bean (1906) of expectation effects in his 
findings regarding sex/gender and race differences in brain structures. 
However, blinding may not make much, if any, difference in results (table 3.4). 62% of blind 
studies found differences (13/21), whereas 47% of non-blind studies found differences (8/17). To look at 
it another way, 62% of studies that found differences employed blind procedures (13/21). When no 
differences were found, researchers were almost as likely to use blind procedures as not: 47% were 
blind (8/17) and 53% were not blind (9/17). If researcher expectations are playing a part in finding 
differences, and researchers expect to find differences, we would expect that more non-blind studies 
would find differences and more blind studies would find no differences. Or that most of the studies 
that found differences were non-blind and most of the studies finding no difference were blind. I ran a 
chi-square test to determine if there were differences between blind and not blind procedures and the 
likelihood of finding a sex or gender difference. The result was not significant, meaning that there were 
no differences in the likelihood of finding a sex or gender difference when blind or non-blind procedures 
were employed (X2= 0.845, DF=1, p>0.25). Thus, non-blind procedures do not seem to affect results. 
 
Table 3.4. Counts of studies employing blind or non-blind procedures divided by findings of difference. 
 Blind Not blind Totals 
Sex or gender difference 13 8 21 
No sex or gender difference 8 9 17 
Totals 21 17 38 
 
 
86 
 
Another way of looking at the effects of expectations on results could be the purpose of the 
study or the avowed theoretical framework. If researchers are looking for sex or gender differences, are 
they more likely to find differences? I logged the purpose of the study, but I did not log avowed 
theoretical framework. By avowed theoretical framework, I mean that the researchers suggested that 
purported differences are due to genetics, hormones, evolutionary processes, social and environmental 
factors, or an interaction of nature and nurture. Considering the expressed purpose of the study, 59% of 
studies looking for sex or gender differences indeed found differences (19/32). Of those not looking for 
sex or gender differences, only 33% (2/6) found differences. Again I ran a chi-square test to determine if 
there were differences between looking for differences or not looking and whether differences were 
found. The result was not significant, meaning that there were no differences in the likelihood of finding 
a sex or gender difference when looking for differences or not (X2= 1.351, DF=1, p>0.2). Thus, whether 
researchers were looking for differences did not seem to affect results. 
 
Table 3.5. Counts of studies divided by purpose and whether they found differences. 
 Looking for differences Not looking for differences Totals 
Sex or gender difference 19 2 21 
No sex or gender difference 13 4 17 
Totals 32 6 38 
 
  
 Although blinding and theoretical stance didn’t in the end affect the study’s likelihood of finding 
sex or gender differences, it is interesting that blind methods are not standard. I am not familiar with 
the whole of cognitive neuroscience, but I do know that similar studies comparing the brains of 
“normals” versus clinical populations, such as individuals with autism, do employ blind measurement 
procedures (Egaas, Courchesne, and Saitoh 1995). 
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E. Assumption that the results generalize universally 
Participants from the United States, Canada, and Germany were overrepresented. People living 
in different situations or from different social classes may have different results. Additionally, races or 
ethnicities of the participants were mostly unmentioned. One study used Japanese participants 
(Hayakawa et al. 1989), one used Asian Indians (Suganthy et al. 2003), one used South Africans 
(Constant and Ruther 1996), and one used South Koreans (Shin et al. 2005). Only two other studies 
commented on the racial makeup of their sample: all were of European descent except one Native 
American (Salat et al. 1997) and all were Caucasian (Morton and Rafto 2006). 
Researchers do not restrict their results to the population studied. They assume that there are 
no non-biological influences affecting CC structure to take into account, and as such, see their results as 
applying to all humans, in all countries and situations, across time. This assumption, that there is a 
universal brain structure, may be problematic if participants from different backgrounds have different 
brain structures. Indeed, this may be true. McShane et al. (1984) found differences in cerebral 
asymmetries on CT scans amongst American Indians, American whites and American blacks in 
Minnesota. Although McShane et al. did not measure the CC, cerebral asymmetry is assumed to be 
related to functional asymmetry and CC morphology. They found that more American Indians are 
structurally symmetric than whites are, and that whites are more left-asymmetric than blacks. This study 
suggests that different groups of people may have different brain development. As such, the assumption 
that the findings from one population generalize to others is questionable.  
Importantly, however, it is not clear whether McShane et al. were studying race or ethnicity. 
Since race and ethnicity are not considered when assessing the CC for sex or gender differences, the 
assumption of universal brain structure is racial-bias-free, but sex-essentialist: it assumes that 
differences between men and women trump differences between races or ethnicities. 
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What I find more worrying, though, is the possible white-centrism of the standard view of brain 
lateralization. Recall that the standard view regarding brain lateralization is structural and functional 
asymmetry, which was best exhibited by the whites in McShane et al.’s study. American Indians, blacks, 
and women are deviations from this standard. Add in left-handers, and the standard view of brain 
structure and function is based on white, right-handed men, and everyone else deviates from this 
standard (though see discussion below on handedness). 
 
F. Assumption that social and environmental factors do not affect CC development 
Researchers collected very little demographic information on participants. The most common 
demographics were education level and IQ. The full list of demographic information follows: transsexual 
individuals (Emory et al. 1991); education (Burke and Yeo 1994; Parashos et al. 1995; Müller-Oehring et 
al. 2007); IQ (Giedd et al. 1996); socioeconomic status (de Bellis et al. 2001); and education and IQ 
(Sullivan et al. 2001). Welcome et al. (2009) included language and family background, reading skill, 
intelligence, and parental education but did not compare these measures between groups nor use them 
in their analyses. Since they didn’t report demographic data on their participants, the researchers 
apparently assumed that it doesn’t matter. However, there is evidence that social experience influences 
CC morphology. In rodents, for example, Juraska and Kopcik (1988) found that environment affected CC 
development. Rats raised in an enriched environment had significantly larger anterior, middle and 
posterior thirds of the CC than rats raised in an impoverished environment. 
 Further evidence that experience affects CC development is demonstrated in human studies 
using musicians. Schlaug et al. (1995) and Öztürk et al. (2002) investigated CC structure of musicians and 
nonmusicians. They found that musicians had a larger anterior half of the CC and thicker CCs. They 
interpret musical training as an environmental factor affecting CC development. However, another of 
Schlaug’s studies (Lee, Chen, and Schlaug 2003), using a more gender-balanced sample, found no main 
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effect of gender or musicianship. Instead, they found a gender X musicianship interaction: male 
musicians had larger anterior CCs than male nonmusicians, but there was no effect in women. More 
studies must be done, but musical training seems to affect CC development. 
Reading is another arena investigated for changes in CC morphology. Castro-Caldas et al. (1999) 
scanned literate and illiterate women of low socioeconomic status from Portugal. They found that CC 
width measurements in the posterior midbody were significantly smaller in illiterate women. Thus, 
literacy can affect CC development. 
 The evidence on social and environmental experience suggests that investigations of sex or 
gender differences may be confounded by external factors and could result in the contradictory findings 
regarding CC morphology. Only 10 studies out of the 38, however, mentioned one of the above studies 
on environmental effects of CC development. Four cited one of the studies merely to note that they did 
not account for experiential factors in their study (Allen et al. 1991; Habib et al. 1991; Giedd et al. 1996; 
Giedd et al. 1999). Habib et al. stated that hormonal factors are a greater influence than experiential 
factors – even though they didn’t consider experiential factors. 
The ignorance of and disregard for studies revealing possible social and environmental 
influences on CC morphology is problematic. It may suggest, as Habib et al. indicate above, that 
researchers treat sex – biology, genetics, hormones – as the primary factor driving supposed sex or 
gender differences in CC morphology and social factors are not important. Whether the studies explicitly 
disregard the experience literature or implicitly ignore it, the studies are, possibly unsuspectingly, 
supporting a view of sex or gender differences that are a result of “nature” or “biology.” Such a view is 
sex-essentialist in that it reduces men and women to their biological, natural, sex-differentiated 
essences.  
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G. Handedness 
Handedness and the corpus callosum are not part of the original gendered hypothesis, but there 
is some interest in the interaction of handedness with functional and structural brain lateralization. 
Driesen and Raz (1995) found an effect of handedness, with an average effect size of d = -.13, meaning 
that lefties had larger CC areas than righties. They noted that the effect size has the same magnitude as 
the difference between men and women in CC area. Bishop and Wahlsten (1997) investigated 
handedness, but were not comfortable ruling on the issue because of the small number of studies 
investigating it and because the handedness measure itself is controversial. In my study, 13 out of the 38 
studies examined handedness. Six out of the 13 found an effect – either a main effect or a sex or gender 
x handedness interaction. An additional study, Clarke and Zaidel (1994), did a supplementary analysis in 
which they dropped one of their handedness groups, consistent left-handers, in order to replicate a 
finding from another article. Four of the six studies found main effects of handedness: nonconsistent 
right handers have larger CC areas than consistent right handers (Habib et al. 1991), right-handers have 
larger whole CCs than non-right-handers (Westerhausen et al. 2004), right-handers had thicker CCs than 
nonright-handers and had larger posterior and anterior midbody areas (Hopper et al. 1994), and left-
handedness was associated with less bulbous and thicker splenia (Peterson et al. 2001). Thus, there 
does not seem to be a reliable main effect of handedness on CC size. 
Three studies found handedness x sex or gender interactions. The Kertesz/Denenberg/Cowell 
set of articles present three contradictory findings. First, Kertesz et al. (1987) found no effect of 
handedness and no sex or gender x handedness interaction. Second, Denenberg et al. (1991) found a 
sex/gender x handedness interaction in the isthmus, with nonconsistent right-handed men having larger 
widths than the other groups. Third, Cowell et al. (1993) found a hand x sex or gender interaction in the 
rostral body and posterior midbody with opposite effects in men and women: CC widths of right-handed 
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women were larger than left-handed women and CC widths of left-handed men were larger than right-
handed men.  
The second study finding a sex or gender x handedness interaction was Habib et al. (1991). They 
found a main effect of handedness, then looked at the genders separately and found that nonconsistent 
right-handed men had a larger overall CC area than consistent right-handed men and that there was no 
difference between the two handedness groups in women. Finally, Burke and Yeo (1994) found that 
stronger right-hand preferences predicted larger posterior CC area in men but smaller overall but CC 
area in women. Taken together, these studies all find different results. Therefore, there does not seem 
to be a reliable sex or gender x handedness interaction. 
 
H. Correcting for multiple comparisons 
 Performing multiple statistical tests increases the likelihood that a significant result will arise by 
chance, rather than be a true finding. In other words, you have “found” a significant result that is not 
really significant, a false positive.  In statistical lingo, this is called Type I error. A number of researchers 
have written on the problem of multiple comparisons in neuroimaging data, but the most famous article 
is the dead salmon one (Bennett et al. 2010). Although Bennett et al. were concerned with functional 
neuroimaging, which compares thousands of voxels across conditions, the problem persists for the case 
of sex/gender differences in the CC. In the case of the CC, most studies investigated multiple measures, 
the most common of which were: CC length, whole CC area, halves, quarters, fifths, Witelson’s 7 areas 
(figure 3.2), width at midpoint, and maximum splenial width. That’s 22 measures. The problem is 
compounded when you do a number of CC measures by multiple groups: sex/gender; handedness; 
handedness x sex/gender; age; age x sex/gender; etc. Testing all these measures independently 
increases the likelihood of finding a false positive. However, the problem could be avoided by using a 
method to correct for multiple comparisons. The most common method was Bonferroni correction, 
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which decreases the standard p value to a lower value based on the number of comparisons tested. This 
method creates a more stringent standard and, as a result, decreases the number of false positives. (So 
if 5 comparisons were made, if the CC were divided into fifths, then the standard p value of 0.05 divided 
by 5 comparisons would yield a more stringent p value of 0.01.) However, not all studies needed to 
correct for multiple comparisons. For example, if a study used a single ANOVA, and followed up a 
significant finding with post-hoc t-tests, that’s fine. However, if the study used multiple ANOVAs or t-
tests, then they should have corrected for multiple comparisons. Alas, only 4 studies explicitly 
mentioned correcting for multiple comparisons: Allen et al. (1991); Johnson et al. (1994); Luders et al. 
(2003); and Luders et al. (2006a, 2006b). Thus, it is likely that some of the significant findings are false 
positives. 
 
I. General methodological critique: Dorion et al. (2001) 
 Dorion et al. (2001) is a methodological review of 17 MRI studies of sex/gender differences in 
the corpus callosum, from 1987-1997. Their concern was that the discrepancies across studies were due 
to methodological problems. They discuss 6 problems. First, the corpus callosum may decrease with age, 
so age may be confounding results. Second, handedness may affect CC size, or handedness and gender 
may interact to affect CC size. Third, some studies have small sample sizes and may not be sufficiently 
powered to find a “sexual dimorphism” (1080).  
The fourth problem they discuss has to do with MRI techniques. They point out 3 problems with 
MRI methodology: A) the signal-to-noise ratio may be too small due to a field of view that is too small; 
B) improper head positioning may lead to an off-centered (not “true”) midsagittal slice – "Measurement 
of the corpus callosum in other sagittal planes than the midsagittal image could mask the sex effect by 
increasing the variability in size" (1081); and C) a large voxel size or large slice thickness may result in 
93 
 
partial volume averaging, in which the voxel averages over the grey and white matter, and could lead to 
inaccurate demarcation of the corpus callosum.  
The fifth problem made three points having to do with the measurements of the CC: A) manual 
tracing of the CC requires data quality checks via inter- and intra-rater reliability, which was not always 
reported; B) there were at least four methods of partitioning the CC – straight-line, curved-line, bent-
line, and radial gravity – but there is little understanding of which measurement is best and if they can 
be compared to each other; and C) different brain measures and different statistical methods were used 
to calculate relative size of the corpus callosum in order to control for brain size.  
The sixth problem Dorion et al. discussed was that the means and standard deviations of the 
corpus callosum differed across studies. Out of the 17 studies they reviewed, only 13 studies provided 
the means and standard deviations of the corpus callosum for men and women separately. Of those 13, 
only 9 used sample sizes greater than 25.7 They found that the means for men across the 9 studies 
differed significantly and the means for women across the 9 studies differed significantly. They attribute 
this discrepancy to the uses of different methods. 
They conclude that "the methods used in the different studies are not equivalent and affect the 
results. Thus, direct comparison between results of various studies is not valid, and meta-analysis should 
not be used" (1086). They conclude that the inconsistency of results across studies could be explained 
by differences in methods. In other words, according to neuroimagers, the quality of the research in this 
area is suspect. 
 
                                                          
7 Two of the 9 studies actually use the same data: Steinmetz et al. (1995) and Jäncke et al. (1997). Dorion 
et al. did not mention this. It is likely that they missed this fact. 
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J. New tools: diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) 
1. Problems with standard parcellation schemes 
Diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) is a newer magnetic resonance imaging tool. It measures the 
direction of movement of water molecules. For the purposes of neuroimaging, it is used to separate 
white from gray matter within voxels, estimate fiber direction within a voxel, and trace fiber tracts. 
Hofer and Frahm (2006) used DTI to image, track and localize where in the cortex the corpus callosum 
fibers project. According to Hofer and Frahm, the traditional Witelson method of partitioning the CC 
divides it into 5 segments (figure 3.4, top). The anterior third is thought to contain fibers from the 
prefrontal, premotor and supplementary motor cortices. The anterior midbody is thought to contain 
fibers connecting the motor cortex. The posterior midbody is thought to contain fibers from the 
somatosensory and posterior parietal cortices. The posterior third (isthmus) and the posterior fifth 
(splenium) are thought to connect the temporal, parietal and occipital cortices. Witelson’s scheme is 
based off of nonhuman primate studies (Witelson 1989). DTI permits the comparison of Witelson’s 
scheme with human participants in vivo. 
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Figure 3.4. Comparison of Witelson’s parcellation scheme with Hofer and Frahm’s (2006) revised scheme 
(Hofer and Frahm 2006, 992). 
 
They scanned 8 right-handed participants (4 women, 4 men, aged 21-47 years). They mapped 
cortical fiber projections from the CC (see figure 3.1 for data from one participant). They found that 
Witelson’s scheme poorly fit the data. Instead, they propose a new system (figure 3.4, bottom). 
Whereas Witelson’s anterior third based on nonhuman primates8 was comprised of prefrontal, 
premotor and supplementary motor cortical projections, the revised anterior sixth is comprised of just 
                                                          
8 From now on, when I say primate I mean nonhuman primate, unless otherwise indicated. 
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human prefrontal cortical projections. Witelson’s anterior midbody, the primate motor cortex, is now 
extended anteriorly and comprises the human premotor and supplementary motor cortical projections. 
The posterior midbody area remains the same, but instead of being comprised of somaesthetic and 
posterior parietal projections as in the primate, the human posterior midbody contains motor cortex 
projections. The revised scheme pushes the posterior border of the isthmus forward, extending the 
splenium from the posterior fifth to the posterior quarter of the CC. The primate isthmus is made up of 
posterior parietal and superior temporal projections whereas the human isthmus is made up of sensory 
cortical projections. Finally, the primate splenium is made up of occipital and inferior temporal 
projections and the human splenium is comprised of parietal, temporal, and occipital projections.  
 Additionally, they found differences across their 8 participants (figure 3.5). As indicated by some 
of the CC studies (Byne et al. 1986 and Bleier et al. 1988, for example), not only is there considerable 
difference in CC size and shape, but there are also differences in locations of cortical projections along 
the midsagittal CC slice. 
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Figure 3.5. Maps of cortical projections in all 8 participants (left: 4 women; right: 4 men) in the 
midsagittal slice. Notice the differences amongst the participants, for example in violet (temporal lobe), 
orange (parietal lobe), and yellow (occipital lobe) (from Hofer and Frahm 2006, 992). Color scheme: 
green, prefrontal lobe; light blue, premotor and supplementary motor areas; dark blue, primary motor 
cortex; red, primary sensory cortex; orange, parietal lobe; yellow, occipital lobe; violet, temporal lobe. 
 
What Hofer and Frahm’s study reveals is that Witelson’s scheme based on nonhuman primates 
is an inadequate method for partitioning the CC into anatomical areas. Since the “arbitrary” method 
previously used in studies of sex or gender differences or handedness in the CC have resulted in 
inconclusive results, perhaps a better method, one more solidly grounded in human anatomy, may 
provide better results. As I suggested above, however, sex or gender (or handedness) may not be the 
best categories to use to study group differences in the CC, since the CC has been shown to reflect 
experience. The interindividual difference indicated in figure 3.5 further suggests that human 
development of the CC may involve many factors and that sex or gender may not be an illuminating or 
fruitful category to investigate. 
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2. Sex or gender differences using DTI 
DTI has been used to probe sex or gender differences in the CC. DTI differs from the traditional 
method of assessing CC morphology in that it investigates CC microstructure rather than 
macrostructure. Microstructural differences may be in the direction of fiber tracts, the size of fiber 
tracts, the ratio of white to gray matter, or the degree of myelination, for example. Some early studies 
demonstrated no sex or gender differences in the CC using DTI. Peled et al. (1998) investigated 
asymmetry in cerebral white matter between right-handed men and women and between left- and 
right-handed men and found no effect of sex or gender or handedness. Sullivan et al. (2001) investigated 
fractional anisotropy (measure of directional water movement – stronger values suggest the presence of 
a fiber tract) in men and women across the lifespan, finding no sex or gender differences, but an effect 
of aging in the corpus callosum. Abe et al. (2002) investigated mean diffusity and fractional anisotropy in 
a number of white-matter ROIs, finding no sex or gender differences, but an effect of aging in the corpus 
callosum.  
Later studies, however, found differences. Westerhausen et al. (2004), included in my review 
above, in addition to looking at CC macrostructural differences between men and women, also 
investigated CC microstructure using DTI. They found that men had more relative anisotropy in both the 
genu and posterior third than females. Relative anisotropy is a measure of the directionality of the 
diffusion of water molecules. Higher anisotropy values indicate that most of the water diffuses in the 
same direction, signifying, in this case, the presence of a fiber tract. There was no gender effect for 
mean diffusion. Mean diffusion is a measure of the overall diffusion within a voxel. It is an indicator of 
barriers to diffusion, such as cell membranes or the myelin sheath of axons. There was a handedness 
effect, however. Lefthanders had lower mean diffusion in both the genu and posterior third and higher 
relative anisotropy in the same regions compared to righthanders. 
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In discussing their results, they note that the gender effect is confounded by the difference in 
brain size. They suggest that a larger brain has a larger CC. Combining their microstructural results with 
histological studies showing that total number of fibers or fiber density is smaller in men, Westerhausen 
et al. propose that the difference in relative anisotropy suggests an altered myelination scheme – that 
the CC of men may have fewer but thicker myelinated fibers.   
However, in relating CC micro- and macrostructure, neither the area of the genu (anterior third) 
nor the area of the posterior third correlated with mean diffusion (MD) or relative anisotropy (RA). They 
state, “Therefore, an individual with a larger mid-sagittal area of the CC (or its subregions) may have 
either a higher or a reduced MD or RA” (424). This suggests that looking at proxies for fiber integrity 
(MD and RA) are unrelated to the theory that CC size can be measured as a proxy for lateralization. In 
other words, leaving aside the weakness of the assumption that CC size can be measured as a proxy for 
structural or functional lateralization, CC microstructure is unrelated to CC macrostructure: CC 
microstructure does not explain differences in CC size. However, this does leave open the possibility of a 
viable research program if we drop the assumption associating CC size with lateralization and instead 
investigate sex or gender differences in CC microstructure, with a new hypothesis regarding CC 
microstructural differences between men and women and relating those differences to purported 
gender differences in lateralization.9 However, given the problems I discuss above about the effects of 
                                                          
9 Although Westerhausen et al. (2004) did not find correlations between macro- and microstructure of 
the CC, they nevertheless probed their nonsignificant result further and looked at the gender and 
handedness groups separately, effectively uncovering a post-hoc correlation of RA and the area of the 
posterior third in right-handed participants. Although they find this meaningful, I am not considering it 
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experience on CC development, individual differences in CC development, and other issues related to 
sex essentialism, I do not endorse such a project on social and ethical and epistemic grounds. I do not 
think it will be empirically fruitful nor socially and ethically responsible to continue to look for 
sex/gender differences that may be used to further oppress women. 
 Another study using DTI to investigate sex or gender differences was Shin et al. (2005). They 
investigated fractional anisotropy (FA, similar to relative anisotropy), T1-weighted MRI signal intensity 
(SI, an index of myelination), and volume of 5 CC subareas for sex or gender differences. They found that 
women had greater signal intensities (calculated as a ratio of CC signal intensity to signal intensity of the 
3rd ventricle in the midsagittal slice) than men for all 5 areas of the CC. Also, the mean fractional 
anisotropy of the whole CC in men was larger than women. Post-hoc t-tests located the significant 
differences in the genu and posterior body.  
Shin et al. claims that their fractional anisotropy results are consistent with those of 
Westerhausen, but their CC subdivisions were defined differently. Westerhausen found differences in 
the anterior and posterior thirds, whereas Shin et al. found differences in the anterior fifth and middle 
fifth. Moreover, whereas Westerhausen et al. attributed relative anistropy differences to myelination, 
Shin et al. ruled that explanation out by using signal intensities. Since women had higher signal 
intensities across the whole CC, and signal intensity is an index of myelination, myelination can be ruled 
out as an explanation for higher fractional anistropy measures in men. Instead, Shin et al. see FA as 
more sensitive to axonal membrane properties, such as axonal diameter, packing density, or coherence, 
than myelination. Placing their results in context with a study that found that women have increased 
                                                          
because the overall result was nonsignificant and further analyses suggest they engaged in the 
questionable practice of data mining. 
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cortical complexity in the frontal and parietal cortices and their avowal of “a great deal of evidence” that 
suggests that “women have less pronounced hemispheric lateralization, and employ a greater degree of 
bilateral hemispheric activity during cognitive tasks, thereby suggesting that the female brain is 
structured more symmetrically than the male brain,” they “tentatively suggest” that “different axonal 
orientations might partially explain sex differences in the fractional anisotropy values of the corpus 
callosum. Women, having higher amounts of interconnections linking different topological areas 
between hemispheres, might have a generally lower axonal coherence value, resulting in lower 
anisotropy value in the corpus callosum of women than that of men” (798). 
Shin et al., like Westerhausen et al. (2004), looked at both CC macro- and micro-structure. Given 
that they didn’t find macrostructural differences in the CC between men and women, but that they 
found microstructural differences, they advocate further investigations at the microstructural level. This 
suggests that they think the question of size (macsrostructure) should be given up in favor of 
microstructure. 
Oh et al. (2007) is a third study using DTI to investigate sex/gender differences in the CC. They 
looked at both parasagittal and midsagittal CC fractional anisotropy values in men and women using 
template deformation, citing Denenberg et al. (1991). The template deformation method is an iterative 
process of normalizing and adjusting on individual brains. They also applied diffusion smoothing, a 
surface-based smoothing procedure. They found that, in general, men had higher fractional anistropy 
values in the corpus callosum midsagittally and parasagittally. A few foci had lower values in men, 
located in the genu, rostrum, isthmus and splenium. When women’s fractional anistropy values were 
larger than men’s, they were most often in the superior parts of the CC, though men had higher 
fractional anisotropy values than women in more regions, including those in the superior CC. They state: 
“In the present study, approximately 42% of the regions in which statistical analysis was conducted were 
found to show a significant (p<0.01) gender difference with respect to fiber integrity; globally higher FA 
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values in males as compared to females have been detected in voxels with significance of p<0.01 and 
some voxels were even significance of p<0.0001” (614). They suggest that their results indicate that men 
have a higher proportion of densely packed, thin fibers across the CC compared to women. They 
additionally suggest that “higher amounts of interconnecting fiber tracts between functionally different 
areas in females as compared to males, which is relevant to a lesser degree of hemispheric lateralization 
and more bilateral hemispheric activities during cognitive tasks in females, can be thought as another 
factor of the gender difference of FA values” (614). 
 The last study on microstructural sex or gender differences in the CC was Menzler et al. (2011). 
They found microstructural sex or gender differences in white matter in the thalamus, midbrain, 
cingulum and corpus callosum using DTI. Specifically, they found that men had larger fractional 
anisotropy values in the corpus callosum in both the right and left hemisphere and that men had lower 
radial diffusivity values in both the left and right corpus callosum. Fractional anisotropy (FA) is a 
nonspecific indicator of white matter microstructural alterations, thought to reflect directionality of 
diffusion. Radial diffusity (RD) is a measure of diffusions along directions orthogonal to the primary 
diffusion direction. It is thought to be associated with changes associated with myelination or the 
morphology of glial cells. They also measured axial diffusity (AD), which measures diffusion along the 
primary diffusion direction, but found no sex or gender differences. Axial diffusity is thought to provide a 
measure of the integrity of axons or changes in extra-axonal or extracellular space.  
 However, I find it difficult to interpret their results. They list MNI coordinates of areas for the 
left and right CC for their FA and RD results, but do not describe the locations of the loci. I used four 
methods to transform the MNI coordinates to Talairach space to locate the regions on the Talairach 
atlas, but each of the three methods resulted in coordinates not on the Talairach brain, which leads me 
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to consider that the reported coordinates are incorrect.10 They do, however, provide a figure to 
illustrate their findings. The problem with the figure is that it comprises only a midsagittal slice, so there 
is no way to visually discern the authors’ parasagittal findings. In any case, according to their figure 
(figure 1 on page 2560, reproduced below as figure 3.6), the superior and inferior borders of the 
posterior midbody and the superior border of the rostral body on the midsagittal image display 
differences in FA, in that men show larger FA values (A in figure 3.6 below). Decreased RD for men was 
found in the superior and inferior border of the posterior midbody (D in figure 3.6). 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 The four methods were: the Talairach Daemon (Research Imaging Institute 2015); the MNI to 
Talairach Coordinate Converter (BioImage Suite 2015); redoing the affine transform (Brett 2002); and a 
non-linear transformation (Brett 2002).  
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Figure 3.6. Sex or gender differences in FA (top) and RD (bottom). The common white matter skeleton is 
shown in green. Increased anisotropy appears as yellow (A-C) and decreased radial diffusivity as blue (D-
F) in the thalamus, corpus callosum, and cingulum in males as compared with females. Note differences 
in the corpus callosum in the midsagittal view (A and D) (from Menzler et al. 2011, p. 2560). 
 
They interpret their results to suggest that there are “differences in the degree of myelination in 
men versus women” (2559) and that their results “might be related to the higher gray/white matter 
ratio or less coherent cortico-cortical projections in female subjects” (2559, references removed). They 
note that they are unable to comment on the origin of the observed sex or gender differences. They 
implicate sex steroids mediating the difference and mention the purported decreased lateralization in 
females. They state: “The differences between male and female Corpora callosi in the present study 
might be a microstructural correlate of the possible sex differences in hemispheric lateralization” (2560). 
 To summarizing the DTI findings, whereas Sullivan et al. (2001) and Abe et al. (2002) found no 
sex/gender differences in FA, Westerhausen et al. (2004), Shin et al. (2005), Oh et al. (2007), and 
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Menzler et al. (2011) found that men had higher FA values in several parts of the CC: genu and posterior 
third (Westerhausen et al.); whole CC (though post-hoc analyses revealed that the differences were in 
the genu and posterior body, Shin et al.); throughout the mid- and parasagittal CC, with the exception of 
a few small foci (Oh et al.); and both left and right hemispheres (Menzler et al. 2011). 
Abe et al. and Westerhausen et al. found no sex/gender differences in mean diffusion. 
Shin et al. found that women had greater T1-weighted MRI signal intensity than men for all 5 
areas of the CC. Menzler et al. found that women had higher RD values in both left and right 
hemispheres and no sex/gender differences in AD. 
Thus, it appears that there may be some differences in FA, with men having greater FA values 
than women in some parts of the CC and that women have greater myelination throughout the CC, but 
more work needs to be done to find consistent results and to better understand what the DTI measures 
indicate regarding axon size, fiber tract direction, degree of myelination, etc. 
The problem with the state of DTI in terms of sex/gender differences in CC microstructure is that 
DTI is still a nascent field and researchers are still developing scanning parameters, algorithms and other 
methods to make it more accurate, precise, and useful. Moreover, research needs to be done to 
connect CC microstructure to CC macrostructure, provided that CC macrostructure is connected to 
overall pattern of lateralization or task-specific patterns of brain activation, which may be quite sketchy. 
Perhaps, then, future research should skip the middle steps (connecting CC microstructure to 
macrostructure to overall pattern of brain activation or task-specific brain activation) and instead look 
into connecting CC microstructure directly to patterns of activation on specific cognitive tasks. 
 
K. A different approach 
Oka et al. (1999) found orientation differences in the CCs of men and women. They used scans 
of 67 adults (34 females and 33 males, aged 20-50) who complained of headache or dizziness at the 
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Kagawa Medical University Hospital outpatient clinic (Japan). Subjects were right-handed and had no 
evidence of neurological or psychiatric illness. MRI scans (1.0 T) were scanned with a color scanner, 
converted to Adobe Photoshop, and analyzed using a software package. Four angles were measured on 
each midsagittal image. All four angles showed sexual dimorphism: two angles were larger in women 
and two were larger in men (figure 3.7). 
  In their discussion they note that “No sexual dimorphism of CC could be detected when the 
present data were analyzed using CC area measurements as in the previously reported studies” (939). 
They interpret their results as showing that the splenium in men is lower than that in women, which 
may mean that men’s CC as a whole might be located more caudally than in females.  
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Figure 3.7. Differences in CC orientation between men and women. Top: orientation lines drawn on 
midsagittal MRI images for a woman (left) and a man (right). Bottom: tracings of the CC and brainstem 
with angles indicated for a woman (left), a man (center), and the two superimposed to show 
discrepancies in orientation angles (right) (modified from Oka et al. 1999, p. 938). 
 
It is hard to say much about the Oka et al. finding that the tilt of the CC differs between men and 
women since it is only one study and it was not motivated by any theory. Additionally, it consisted of 
only right-handed individuals. It functions as a merely exploratory, descriptive study. Oka et al. don’t 
speculate what the anatomical differences amount to cognitively. They tentatively suggest that the 
differences are due to developmental factors – the CC in men is pushed down due to men’s larger 
cerebral cortex or the CC in women is pushed up due to women’s more developed temporal and 
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occipital cortex – without considering if there are any functional implications for the different degree of 
tilt. 
An alternate explanation for sex/gender differences in the CC was proposed by Driesen and Raz 
(1995). They point out the size difference between men’s and women’s heads – and the resulting 
difference in the sizes of their brains. Since men’s heads and brains are bigger than women’s, and corpus 
callosum size only modestly correlates with brain size, Driesen and Raz (1995) point out that “sex 
differences in CC area may imply the need to connect greater areas of cortex rather than differences in 
brain laterality or interhemispheric transfer” (241). In other words, it might be an engineering or 
architecture problem. They don’t speculate further, but it is an interesting proposal.  
My thought is that the overall organization of brains differs depending on size. Consider a small 
town. There are many roads that make direct connections from one location to another. If you want to 
get from A to B, you travel the local roads. Compare this to a large city. Although there are many roads, 
oftentimes, the best way to get from A to B is to take a local road to a highway, and then exit onto 
another local road to travel to your destination. Highways (fiber tracts) collect traffic from many local 
roads (neurons) for efficient long-distance travel. It is more efficient for smaller brains to make more 
direct connections, whereas efficiency is achieved in larger brains by bundling information “traffic” into 
fiber tracts to travel longer distances. It just so happens that, on average, men have larger brains, so 
men are more likely to develop a brain organization that fits their larger brain size. Women’s brains, 
which are smaller, are able to make more shorter-distance, “local” connections to accomplish the same 
tasks. This architectural/engineering explanation may then supplant the gendered lateralization 
hypothesis: rather than men and women having different functional or cognitive styles, the size of the 
brain determines overall brain organization, which has implications for brain structure and function. The 
same cognitive task may be accomplished in at least two different ways, utilizing either a smaller-brain, 
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local or direct network, or a larger-brain, distributed network. In other words, it may not be sex/gender 
that shapes the architecture of brains but brain size. 
Some of the articles I reviewed for this study may be interpreted to support my alternative 
hypothesis. For example, Westerhausen et al. (2004), in explaining the relative anisotropy difference 
between men and women, suggest that men have fewer fibers in their corpora collosa than women, but 
that those fibers are more thickly myelinated. This would support my suggestion that larger brains need 
to rely more on long-distance, well-myelinated fiber tracts for communication than smaller brains.  
Menzler et al. (2011) interpret their results to suggest that there are “differences in the degree of 
myelination in men versus women” (2559) and that their results “might be related to the higher 
gray/white matter ratio or less coherent cortico-cortical projections in female subjects” (2559, 
references removed). Again, if smaller brains are making more direct connections, they may rely more 
on gray matter for information transfer and less on long-distance white-matter “highways.” 
The proposal I’m suggesting is an empirical one. Existing functional and structural data sets 
could be re-analyzed based on brain size rather than sex/gender to investigate differences in CC size or 
shape, task-related functional activation, functional connectivity, and white matter structure and 
organization. Focusing on sex/gender as the key categorical variable, however, obscures such a 
consideration, and as such, needs to be dropped in order to pursue other interesting research avenues. 
 
Conclusion 
The interest in sex or gender differences of the corpus callosum relates to purported differences 
in overall brain organization between men and women, with men being more functionally and 
structurally symmetric and women being more asymmetric. However, there are a number of links tying 
this view together. Some assumptions I do not consider in this chapter, such as the hypothesis that men 
and women have different patterns of brain organization, the assumption that the size and shape of the 
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CC (its macrostructure) reflects differences in brain organization, and the assumption that a certain 
pattern of brain organization is most efficient for certain types of tasks.  
Other links I do consider, such as the hypothesis that men and women's CCs differ in terms of 
size or shape. I find no reliable sex or gender differences in the CC or its subareas in terms of size or 
shape. I also consider the assumption that experience doesn't affect CC development, and I have shown 
that this is false. I consider the assumption that findings from industrialized, affluent, Western, mostly 
white subjects apply across races or ethnic groups, and I suggest that McShane et al.'s (1984) findings 
throw that into question. I consider the assumption that the CC's "arbitrary" subdivisions, based on 
nonhuman primate dissections, accurately relates to human anatomy. I point to Hofer and Frahm 
(2006), which shows that they do not.  
Given the failure of the current method of using the midsagittal slice to assess macrostructural 
sex or gender differences in the CC, we might want to look at DTI to investigate microstructural sex or 
gender differences. However, the one study that attempted to relate microstructural and 
macrostructural data failed to show a relationship: measures of diffusion do not correlate with CC 
subarea size (Westerhausen et al. 2004).  
Thus, there are a number of assumptions and links involved in the hypothesis relating sex or 
gender to CC size or shape and overall pattern of brain organization. I do not consider every one, but 
those that I do are shaky. I hope that I have revealed that the epistemic foundations for this research 
program are insecure. In addition to demonstrating that there is no evidence for sex/gender differences 
in the size or shape of the corpus callosum, I have demonstrated that a framework of sex essentialism 
backgrounds research in this domain. This framework arises in four specific ways. First, researchers 
continue to look for differences, even though they have failed to consistently find one. Second, 
researchers do not distinguish sex and gender terms, contributing to the confusion regarding the cause 
(sex/nature, gender/nurture, or a combination of nature and nurture) of purported differences. Third, 
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researchers assume that their results generalize universally across cultures and across time. Fourth, 
researchers ignore or disregard experiential explanations for purported difference, thereby explicitly or 
implicitly supporting sex-essentialist views of brain development. Other problems arise in the 
methodology: how participants are assigned to groups, failing to correct for multiple comparisons, and 
using an “arbitrary” parcellation scheme based on nonhuman primates that may not suitably reflect 
human anatomy. 
Taken together, these practices uphold the historical tradition of attributing purported 
differences between men and women to nature or biology and may be further used to deny women’s 
equality. Thus, the research program is epistemically unsound for ignoring or disregarding evidence that 
contradicts the preferred view – the sex-essentialist framework grants only a partial or distorted view of 
the world – as well as being socially and morally irresponsible for its complicity in the continued 
oppression of women. 
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Chapter 4 
Mental rotation case study 
 
Introduction 
Visuospatial tasks typically display sex or gender differences favoring men. According to Linn and 
Peterson (1985), “Differences between males and females in spatial ability are widely acknowledged” 
(1479). Visuospatial ability refers to skill in representing, transforming, generating, and recalling non-
linguistic, symbolic information (Linn and Peterson 1985). 
 One of the most studied visuospatial tasks is mental rotation. Participants are presented with 
two objects and are asked if the two objects are the same object rotated at different angles or are 
different objects – a mirror image of the other object (see examples in Figure 4.1, A and B). According to 
Fine (2010), “Mental rotation performance is the largest and most reliable gender difference in 
cognition. In a typical sample, about 75 percent of people who score above average are male” (27).  
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Figure 4.1. (A and B) Examples of Shepard-Metzler figures used in a neuroimaging experiment. (C) 
Example of control stimuli used in a neuroimaging experiment. (D) Task design: order of tasks in the 
scanner (from Tagaris et al. 1996, 774). 
 
Mental rotation is related to the lateralization hypothesis in that, as a visuospatial task, it is 
thought to be right-lateralized (McGlone 1980). Given that men are thought to be more lateralized than 
women, men’s superior performance on mental rotation tasks seems to be explained by 1) their more 
lateralized brains and 2) mental rotation as a (right) lateralized task. I note the weasel-y phrase “seems 
to be explained” because the supposed links are far from demonstrated.  
The social and ethical issue related to the neuroimaging of mental rotation is the purported link 
between math and spatial skills and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields. 
Not only is it thought that math and spatial skills are related, but both math and spatial skills are thought 
to be related to scientific reasoning as well. Another “seeming” explanation for women’s 
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underperformance and underrepresentation in math and science fields is their underperformance on 
math and spatial tests. Neuroimaging research on sex or gender differences in math and visuospatial 
tasks, such as mental rotation, is thought to provide evidence that women’s underperformance is due to 
a neural, natural, biological difference. Thus, this research may be taken to demonstrate women’s 
natural, biological unworthiness for STEM careers, and may be used by individuals and institutions to 
deny extra resources to increase the representation of women in STEM fields. Why waste resources on 
individuals who are unable to benefit from them? Moreover, granting a natural, biological basis for the 
underrepresentation of women in STEM fields shifts social and policy-related attention and resources 
away from combatting social and institutional barriers that hold women back, such as sexist work 
environments and implicit biases against women. 
In reviewing the literature, I used a two-pronged approach. The first prong was assessing the 
science based on its own empirical standards in order to formulate an internal critique. This involved 
assessing the empirical findings and the methodology. Are there sex or gender differences in the 
activation associated with mental rotation processing?  Does the research on sex or gender differences 
uphold the standards of science in cognitive neuroscience or other related sciences?  
The second prong was assessing the science based on feminist concerns aided by my assuming 
the feminist standpoint in order to formulate an external critique. How are women’s lives different from 
men’s lives and how does that affect mental rotation performance and mental rotation processing? How 
does research in this domain add to the oppression experienced by women? Are there other 
possibilities, other than sex, that may better explain differences, if differences are found? Were the 
researchers making a distinction between sex and gender? Between nature and nurture? What language 
is used to report results? Is there sexism in the field? Is it explicit or implicit? I looked at the content of 
the science, the practices, the culture, and the power structures at play to identify what the research 
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was focusing on and neglecting, theories, background assumptions, analyses, and language, and the 
implications of the research. 
To briefly preview my findings, I find neuroimaging articles fail to elicit the supposed 
performance advantage for men. Additionally, I find no evidence of sex or gender differences in the 
mental rotation activation. Researchers' expectation of difference drives continued research in this area, 
as evidenced by researchers rejecting or reinterpreting their own findings of no difference in order to fit 
within the standard framework rather than questioning it. Like the corpus callosum case study, 
researchers are sloppy regarding their use of sex and gender terms, often using them interchangeably, 
they do not describe how they created their groups. Researchers do not routinely engage in blind data 
analysis procedures, resulting in "cognitive strategy" explanations that rely on sex/gender stereotypes. 
They assume their results generalize for all humans, despite mostly testing relatively well-educated 
individuals from a few industrialized, Western countries. Researchers fail to consider the role of social 
and environmental factors on mental rotation ability or performance, betraying a bias for biological-
based explanations rather than experience-based. Underlying many of these problems is the 
problematic assumption of sex essentialism, which is the view that men and women are essentially 
different due to their sex-based, natural, biological essences.  
 In sum, I find that researchers continue to look for differences in order to affirm the expectation 
that men’s supposed performance advantage has a neurological basis. I conclude that current practice in 
the neuroimaging of sex or gender differences in mental rotation processing is methodologically and 
theoretically flawed and contributes to the reduction of sex or gender differences to nature. It is sex-
essentialist and socially and ethically irresponsible. 
Looking ahead, in the final chapter, I combine the specifics of practice in cognitive neuroimaging 
from this chapter and previous chapter on the corpus callosum with feminist standpoint empiricism to 
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construct a philosophy and practice of cognitive neuroimaging that overcomes the problems I identify. 
But first, I present the history of sex or gender differences research on mental rotation processing. 
 
History 
Shepard and Metzler (1971) created the standard mental rotation task. They were interested in 
the time it took for people to recognize whether a pair of two-dimensional representations of three-
dimensional objects were identical or not and if the axis of rotation made a difference. They created 
abstract 10-block line drawings instead of using two-dimensional drawings of common three-
dimensional objects to control for interaction with previous experience (figure 4.1). They found that 
reaction times increased with increased angle of rotation. Although they only used eight subjects 
(sex/gender was unreported), each subject underwent 1600 trials. The strategy subjects reported was to 
“[attempt] to rotate one end of one object into congruence with the corresponding end of the other 
object; they discovered that the two objects were different when, after this ‘rotation,’ the two free ends 
still remained noncongruent” (703). Thus, the standard strategy for mental rotation is thought to involve 
the encoding of a visual image into a mental representation, which is then rotated in order to compare it 
with another visual image. Since the time it took subjects to compare the two images increased with 
greater angles of disparity, Tagaris et al. (1996), the first neuroimaging study of mental rotation, 
assumed that subjects were rotating a mental image of the figure in the same way they would physically 
rotate an object in their hands. 
After the Shepard and Metzler paper introduced the method of studying mental rotation to the 
scientific community, many other researchers took up the method. Vandenberg and Kuse (1978) were 
the first to put the accumulating data together to claim that males had an advantage on spatial tasks, 
including mental rotation. Importantly, the authors remained noncommittal as to the cause of the 
observed sex or gender difference. They state: “…sex differences in spatial ability increases with the 
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onset of puberty, either because of the effect of hormones or due to greater pressure of sex-role 
expectations” (602). However, they also note that “Subjects report that it is more difficult to solve the 
items verbally in the Mental Rotations Test than in the other spatial tests. If so, this may explain why the 
usual sex difference in favor of males is more pronounced” (602). Thus, the authors assume that women 
use verbal strategies to solve spatial tasks, which is a less effective strategy for solving mental rotation 
problems, to explain the observed sex or gender difference. 
After Vandenberg and Kuse (1978), there were a number of studies interested in sex or gender 
differences in spatial tasks. An early meta-analysis was Hyde (1981), comprising articles prior to 1974. 
The next important meta-analysis was Linn and Peterson (1985), using articles published from 1974-
1982. The third was Voyer, Voyer and Bryden (1995), which included articles from Hyde, Linn and 
Peterson, and articles published from 1974-1993. Voyer et al. which was the most highly cited among 
the neuroimaging articles I reviewed. 
Hyde (1981) investigated visuospatial sex/gender differences in papers using only participants 
from the United States. She assessed cognitive gender differences in multiple domains. Focusing on just 
the visuospatial results, she reports an effect size (d) of 0.45. Effect size is the mean standardized 
difference between two groups. An effect size of 0.45 is moderate according to the standard 
interpretation. What it means is that the means of men and women are approximately half a standard 
deviation apart. 
Linn and Peterson (1985) performed a meta-analysis of papers published after the cutoff for the 
Hyde paper. Early on, they note in a footnote: 
Note that the term “sex” is used to reflect that individuals are assigned to groups on the basis of 
being males or females. This choice of term does not imply that biological differences account 
for the observed performance of the group. Clearly, different socialization experiences are also 
associated with membership in the two groups. (1479) 
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Linn and Peterson investigated the homogeneity of the effect sizes across the different tests of 
spatial ability. Finding that the effect sizes were not homogeneous, they divided the studies based on 3 
categories: spatial perception, mental rotation, and spatial visualization. Spatial perception involves 
participants determining spatial relationships with respect to their own bodies while ignoring distracting 
visual cues. Mental rotation involves rotating a two-dimensional representation of a two- or three-
dimensional figure to determine if it matches a target figure. Spatial visualization involves complicated, 
multistep manipulations of spatially presented information that may involve aspects of spatial 
visualization and mental rotation. Spatial visualization problems differ from the other two categories 
because they may be solved by multiple strategies. If homogeneity was still not accomplished in the 
category, they attempted an age analysis or further division of task. 
They found a non-homogeneous effect size of 0.44 for spatial perception (62 studies), which was 
not significant. Mental rotation also yielded a non-homogeneous effect size of 0.73 (29 studies). Age did 
not reduce heterogeneity, so they divided the mental rotation category into two groups based on task: 
the Vandenberg and Kuse (1978) version of the Shepard and Metzler task and Primary Mental Abilities 
(PMA) space or Coordinated Viewpoints. The Vandenberg test yielded a large, significant effect size, 
0.94. PMA space yielded a small, significant effect size, 0.26. Spatial visualization was homogeneous, so 
no further partitioning was necessary. The effect size was small and not significantly different from zero, 
0.13 (81 studies).  
Linn and Peterson conclude that spatial ability is not a single ability but several abilities. 
Moreover, their findings challenge the hypothesis that sex or gender differences in spatial ability are 
present in childhood. Significant differences only emerge for spatial perception at age 18, spatial 
visualization displays no sex differences, and mental rotation results in sex differences at all ages, 
though some versions of the test are not appropriate for children under age 13. 
119 
 
In offering explanations for sex/gender differences in spatial ability, they offer two suggestions: 
women and girls may be more likely to select and use less efficient strategies and may be less likely to 
acquire efficient strategies. They note, however, that these two suggestions could reflect different 
experiences for boys/men and girls/women. Thus, if girls/women really are using less efficient 
strategies, it is an open question if it is because they are biologically programmed to or if socialization 
experiences do not afford them the same opportunities as boys/men to learn more efficient strategies. 
Importantly, they do not claim that girls/women are using less efficient strategies. They are merely 
suggesting it as a possibility. They note, “To the extent that any biological factors affect spatial ability 
they would interact with sex-typed experiences and sex-role expectations to produce the observed 
patterns of performance” (1494, references removed).  
Voyer, Voyer and Bryden (1995) is the most well-known meta-analysis for the studies included 
in my case study. It was the most comprehensive: it included the studies from Hyde (1981), Linn and 
Peterson (1985), and studies published from 1974-1993. Only published studies were included, so some 
studies from the Hyde and Linn and Peterson articles were excluded. In order to counteract the “file 
drawer problem,” which describes the possibility that only positive findings get published whereas 
studies with negative findings don’t and thus accumulate in filing cabinets, Voyer et al. calculate a fail-
safe number. The fail-safe number is the number of studies averaging an effect size of zero that would 
be needed to offset the significance of the published positive findings. A large fail-safe number suggests 
that the finding is not subject to the “file drawer problem.” 
About the studies included, they note, “in a large number of those studies, the primary purpose 
was not to test the existence of sex differences in spatial skills; rather, sex of participants was examined 
only because it was easily observable” (252). Thus, sex or gender differences was not the primary 
interest in many of the articles. Rather, sex/gender analyses were reported because it was an easy 
analysis to do. 
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They used the three hypothesized groupings for spatial tasks from Linn and Peterson’s (1985) 
meta-analysis as well as an analysis based on age. When heterogeneity persisted, they further 
subdivided the categories based on the specific tests used, age of participants, and test-specific 
procedural variables.  
The overall effect size of the 286 studies was d=0.37 (z=2.61, p < 0.01), meaning that sex 
differences favoring males is significant. Congruent with Linn and Peterson, Voyer et al. found that the 
effect sizes were not homogeneous. Partitioning the studies into Linn and Peterson’s 3 categories 
resulted in a replication of Linn and Peterson’s findings: men outperform women for spatial perception 
and mental rotation and there are no significant sex/gender differences for spatial visualization. 
Comparing the two meta-analyses, both Linn and Peterson (n=62) and Voyer et al. (n=92) found a spatial 
perception effect size of 0.44. For mental rotation, Linn and Peterson found an effect size of 0.73 (n=29) 
and Voyer et al. found an effect size of 0.56 (n=78). For spatial visualization, Linn and Peterson found an 
effect size of 0.13 (n=81) and Voyer et al. found an effect size of 0.19 (n=116). 
Focusing on mental rotation, Voyer et al. showed a smaller effect size than that reported by Linn 
and Peterson, but it was still considered “moderate” in size. They calculated a fail-safe number of 
25,304, meaning that there needs to be 25,304 unpublished studies of no sex/gender differences sitting 
in drawers to counteract the published findings. It is presumably unlikely that there is such a large 
number of unpublished studies sitting in a file drawer, so it appears that the file drawer problem is not 
an issue. The effect size can be interpreted in standard deviation units, meaning that, on average, males 
outperform women by about 0.6 standard deviation units on mental rotation tasks. 
Heterogeneity remained in all 3 categories, so they followed Linn and Peterson’s approach and 
subdivided the categories based on age. However, homogeneity was only achieved in a few cases, so 
they then calculated effect sizes for the individual tests. Four of the 12 tests did not show significant 
sex/gender differences. When heterogeneity persisted, effect sizes were calculated for age groups. 
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When heterogeneity remained, additional, task-specific factors were considered. The mental rotations 
test (Vandenberg and Kuse version) achieved homogeneity when partitioned based on scoring 
procedure. The test consists of 20 items, each of which has two correct answers. The two main scoring 
methods are the following: it can be scored out of 20 if participants must correctly identify the two 
answers per item to receive credit for the item, or it can be scored out of 40 if credit is given for every 
correct answer. When scored out of 20 (n=19), the effect size was 0.94. When scored out of 40 (n=13), 
the effect size was 0.70. Three studies used modified versions of the test and yielded an effect size of 
0.14 (not significant). Thus, the two main scoring methods of the Vandenberg and Kuse mental rotation 
task both display sex/gender differences in favor of men, with the scoring procedure out of 20 showing 
the greatest sex/gender difference. In fact, the effect sizes for the two main scoring procedures were 
significantly different.  
Interestingly, Voyer et al. analyzed the change in effect size over time. When looking at 
individual tests, they found that the effect size of most tests did not differ depending on the 
generational age of most participants. However, 4 tests showed a significant decrease in effect size over 
time, meaning that the sex/gender difference in younger generations is smaller than the difference in 
older generations. In other words, on those tests, the sex/gender difference is decreasing in younger 
generations. Only one test, the mental rotations test, resulted in a significant increase in effect size over 
time, meaning that the sex/gender difference is greater for younger generations than it is for older 
generations. In other words, the male performance advantage in mental rotation is increasing over time. 
These findings partially support Feingold’s (1988) hypothesis that  
cognitive sex differences are decreasing in magnitude, and it argues for the plausibility of the 
interpretation that changes in attitudes toward sex differences in cognitive abilities, changes in 
attitudes toward the sexes, or changes in educational practices have an effect on the size of sex-
related differences in specific tasks. (Voyer et al. 1995, 264)  
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However, the mental rotations test challenges this view. Voyer et al. state:  
The failure of social changes to reduce the magnitude of sex differences on the Mental 
Rotations Test supports the claim that basic biological differences between females and males 
may play a role in determining cognitive sex differences on this test and should not be discarded 
in favor of exclusively environmental explanations. However, biological factors alone cannot 
account better than environmental factors for an increase in the magnitude of sex differences in 
recent years. More empirical work is needed if we are to disentangle the influence of social, 
environmental, and biological factors on the magnitude of sex differences in spatial 
performance in general and on the Mental Rotations Test in particular. (264) 
I disagree with Voyer et al.’s assessment. I think it is presumptuous to take the anomalous 
mental rotation result out of context. Given that most effect sizes are either staying the same or 
decreasing, basing a view off one anomalous result is silly. Certainly it is interesting that some effect 
sizes are staying the same or decreasing while one is increasing, but I don’t think it is clear evidence in 
favor of biological or biological plus environmental explanations. If biology strongly played a role, 
wouldn’t it affect all the purportedly related spatial tests similarly? Moreover, is an increase in effect 
size over time supposed to indicate that human biology is changing to be more sexually dimorphic in the 
past 50 years? 
Returning to the meta-analysis, Voyer et al. note in their discussion: 
For many tests, heterogeneity of effect size was achieved only by partitioning according to some 
aspect of the way the test was administered or scored. The fact that such procedural factors 
have a strong influence on effect size indicates that serious attention should be given to the way 
in which particular tests are administered. (262) 
Given the finding that test administration affects performance, they suggest that future research should 
examine how the scoring and administration of tests differentially affect men and women. 
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Regarding the cause of sex or gender differences, Voyer et al. mentioned the variety of 
explanations offered – including cognitive strategy, rate of maturation, cerebral lateralization, genes, 
hormones, experience and socialization, and sex role identification – without endorsing any. As they 
note, the meta-analysis procedure they followed did not allow them to test amongst the proposed 
causes. 
Voyer, Voyer and Bryden (1995) became the definitive text for men’s superior performance in 
spatial tasks, especially mental rotation. Most of the neuroimaging studies cite it. It is an important 
supporting beam of the framework for the research on sex or gender differences in visuospatial ability. 
As such, the authors have to explain their findings within or in response to this framework. 
In the late 1980s, new neuroimaging technologies were adopted by cognitive psychology and 
were seen as a way to connect cognitive psychology to neuroscience. Electroencephalography (EEG) had 
been around for a long time, but new imaging methods such as Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) were developed in medicine and were beginning to be applied to 
cognitive research. A new emerging field of cognitive neuroscience arose built mainly on these new 
neuroimaging technologies. As such, many established protocols and research interests in cognitive 
psychology were modified for neuroimaging technologies. Visuospatial processing and sex and gender 
differences were two such research questions. 
The early interest in visuospatial processing was in locating where in the brain it occurred. 
Researchers quickly identified the parietal lobes as the locus for visuospatial processing. The next 
question involved the contribution of the left vs. right parietal lobe. Given the lateralization hypothesis I 
discussed in the previous chapters and the preliminary findings, researchers hypothesized that the right 
parietal lobe was specialized for visuospatial processing. The third question involved the question of sex 
or gender differences in visuospatial processing. These three questions – where in the brain does 
visuospatial processing occur, is visuospatial processing a predominately right-hemisphere task, and do 
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men’s and women’s brain activation differ when completing visuospatial tasks – shaped the 
neuroimaging research on visuospatial processing. 
 
Case study 
Method 
 On August 16, 2011, I searched the databases PsycINFO and MEDLINE for the terms “mental 
rotation,” “human sex differences,” and “brain.” Additional articles were found from the references 
section of the relevant papers. This resulted in 14 studies,1 which designated in the bibliography with 
two asterisks. Three studies were re-analyses of previous studies: Hugdahl et al. (2006) was a re-analysis 
of Thomsen et al. (2000); Butler et al. (2007) was a re-analysis of Butler et al. (2006); and Kucian et al. 
(2007) re-analyzed Kucian et al. (2005) and added a group of children to compare. Of the 11 original 
studies (ignoring for the moment the 3 re-analyses), seven studies used Shepard-Metzler figures. Jordan 
et al. (2002) used Shepard-Metzler figures, letters, and shapes, but they did not analyze the stimuli 
separately: they collapsed their data across conditions. Four studies used other stimuli. Seurinck et al. 
(2004) used photographs of hands and tools, Kucian et al. (2005) and Kucian et al. (2007) used line 
drawings of seahorses, whales and squids, and Gizewski et al. (2006) used 2-dimensional geometric 
figures. (Halari et al. 2006) did not describe their stimuli, other than to state they used three-
dimensional figures. 
I read the papers with an eye to the following: (1) the theoretical framework within which the 
authors situated their research (introduction and discussion sections); (2) subjects: sample size, the 
                                                          
1 An additional study was excluded (Tagaris et al. 1998) because it did not use a standard activation 
analysis method and it did not compare activation between men and women. 
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choice of participants, participants’ demographic information, and participant recruitment procedures; 
(3) experimental and control tasks; (4) behavioral performance; (5) group comparisons on activation 
data; (6) additional activation analyses; and (7) the authors’ interpretation of the data, which is 
connected to their theoretical framework (1). 
There are a few differences between the scanning procedure for the corpus callosum and 
mental rotation. Whereas some of the early corpus callosum studies used MRI scans on file from 
databases, functional scans cannot do that. Participants must perform the task in the scanner. 
Moreover, in order to maximize expensive scanner time, participants may be run on multiple tasks in 
the scanner. For example, Dietrich et al. ran participants on three tasks – language, motor, and spatial – 
though I report on only the spatial test. Only a few studies reported where their participants were 
recruited (undergraduate psychology students, Jordan et al. (2002); graduate students or employees of 
the university of hospital, Seurinck et al. (2004); psychology students who performed well on a mental 
rotation pre-test, Weiss et al. (2003)). Beyond age, very little demographic information was reported 
about the participants. 
There are two main versions of the mental rotation task employed by neuroimaging 
researchers. The first version is the original Shepard and Metzler (1971) version. Two images are 
displayed, usually horizontally, for a set amount of time (which varies across studies) and subjects must 
choose whether the figures are the same or different (one is a mirror image of the other). The control 
task varies as well. The second version is a paper-and-pencil adaptation created by Vandenberg and 
Kuse (1978) and was discussed above in the discussion on Voyer et al. The Vandenberg and Kuse version 
consists of 20 questions. Each question contains one target figure, two correct (rotated) alternatives and 
two incorrect distractors. The two main scoring methods are described above: both correct alternatives 
must be marked in order to receive credit for the question (maximum of 20 points) and each correct 
alternative is granted a point (maximum of 40 points).  Some variations set time limits on completing the 
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paper-and-pencil version. In general, when the Vandenberg and Kuse version is used, it is completed 
outside of the scanner and usually because a magnetic resonance scanner or research team does not 
have the equipment to collect behavioral data during the scan, so behavioral data is collected before or 
after the scan. A problem with this method is that if behavioral data is not collected during the scan, 
there is no way to verify if the participant were completing the task as instructed.  
The usual method for brain imaging analysis is the subtraction method. This involves subtracting 
the activation found in the control condition from the activation found in the experimental condition, 
symbolized as “experiment - control” or “experiment > control.” The resulting activation captures the 
areas that are active during the experimental (behavioral) task but not the control task. The choice of 
control task is important: choosing a passive rest condition only rules out baseline activation data, but 
choosing a control condition that includes stimuli similar to those used in the experimental task rules 
out activation related to stimulus processing and encoding. For the studies on mental rotation, the hope 
is that only the areas involved in mental rotation are left after the subtraction.  
Control tasks varied. Tagaris et al. (1996) used “pairs of identical two-dimensional longitudinal 
rectangles” (figure 4.1c) and asked participants to push any button. Thomsen et al. (2000) and Hugdahl 
et al. (2006) used two-dimensional white bars against the black background oriented either vertically or 
horizontally. Subjects were instructed to alternate pressing left and right buttons to the control stimuli. 
In Weiss et al. (2003), “subjects were presented with identical 3D drawings, pointing either to the right 
or to the left side, and answered by pressing the corresponding button of the response box (i.e. right 
button for shapes pointing to the right)” (170). Most groups presented the same stimuli from the 
experimental condition but without rotation and had participants decide if the two images were the 
same or different (mirror images) (Halari et al. 2006; Schöning et al. 2007; Butler et al. 2006; Butler et al. 
2007; Seurinck et al. 2004; Gizewski et al. 2006). In Dietrich et al. (2001), participants looked passively at 
2-D objects (Dietrich et al. did not collect in-scanner data). In Jordan et al. (2002), participants did a 
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same-different judgment of non-rotated figures of letters, shapes or Shepard-Metzler figures. Kucian et 
al. (2005) and Kucian et al. (2007) did not use a control task.  
I discuss the results of my investigation in three parts. First, I discuss the two studies that were 
not looking for sex or gender differences. Then I address the empirical questions: are there sex or 
gender differences in mental rotation performance or activation? Third, I analyze the studies based on 
feminist and methodological considerations. 
 
Results 
1. Outliers: Tagaris et al. (1996) and Dietrich et al. (2001) 
Two studies were not looking for sex or gender differences. Tagaris et al. (1996) was the first 
fMRI study to look at mental rotation. They were interested in the relationship between performance on 
a mental rotation task and activation in the superior parietal lobe (SPL), which they found to activate in 
both the left and right hemispheres. They scanned 8 men (mean age 30.5 ± 5.0 years) and 8 women 
(mean age 31.9 ± 9.7 years). They found that accuracy on the mental rotation task (87.4%) was 
negatively correlated with SPL activity in both hemispheres, meaning that more activation was 
associated with more errors. As for gender, all that Tagaris et al. said was that “In general, these 
relationships were qualitatively similar in men and women” (775). They made no mention of the 
supposed performance advantage for men on mental rotation tasks. 
The other study that was not interested in sex or gender differences was Dietrich et al. (2001). 
Dietrich et al. were interested in how normal cyclic estrogen levels in women affect brain activation. The 
hypothesis was that menstrual cycle hormones affect the lateralization of activation. They had three 
tasks: a motor task, a language task, and a spatial task. I’ll focus my discussion here on the spatial task, 
which was mental rotation. They scanned 6 women (age 21-31) twice in randomized order: once during 
menses (low estrogen) and once at day 11/12 of the cycle (ovulation, peak estrogen level). They scanned 
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6 men (age 22-29) as well. The men were only scanned once. No reason or justification was provided as 
to why men were included in the study, since the study was on the effect of menstrual-cycle-related 
hormone levels on brain activation, and men don’t have menstrual cycles. However, figures 2-4 in the 
article include bar graphs of the number of activated voxels in each condition divided by group. The 
groups are labeled menses, ovulation, and control (figure 4.2). It seems, then, that men were included in 
the study to serve as a control: what “normal” brain activation, unaffected by cyclic menstrual 
hormones, looks like. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Figure from Dietrich et al. (2001, 429) showing number of activated voxels across the three 
groups. Women are labeled “menses” and “ovulation.” Men are labeled “control.” 
 
The assumption guiding the choice of men as control is that women’s hormone fluctuation, 
associated with the menstrual cycle, is abnormal. Men, who do not have a menstrual hormone cycle, are 
the norm. This is an example of androcentrism. Thus, men are only scanned once, since they are not 
prone to hormone fluctuations. However, the question of differences between scans is not considered 
for men. However, men’s hormone levels have been shown to fluctuate across the day (Lejeune-Lenain 
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et al. 1987; Dabbs 1990), across weeks and months (Dabbs 1990), and across seasons (Smals, 
Kloppenbort, and Benraad 1976). Although hormone fluctuation is thought to affect brain activation in 
women, researchers do not consider if hormone fluctuation also affects brain activation in men. In 
addition to the androcentrism displayed, it is likely that the researchers’ reasoning is affected by the 
stereotype that women are “hormonal.” 
Since Dietrich et al. were only interested in menstrual-hormone related effects, they did not 
collect behavioral data for the men. They found that menstrual cycle phase did not affect women’s 
behavioral performance. They also did not do a subtraction comparison as I describe above but made t-
maps of significant activation for each of the three groups. T-map analysis is a form of significance 
testing where voxels are compared between experimental and control conditions. A threshold is set for 
how many voxels in an area must be significantly activated in the experimental condition in order for 
that area to be reported. There is no direct comparison of groups: the researchers merely construct 
different t-maps for each group and then qualitatively point out which areas were differently activated 
between the two groups. Thus, the areas of difference are not significantly more activated in one group 
rather than the other. In other words, were the two groups directly compared, their activation may not 
actually differ. Therefore the t-map method is not useful for comparing different groups because it does 
not actually directly compare groups. Nevertheless, the t-map method was the one that Dietrich et al. 
used. 
They found that men and women in the lower estrogen phase of the cycle (menses) activate the 
same areas – the superior parietal lobe bilaterally (BA 72) – and did not differ in the number of activated 
                                                          
2 Brodmann’s areas (BA) are a common parcellation scheme based on the cytoarchitectonic 
characteristics of the neurons. 
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voxels. Women in their higher estrogen phase (ovulation) showed bilateral SPL and bilateral angular 
gyrus/occipitotemporal activation (BA 39/37). A significantly higher number of voxels were activated in 
the high-estrogen-phase women when compared with either men or low-estrogen-phase women.  
They concluded that estrogen does not change functional brain laterality or performance on 
mental rotation tests. In other words, low-estrogen women aren’t activating any different areas than 
men on mental rotation and estrogen levels don’t affect mental rotation performance. Instead, high 
levels of estrogen are associated with greater activation in additional areas. They do note that a possible 
explanation that high-estrogen-phase brains were “hotter” than low-estrogen-phase brains could be 
that estrogen enhances neural activity or that estrogen is a vasodilator, thereby increasing blood flow. 
However, Dietrich et al. did employ some loaded language, stating: “Our study has shown that due to 
changing blood estrogen levels, the female brain is more susceptible to changes in cerebral 
hemodynamics” (431). It is hard to say what “the female brain” is being compared to such that it is 
“more susceptible.” Is it more susceptible than the “male brain” exposed to daily, monthly, or seasonal 
testosterone fluctuations? Even though this study wasn’t assessing sex or gender differences in mental 
rotation performance, they engage in sex-essentialist assumptions and sexist stereotypes regarding 
women’s brain activation and monthly hormone fluctuations and men’s constant hormone level, steady 
emotional state and rationality. 
The rest of the studies were directly assessing sex or gender differences in mental rotation 
ability and brain activation. 
 
2. Empirical 
 In this section, I discuss the results of the behavioral question – do men outperform women on 
mental rotation tasks in the scanner? – and the activation question – are there brain activation 
differences between men and women on the mental rotation task? 
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A. Behavioral 
 Of the 14 articles, 3 were reanalyses. I consider the original study and its reanalysis as one study. 
That leaves 11 studies. The behavioral results are displayed in table 4.1. Of the 11 studies, only 9 
collected behavioral data. Of those 9, only 2 found a performance advantage for men (Halari et al. 2006; 
Schöning et al. 2007). However, Schöning et al.’s results are not so straightforward. Schöning et al. 
(2007) scanned women during two phases of the menstrual cycle. They found that men outperformed 
women during the midluteal (high hormone) phase but not women in the early follicular (low hormone) 
phase. However, women’s performance did not differ between phases. Thus, though they stressed 
finding the performance advantage for men, they only found it for one phase of the cycle, and women’s 
performance didn’t differ between the two sessions, which makes the significant finding when 
comparing the midluteal phase with men suspect. The difference is likely an artifact, but the authors 
stress the difference, which conforms with the standard assumption. 
 
Table 4.1. Behavioral results for the mental rotation task. 
Behavioral results Studies Samplea 
Men outperformed 
women 
Halari et al. (2006) 
Schöning et al. (2007)b 
9 M, 10 W 
12 M, 12 W 
No difference Tagaris et al. (1996) 
Thomsen et al. (2000) and Hugdahl et al. 
(2006) 
Jordan et al. (2002) 
Weiss et al. (2003) 
Seurinck et al. (2004)c 
Kucian et al. (2005) and Kucian et al. (2007) 
 
Butler et al. (2006) and Butler et al. (2007) 
Schöning et al. (2007)b 
8 M, 8 W 
6 M, 5 W 
10 M, 14 W 
10 M, 10 W 
11 M, 11 W 
10 M, 10 W 
10 B, 10 G 
12 M, 13 W 
12 M, 12 W 
No comparisond Dietrich et al. (2001) 
Gizewski et al. (2006) 
6 M, 6 W 
12 M, 14 W 
aM=Men; W=Women; B=Boys; G=Girls 
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bSchöning et al. (2007) scanned women during two phases of the menstrual cycle. They found that men 
outperformed women during the midluteal (high hormone) phase but not women in the early follicular 
(low hormone) phase. However, women’s performance did not differ between phases. 
cSeurinck et al. (2004) overpracticed women “to remove possible gender differences in performance” 
(1442) “because men are known to outperform women on mental rotation” (1442). This was done so 
that they could investigate sex/gender differences in activation without the confound of supposed 
performance differences. 
dDietrich et al. (2001) assessed mental rotation performance after the scan by having participants repeat 
the experimental task and recording their answers. They reported women’s performance for the two 
phases, which did not appear to differ (they did not perform a test of significance), but they did not 
mention men’s performance. Gizewski et al. (2006) measured performance on the mental rotation task 
before the scan, but they did not report on it.  
 
 Thus, the first important point is that neuroimaging studies fail to support the supposed 
performance advantage for men. This is not surprising, however, considering the small sample size, 
ranging from 5-14 participants per group, with an average sample size of 10. Given the effect size of Linn 
and Peterson (1985) of 0.73 and an α of 0.05, a sample size of 10 has a power of 0.34. That’s the 
probability of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis. In other words, there is only a 34% chance that the 
experiment truly found sex or gender differences. In order to boost the statistical power of the 
experiment to the standard, ideal value of 0.8, a sample size of 31 per group would be necessary. 
(Calculations of statistical power and sample size were provided by the AI-Therapy Statistics online tool 
(beta) (AICBT Ltd. 2014).) Using Voyer et al.’s effect size of 0.56, an even larger sample would be 
needed. Given the low statistical power of the neuroimaging articles, it is no surprise that most articles 
failed to support the supposed performance advantage for men. A few studies did mention that small 
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sample sizes could account for their failure to find the expected performance advantage for men, but 
they were more focused on activation differences and assumed men’s performance advantage. 
However, the effect size for brain activation differences could be different from the effect size 
for performance differences. It could be the case that men’s and women’s brain activation differences 
are so large that it can be detected in samples of 10 individuals per group, even though samples of that 
size will not display performance differences. If it is the case that differences between the groups are 
large, then there is no need to increase the sample size in order to achieve a sufficiently powered 
behavioral result. The problem is that none of the articles assessed the power of their activation results. 
None of the articles considered what the effect size is for activation differences between men and 
women and what sample size would be necessary to conduct a sufficiently powered study. Thus, it could 
be that reliable activation differences could be found in a sample of 5 or in a sample of 100. Without an 
investigation of effect sizes and a power analysis, it doesn’t make any sense to continue running 
experiments that may be worthless.  
It is worrying that no one in this area has reflected on the methodological shortcomings of 
“standard procedure.” It could be that the domain of sex/gender differences is an exception – that sex 
essentialism primes researchers to expect large, clear activation differences between men and women 
given the moderate-to-large behavioral effect size for mental rotation tasks – and other domains of 
functional neuroimaging are more careful about assessing effect sizes and designing sufficiently 
powered experiments. I do not have the information to state definitively at this point, but I am skeptical 
that sex/gender differences in mental rotation is an exception. I am not aware of functional 
neuroimaging studies assessing effect sizes and performing power analyses, though it is possible that 
researchers are becoming aware of this issue.  
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B. Activation 
 The activation results are listed in table 4.2. Many areas across the brain were found to display 
sex or gender differences, but few areas were found to be active in more than one study. A summary of 
results from table 4.2 are presented in table 4.3. The areas displaying significant sex or gender 
differences in more than one study were the right inferior frontal gyrus (3 studies) and right superior 
parietal lobe (2 studies), which were both more active in women than men. There were no areas that 
were found in multiple studies to be more active in men than women. 
 Thus, the second important point is that there is little overlap, and certainly no consensus, on 
different sexed or gendered areas or networks underlying mental rotation processing. 
 
Table 4.2. Sex or gender differences in brain activation on the mental rotation task divided by lobe and 
brain area.a 
Lobe Area Women > Men Men > Women 
Right frontal Right inferior frontal gyrus Thomsen et al. (2000) 
and Hugdhal et al. (2006) 
 
Weiss et al. (2003) 
 
Kucian et al. (2005) and 
Kucian et al. (2007) 
 
Right middle frontal gyrus Schöning et al. (2007)b  
Right medial frontal cortex  Gizewski et al. (2006)c 
Right superior frontal cortex Gizewski et al. (2006)c  
Right dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex/superior frontal gyrus 
Butler et al. (2006) and 
Butler et al. (2007) 
 
Right insula/precentral gyrus  Schöning et al. (2007)d 
Right precentral gyrus/PMdc Jordan et al. (2002)  
Right precentral gyrus Kucian et al. (2005) and 
Kucian et al. (2007) 
 
Right precentral cortex  Gizewski et al. (2006)c 
Right precentral sulcus/M1  Jordan et al. (2002) 
Left frontal Left dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex/superior frontal gyrus 
Butler et al. (2006) and 
Butler et al. (2007) 
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Left superior frontal gyrus Schöning et al. (2007)d  
Left precentral gyrus/inferior 
frontal gyrus 
Seurinck et al. (2004)  
Left precentral gyrus/M1  Jordan et al. (2002) 
Left precentral gyrus Kucian et al. (2005) and 
Kucian et al. (2007) 
 
Left medial/paracentral 
lobule 
 Butler et al. (2006) and 
Butler et al. (2007) 
Right 
temporal 
Right medial temporal gyrus Kucian et al. (2005) and 
Kucian et al. (2007) 
 
Right medial temporal cortex Gizewski et al. (2006)c  
Right inferior temporal gyrus Jordan et al. (2002)  
Right inferior temporal cortex Gizewski et al. (2006)c  
Right temporal pole Butler et al. (2006) and 
Butler et al. (2007) 
 
Right lingual gyrus  Seurinck et al. (2004) 
Right fusiform gyrus/lingual 
gyrus 
 Schöning et al. (2007)d 
Left 
temporal 
Left inferior occipito-
temporal cortex 
Butler et al. (2006) and 
Butler et al. (2007) 
 
Left superior temporal gyrus Schöning et al. (2007)d  
Left lingual gyrus  Seurinck et al. (2004) 
Left fusiform gyrus/lingual 
gyrus/declive 
 Schöning et al. (2007)b 
Left fusiform gyrus Gizewski et al. (2006)c  
Right 
parietal 
Right inferior parietal gyrus  Weiss et al. (2003) 
Right inferior parietal 
lobe/postcentral gyrus 
 Schöning et al. (2007)d 
Right inferior parietal cortex  Gizewski et al. (2006)c 
Right superior parietal lobe Weiss et al. (2003) 
Jordan et al. (2002) 
Thomsen et al. (2000) and 
Hugdhal et al. (2006) 
Right postcentral gyrus  Butler et al. (2006) and 
Butler et al. (2007) 
Right posterior intraparietal 
sulcus 
Jordan et al. (2002)  
Right anterior intraparietal 
sulcus 
Jordan et al. (2002)  
Right parieto-occipital sulcus  Jordan et al. (2002) 
Left parietal Left inferior parietal gyrus  Weiss et al. (2003) 
Left inferior parietal cortex  Gizewski et al. (2006)c 
Left inferior parietal lobe Jordan et al. (2002)  
Left superior parietal lobe Weiss et al. (2003)   
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Left precentral and 
postcentral gyrus 
Schöning et al. (2007)b  
Left postcentral gyrus  Butler et al. (2006) and 
Butler et al. (2007) 
Left precuneus  Butler et al. (2006) and 
Butler et al. (2007) 
Left inferior parietal 
lobe/postcentral gyrus 
 Schöning et al. (2007)b 
Left anterior intraparietal 
sulcus 
Jordan et al. (2002)  
Left posterior intraparietal 
sulcus 
 Jordan et al. (2002) 
Right 
occipital 
Right middle occipital gyrus Jordan et al. (2002)  
Left occipital None   
Sub-cortical 
structures 
Right caudate nucleus Schöning et al. (2007)d 
 
 
Bilateral (medial) peri-
midbrain 
 Butler et al. (2006) and 
Butler et al. (2007) 
Left ventral globus pallidus  Butler et al. (2006) and 
Butler et al. (2007) 
Left cerebellum Schöning et al. (2007)b  
aNot including Tagaris et al. (1996), Halari et al. (2006), and Dietrich et al. (2001). Tagaris et al. and Halari 
et al. found no sex or gender differences. Dietrich et al. did not directly compare men and women. 
bSchöning et al. (2007): Differences found when comparing with women in the early follicular phase. 
cGizewski et al. (2006) performed t-tests instead of using the subtraction comparisons. 
dSchöning et al. (2007): Differences found when comparing with women in the midluteal phase. 
 
 
 
Table 4.3. Summary table of activation findings from table 4.2. 
Area Women > Men Men > Women 
Right frontal 6 different areas, one of which 
was active in 3 studies 
4 different areas 
Left frontal 4 different areas 2 different areas 
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Right temporal 5 different areas 2 different areas 
Left temporal 3 different areas 2 different areas 
Right parietal 3 different areas, one of which 
was active in 2 studies 
6 different areas 
Left parietal 4 different areas 6 different areas 
Right occipital 1 area None 
Left occipital None None 
Sub-cortical structures 2 different areas 2 different areas 
 
  
 
3. Feminist and methodological critiques 
A. Persistence of the question 
 As demonstrated above, most studies failed to find a performance advantage for men. However, 
researchers explained their results as if they had found it. Thomsen et al. (2000) stated 3 times that they 
found a trend for a performance advantage for men that did not reach significance. Hugdahl et al. 
(2006), however, using the same data as Thomsen et al., moved away from the language stressing a 
performance advantage for men that did not reach significance and instead interpreted the difference 
as stemming from “sex” rather than sex confounded with performance. It’s the same data; they just 
frame it differently depending on what they want to show.  
Butler et al. (2006) and Butler et al. (2007) said they found a trend for men’s performance 
advantage, but it went away when omitted trials are counted as incorrect. Usually, omitted trials, those 
the subject did not answer, are counted as incorrect. However, Butler et al. (2006) and Butler et al. 
(2007) performed a nonstandard analysis: they didn’t treat omitted trials as incorrect. So, when they 
performed a nonstandard analysis, they found a trend for the expected result. This practice is 
suspicious; some may consider it data mining.  It seems the only reasoning behind doing so is it 
demonstrates what the authors believe: that men are better at mental rotation than women. In 
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addition, Butler et al. (2006) interpreted women’s activation to be involved in “effortful” processing, 
whereas men’s is involved in “effortless” processing – even though there was no significant difference in 
behavioral performance.  
Schӧning et al. (2007) confirmed sex or gender differences in mental rotation performance 
despite only finding it for one phase of the menstrual cycle and women’s performance didn’t differ 
across phases. Kucian et al. (2007) said they expected to find the performance advantage for men with 
more complex stimuli.  
Only 4 of the 12 interested in sex or gender differences do not attempt to explain their results to 
fit into the standard framework (Weiss et al. 2003; Jordan et al. 2002; Seurinck et al. 2004; Kucian et al. 
2005). 
 This leads me to the third important point: despite their failure to support the supposed 
performance advantage for men (the standard framework), some researchers reject or reinterpret their 
own findings to support the standard framework rather than questioning it. The accepted framework for 
neuroimaging sex or gender differences on mental rotation tasks is that men are better. This is the 
framework established by Linn and Peterson’s (1985) and Voyer et al.’s (1995) meta-analyses. 
Neuroimaging researchers buy into the standard framework and tried to fit their results into it even if 
their data didn’t support it. Even though their results didn’t fit into the standard framework, they don’t 
question it. They don’t question if men are better than women on mental rotation. 
Ignoring data is a questionable practice according to the standards of empiricism. It may betray 
sexist bias in this research domain in that researchers are blind to disconfirming evidence. Specifically, 5 
out of the 11 articles finding no differences tried to explain away their finding of no differences. It also 
indicates that sex essentialism is at work. Recall that sex essentialism is a type of biological essentialism. 
It is the view that men and women are essentially different due to their sex (biology). The researchers 
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are committed to the view that, due to their sex, men perform better than women on the mental 
rotation task. 
It could be argued that the early studies, with no precedent of other disconfirming evidence, 
should not be faulted for upholding the dominant framework. On this line of reasoning, only the later 
studies, as evidence began accumulating that neuroimaging studies fail to support the expected 
performance advantage for men, should be faulted for not updating the framework. I’m not going to 
draw an arbitrary line to blame researchers. I merely wish to point out that zero of the 12 articles 
looking for sex or gender differences actually suggests that the dominant framework should be 
reconsidered in light of the growing evidence that neuroimaging studies fail to elicit the supposed 
performance advantage for men. Some mention that larger sample sizes might be needed, but this 
suggestion isn’t actually being listened to. 
 
B. Language 
 Most studies used a combination of sex terms (sex, male, female) and gender terms (gender, 
man, woman) without defining them. Gizewski et al. (2006) defined gender but did not stick to their 
own definition. They state, “Gender, the feeling of being male or female, is considered to be dependent 
on prenatal hormones and compounds changing the level of these hormones, whereas postnatal social 
factors are considered to have less influence on gender identification” (14). Their use of “gender” in this 
case, is “gender identification” rather than the roles assigned by society to a specific sex (gender roles). 
This definition completely ignores the role that society plays in constructing separate gender roles for 
men and women. They also identify their work as investigating “gender differences,” but they don’t 
assess differences in “the feeling of being male or female” as they define above. Rather, they just look at 
“gender-specific” patterns of cerebral activation on the cognitive tasks. Thus, it is unclear what “gender” 
is and what role it is playing for Gizewski et al. Moreover, they only scanned “females” in the ovulatory 
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phase of their menstrual cycles who were not using hormonal contraception. In a follow-up meeting 
occurring at the start of the women’s next menstrual period, if the scanning session occurred outside of 
the ovulatory phase, those women were “discharged” from the study, resulting in the removal of two 
women. Thus, it appears that gender is not playing any role for Gizewski et al., as the requirement for 
women is regular menstrual cycles, a seemingly sex-based classificatory system rather than a system 
based on “gender identification” (“the feeling of being male or female”). 
Only two studies consistently used sex and gender terms. Tagaris et al. (1996) used “men” and 
“women” and Thomsen et al. (2000) used “sex,” “male” and “female” throughout. Of the 12 articles 
looking for sex or gender differences, only 2 did not use the term “sex difference.” They use “gender 
difference” but also talk about “the sexes” (Gizewski et al. 2006; Kucian et al. 2007). In Gizewski et al.’s 
case, they also talk about “the genders,” exemplifying sex/gender term slippage. The fourth important 
point is that neuroimaging researchers do not consistently use sex or gender terms. 
 Sloppy language contributes to confusion regarding the cause of difference (sex/nature, 
gender/nurture, or an interaction of nature and nurture). Such sloppy language, when placed in the 
historical context of science’s long history of “proving” the inferiority of women, can be seen as further 
oppressing women. It also reveals researchers’ assumptions of sex essentialism – there is no room for 
gender or they are ignorant of the sex/gender distinction. For these reasons, sloppy language 
contributes to morally irresponsible research because it continues to create two groups of individuals, 
and attribute biological differences to those individuals, and place values upon those differences, which 
functions to oppress one group. 
 Another problematic aspect of the language used in these studies is their conception of biology. 
Jordan et al. (2002) provide the following definition of biology: “biological (genetic, hormonal, 
evolutionary)” (2397). For Seurinck et al. (2004), “biological” means “genetics, hormone exposure and 
cerebral organization” (1440). From these quotes, the sense of biology researchers have in mind is the 
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reductive, essentialist sense rather than the holistic, non-essentialist sense in which biology is a result of 
gene-environment interaction. Thus, the point here is that some neuroimaging researchers use 
“biology” in the reductive, essentialist sense rather than the non-essentialist, interactionist sense. This 
reveals an assumption on the part of the researchers that biological factors take priority over 
experiential, environmental factors. 
 
C. Creating groups 
 Researchers did not disclose how they assigned participants to groups. As discussed in chapter 
2, sex or gender may have been self-assigned by participants filling out a demographics form or assigned 
by researchers based on the participants’ gender presentation. Problems with categorization stem from 
researchers’ not having a theory of sex/gender. As they do not recognize the difference, they fail to 
notice how their practices obscure sex and gender. In other words, by not making a distinction, they fall 
back upon the standard sex dichotomy and assume that those who present as women or girls are 
female. This assumption belies their sex essentialism: men and women have different sex-differentiated 
essences and sex and gender are not separate. 
 
D. Blind measurement and analysis procedures and expectation effects 
 None of the studies analyzed the brain activation data blind to sex/gender. When making 
sex/gender-specific group activation maps, they knew which sex/gender they were looking at. They 
could “read off” the group activation map sexed or gendered assumptions regarding processing 
strategies. The same goes for the direct comparisons. Knowing which group was subtracted from the 
other clued the researchers in on what to look for and what to read as relevant. For example, an area 
that was active for the men could be interpreted in a masculine context whereas that same area, if 
active in the women, could be interpreted in a feminine context. The fifth important point is that, 
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without blind analysis, researchers’ expectations regarding what should be found could affect the way 
they see and interpret their data. When I give talks on this point, I show a slide of the “duck-rabbit” 
ambiguous image and explain that it’s the same image, but depending on the expectations one group 
has, they see a duck, whereas another group, with their expectations, sees a rabbit. Knowing that you’re 
looking at the activation for women may allow for sex essentialism to affect your interpretation. Indeed, 
this may be what is happening when researchers use “cognitive strategy” to explain differences in 
activation data between men and women. 
 Eight articles out of the 14 discussed “cognitive strategies” to explain activation differences 
between men and women. What this entailed was “reading” off of the activation what the group was 
doing to solve the mental rotation problems. If a brain area were active, they called upon what they 
knew about that area to implicate how it could be involved in solving mental rotation problems. This is a 
recognized problem in cognitive neuroimaging. It is called reverse inference (Poldrack 2006). The 
reasoning is such. We found activation in task X in brain area A. In other studies, brain area A was 
putatively involved in cognitive process Y. Thus, the activity of brain area A in the current study suggests 
that cognitive process Y is involved in task X. The problem of reverse inference plagues not just 
sex/gender differences research, but many research questions in cognitive neuroimaging. However, its 
use in the sex/gender differences question allows for gendered stereotypes to affect reasoning. 
Thomsen et al. introduced the “cognitive strategy” hypothesis in 2000. Seven other studies 
echoed or adapted Thomsen et al.’s proposal or suggested an alternative. Thomsen et al. (2000) and 
Hugdahl et al. (2006) and Weiss et al. (2003) suggested that men were using a gestalt strategy, rotating 
the figures in whole, whereas women were using a serial strategy, rotating the figures in parts. Butler et 
al. (2006) claimed that men were using an effortless, bottom-up, natural strategy, whereas women were 
using an effortful, top-down strategy – even though women were not performing worse than men. 
Jordan et al. (2002) suggested several strategies: women were using a piecemeal, analytic, serial 
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strategy and were expending effort on object identity and men were using a hand’s-on approach, 
imagining rotating the object with their hands, and attending to the surface characteristics of the object. 
Seurinck et al. (2004) suggested that both men and women use an egocentric strategy, but that they 
emphasize different aspects: women rely on imitation or use perceptual comparisons whereas men rely 
more on early visual or semantic processing. Kucian et al. (2005) didn’t describe the strategy they 
thought men were using, but noted that women use a strategy that involves spatial and verbal working 
memory.  Gizewski et al. (2006) said that men were using object orientation in space and assumed 
haptic manipulation whereas women were using recall and recognition.  
 Value enters into the discussion of cognitive strategies when working within the framework that 
men outperform women in mental rotation. In light of the assumption that men are better at mental 
rotation than women, Thomsen et al. called men’s cognitive strategy, gestalt, more effective than 
women’s serial, part-based strategy. Additionally, Thomsen et al. only considered that the women, not 
the men, possibly gave up on the task as too difficult, though the subjects claimed to attempt all 
problems, suggesting that they didn’t trust women’s reports. Butler et al. (2006) called women’s top-
down processing “effortful” and men’s bottom-up “effortless” – without affirming what they were 
actually doing and what actual effort was expended. Thus, not only are the strategies gendered, but 
some of the language is value-laden, with men’s strategies assumed to be more efficient or “natural” 
(gestalt, “effortless,” natural), revealing the researchers’ expectation that men are better at mental 
rotation than women. 
 Another concern is that it is not clear what a cognitive strategy is or what it does. Is it conscious? 
Is it something that is learned? Is it something that one can choose? Does it suggest that different lower-
level cognitive functions complete the higher-level cognitive task of performing mental rotation or 
solving mental rotation problems? Is there a difference between “performing mental rotation” and 
“solving mental rotation problems”? Is “cognitive strategy” merely a description of a neural pattern with 
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no connection to processing? Is the processing the same except that it occurs in different places in 
different brains? Perhaps cognitive strategy carries no mental-processing suppositions but is merely an 
obscurant way of saying that different parts of the brain were active. If this is so, a better description 
that eliminates the cognitive-processing connotation would be neural network. It is possible that the 
“cognitive strategy” may mean different things to different authors, thereby further obscuring its 
meaning. 
Setting aside the question of what a cognitive strategy is, only 2 articles asked about strategy, 
and both reported no difference in strategy reports between men and women: Schöning et al. (2007) 
found no difference in strategy reports between men and women and Seurinck et al. (2004) reported 
that all subjects claimed to use an egocentric strategy – they rotated their hands to demonstrate how 
they completed the mental rotation problems. The cognitive strategy hypothesis is an empirical 
hypothesis, which is testable by asking participants what they were doing when they were solving the 
mental rotation problems. However, researchers for the most part did not test it. Rather, they relied on 
sex-essentialist assumptions to explain activation differences. Bluhm (2013a; 2013b) found the same 
phenomenon occurring in her investigation of neuroimaging research on sex/gender differences in 
emotion-related processing. Her take is that sex stereotypes act as explanations. Even though “cognitive 
strategies” is offered as an hypothesis to explain differences in activation between men and women, it 
was not tested. Instead, it just gets repeated or altered by other researchers and starts to look like a 
finding rather than an hypothesis.  Thus, the sixth point is that invoking cognitive strategies is a way for 
sexist stereotypes to enter into science and gain scientific legitimacy. It is another example of sex 
essentialism affecting research. 
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E. Assumption that the results generalize universally 
 The participants from the studies came from Austria, Belgium, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Researchers did not disclose the race or ethnicity of 
participants. Notice that these participants come from wealthy, industrialized, Western nations. 
According to Henrich et al. (2010), they are WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, 
Democratic). No mention was made if the results are limited to these samples or across all cultures and 
education levels and if they persist over time. Researchers are not careful about limiting their 
generalizations to the populations studied but present their data as getting at “sex differences.” Without 
limiting their generalizations, stating that they demonstrate “sex differences” implies that the 
differences they find are “natural” and universal – they persist across time and culture.  
 However, sex/gender differences differ across cultures, suggesting that the assumption that 
sex/gender differences are universal is incorrect. Sex/gender differences are dependent on a number of 
factors, such as culture and education and may change across generations. For example, Reilly (2012) 
reviewed data from the 65 nations in the 2009 Program for International Student Assessment, which is a 
standardized test for 15-year-olds that assesses reading, mathematics, and science literacy. He assessed 
sex/gender effect sizes for all 65 nations individually, as a group, and separately for the 34 nations of the 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), and the 31 non-OECD nations. He 
found a wide range of sex/gender effect sizes across countries. Across all countries, girls exhibited 
higher reading literacy scores (d= -0.44, range= -0.68 to -0.11, effect size for the United States was -
0.26). As for mathematics, boys outperformed girls in mathematics literacy in most OECD countries (d= 
0.13), with the exception of 7 out of the 34, in which the effect size was not significant. The US effect 
size was 0.22. Only 17 out of the 31 non-OECD countries displayed a sex or gender difference favoring 
boys on mathematics literacy. Nine countries exhibited no sex/gender differences and 5 countries had 
sex/gender differences favoring girls. Across the two groups, the effect sizes ranged from -0.12 to 0.43. 
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Science literacy displayed the greatest variability. No sex/gender difference was found for OECD 
countries (d= .00, range= -0.17 to 0.14). The United States had the largest sex/gender difference of all 
the OECD nations, d= 0.14. In the non-OECD nations, a sex/gender differences in science literacy was 
found favoring girls (d= -0.04, range= -0.39 to 0.26).  
 On the question of the biological vs. cultural contribution to sex/gender differences, Reilly 
suggests that reading literacy is strongly biological, given that all nations displayed significant differences 
favoring girls, though cultural differences suggest that it is “at least partially malleable by social and 
cultural factors” (10). Unlike reading literacy, however, he suggests that mathematical literacy is unlikely 
strongly biologically influenced, pointing to the number of countries with nonsignificant gender 
differences. He states, “It may be the case that whatever slight advantage boys have is magnified by 
social and cultural reinforcement, to produce gender differences in some countries but that other 
nations raise girls and boys to equivalent performance” (12).  
Reilly notes, “It would appear that gender differences in number [sic] of cognitive abilities are at 
least partially influenced by social and cultural influences such as gender equality and the status of 
women” (13). He concludes, “This study finds evidence of gender similarities rather than differences 
cross-culturally but also that meaningful gender gaps in maths and science remain and are related to 
cultural factors” (14). An important takeaway from this is that focusing on the US might overexaggerate 
some cognitive sex/gender differences, particularly those for mathematics and science. The picture of 
sex/gender differences using samples from the US does not adequately describe the global situation. 
Similarly, neuroimaging research that focuses on WEIRD populations (Heinrich et al. 2010) may not 
adequately capture non-WEIRD populations. 
Herlitz and Kabir (2006) assessed gender and cognitive abilities cross-culturally in elderly 
samples of illiterate Bangladeshi, literate Bangladeshi and (literate) Swedes. They hypothesized: 
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Assuming that the pattern of sex differences is biologically based, whereas the magnitude of the 
differences is influenced by psychosocial factors, we hypothesized that the three groups would 
exhibit a similar pattern in cognitive sex differences, although the magnitude of the differences 
would vary among the samples and tasks. (442)  
Although they interpreted their results as indicating that “sex differences in visuospatial functioning 
favoring men appear worldwide and irrespective of literacy level” (445), what they actually find is very 
little similarity across groups regarding patterns of gender superiority. The three tasks of interest are: 
Calculation, a measure of mathematical ability supposedly favoring men (subtract 3 from 17 5 times); 
Recall, a measure of episodic memory supposedly favoring women (recall the three objects learned 
earlier); and Figure/Stick, a measure of visuospatial skill, supposedly favoring men (copy a figure).  
They found that illiterate Bangladeshi men outperformed women on Calculation and 
Figure/Stick tasks, but illiterate Bangladeshi women did not outperform men on the Recall task. 
Additionally, illiterate Bangladeshi men outperformed women on the Place and Attention tasks. Literate 
Bangladeshi men outperformed women on only the Calculation task (not Figure/Stick) and literate 
Bangladeshi women outperformed men on the Comprehension task (not Recall).  Finally, Swedish men 
outperformed women on the Attention, Comprehension, and 3-step tasks (not Figure/Stick, and 
Calculation was not tested), whereas Swedish women outperformed men on the Recall task, as 
expected. Thus, they did not find that men consistently outperform women on mathematical 
(Calculation) and visuospatial (Figure/Stick) tasks and that women consistently outperform men on an 
episodic memory (Recall) task. Thus, gender differences are not biological, as the authors assume, but 
differ across cultural groups and with respect to experience – education in particular. 
Lippa et al. (2010) assessed sex/gender differences in two visuospatial tasks, mental rotation 
and line angle judgments, across 53 nations. Since findings were similar for both mental rotation and 
line judgment, I focus on mental rotation. Across all nations, men's mental rotation scores were higher 
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than the women's scores (paired t-test, men's mean = 8.16, women's mean = 7.00, p<0.001). The mean 
effect size across nations was 0.47. Unfortunately, means for individual countries were not provided. 
Instead, Lippa et al. presented the data in a line graph, even though the data was ordinal instead of 
continuous, which means it should have been presented in a bar graph. Eying the figure (figure 4.3 
below), the lowest mean for men was 6 and the highest mean for men was just over 9. For women, the 
lowest mean was 6 and the highest was 8. Again, just eying the results, the difference between men's 
and women's scores ranged from almost zero to 2 points (out of 12). Two countries had very small 
differences. Since Lippa et al. did not present means and sample sizes from individual countries, it is 
impossible to know if the differences between men and women were significant in all or even most 
countries. 
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Figure 4.3. Means for mental rotation scores for men and women across 53 nations. Countries are listed 
in order of UN gender development score, from most gender egalitarian on the left to the least on the 
right (from Lippa et al. 2010, 994). 
 
There are other worrisome methodological problems to consider. One is that the study was an 
online study, which excluded large groups of people (those who are poor, don't have access to the 
internet, those who lack education), and may have resulted in a skewed sample. Another is that the 
instructions were in English, which means that individuals without reading fluency in English were at a 
disadvantage in understanding the test. 
What Lippa et al. took away from this was that sex/gender differences cross-culturally were 
confirmed, suggesting an environmental component, and that there was an association between 
sex/gender differences and measures of economic development and gender equity, a result that is in 
need of further study. However, my takeaway is the variability across nations, which suggests that what 
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is being tapped into is not some stable, innate ability but rather a skill that is differentially developed in 
different cultures. 
Berry (1966) investigated cognitive differences in two groups with very different cultures and 
social organizations – the Temne of Sierra Leone, a strict, patriarchal, farming society, and the Canadian 
Eskimo, a non-strict, non-hierarchical but still strongly gendered, hunting society. He compared two 
populations of each group – “traditional” individuals lacking substantial contact with Westerners and 
Western education and “transitional” individuals from settlements with greater engagement with 
Westerners and Western education. He compared these groups with two populations of Westerners, 
Scottish individuals from rural farming communities and Scottish individuals from an urban population. 
He found several interesting differences both within and amongst these groups. Comparing traditional 
with transitional communities, Eskimos outscored Temne on 4 tests of spatial ability. Traditional Eskimos 
matched rural Scots on two measures of spatial ability and were outscored on two. Transitional Eskimos 
matched urban Scots on two measures of spatial ability, were outscored on one, and outscored the 
Scots on the fourth. In general, transitional Eskimos and Temne outscored their traditional counterparts 
on the spatial ability measures. Level of education correlated with performance on spatial tests in all but 
one of the samples (the traditional Temne). Regarding sex/gender differences, Temne males scored 
significantly higher than Temne women on 4 out of 8 comparisons. A similar result was found for the 
Scottish samples. There were no significant differences between Eskimo men and women.  
Explaining his results, Berry stated: “The analysis of sex differences suggests the conclusion that 
in societies where women assume a dependent role, they will have more field-dependent perceptual 
characteristics than the men, but in societies where women are allowed independence, sex differences 
will disappear” (228). Given the comparisons between the traditional and transitional samples, and the 
similarity between Eskimo and Scottish populations, Berry eliminates race as an explanation for 
151 
 
differences in cognitive (perceptual) ability and instead indicates social and environmental (ecological) 
factors. 
Hoffman et al. (2011) assessed spatial abilities in two genetically similar populations with very 
different social structures: the Khasi, a matrilineal society, and the Karbi, a patrilineal society. The Khasi 
and Karbi are agriculturalist peoples from Northeast India. They found a main effect of culture, such that 
matrilineal members outperformed patrilineal members on the spatial ability puzzle task. They also 
found a gender x culture interaction: in the patrilineal society, men outperformed women, but there 
were no sex/gender differences in the matrilineal society. Although the test is crude, the findings are 
interesting, and more research should be done to understand the role that social structure plays on 
cognitive development of different genders. 
Finally, the Voyer et al. (1995) meta-analysis discussed early in the chapter assessed the change 
in magnitude of sex/gender differences in visuospatial tasks across time, finding that the effect size was 
changing over time for several tests. The Cards Rotations Test, Water Level Test, Embedded Figures Test, 
and Identical Blocks Test showed a significant decrease in effect size over time, indicating that the 
sex/gender difference is decreasing over time. Only one test, the Mental Rotations Test, showed an 
increase in effect size over time. Eight other tasks showed no significant change over time.  
Thus, there is wide cross-cultural variation in sex/gender differences, and sex differences in 
some visuospatial tasks are changing across time, but this is not taken into consideration by most 
neuroimaging researchers. Instead, they present their results as if they demonstrate differences 
between “the sexes” and don’t limit or constrain their results to the samples studied and to the late 
20th- and early 21st century. 
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F. Assumption that social and environmental factors do not affect mental rotation ability 
 Only one study asked anything about the participants’ academic and activities background. The 
one that did was unhelpfully vague: “None…had any special experience in spatial cognition” (Jordan et 
al. 2002, 2398). Only some studies considered the social science literature on the effects of experience 
on mental rotation ability or performance, but they didn’t take the work seriously. Butler et al. (2006) 
mentioned a study (McWilliams, Hamilton, and Muncer 1997) that found that using wooden models of 
the Shepard-Metzler figures eliminates men’s performance advantage. Jordan et al. (2002) and Seurinck 
et al. (2004) discuss some literature on the effect of social experience on spatial ability. Halari et al. 
(2006) mentioned the social science literature but didn’t actually consider it because their focus was on 
hormones. Gizewski et al. (2006) mentioned that “gender differences” in cognitive tasks “are thought to 
involve social factors influencing gender-specific behaviors, as well as genetic and hormonal influences” 
(14) but don’t discuss any of the literature. 
 In addition to failing to consider the role that social and environmental factors may have on 
mental rotation ability or performance, researchers additionally fail to consider that the social 
environments differ for men and women. As I demonstrate below, there are a number of research 
programs demonstrating the effect of social factors on mental rotation performance. The research 
programs involve a number of factors that affect, and sometimes even eliminate, the supposed 
performance advantage for men on mental rotation tasks. 
  
i. Wooden models, three-dimensional stimulus presentation, and virtual reality 
The McWilliams et al. (1997) study mentioned above demonstrated that the performance 
advantage for men went away when using wooden models of the Shepard-Metzler figures. Neubauer et 
al. (2010), using 2-D and 3-D projections of Shepard-Metzler figures similarly found that gender 
differences disappeared in the 3-D presentation condition. For the 2-D presentation, Shepard-Metzler 
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figures were projected on a screen. For the 3-D presentation, a 3-D projector was used. It projects 
images from two different angles, one presented to each eye, through the use of special 3-D glasses.  
On the other hand, Felix et al. (2011) did not find that using wooden models eliminated the 
gender difference. However, the McWilliams et al. study was sparse on details, so it makes comparing 
the two studies difficult. McWilliams counted the number of pairs of items correctly identified, 
suggesting that the experimental design was a pair of matching or nonmatching objects, similar to the 
normal fMRI protocols. Felix et al., however, used the Vandenberg version of the MR test (match 2 of 4 
possibilities to the target) as opposed to the paired, Shepard-Metzler version (same or different). The 
Vandenberg version is known to display a larger gender effect, especially under the scoring system that 
Felix et al use (one point if choosing both and only the two correct possibilities, Voyer et al. 1995). In 
addition, Felix et al. secured the subjects’ heads so they couldn’t move, which, according to ecological 
psychology, prohibits organisms from behaving in their normal way. Also, the accuracies were abysmal. 
For wooden models, men’s accuracy was 46% and women’s was 38%. For the drawings, men’s accuracy 
was 41% and women’s was 30.5%. McWilliams reported accuracy as number of items correct without 
providing the total number of items presented, so it is impossible to compare percentage correct across 
the two studies. Neubauer et al.’s accuracies were: for the 2-D condition, men scored 85.7% and women 
scored 78.1%, and for the 3-D condition, men scored 86.3% and women scored 82.3%. Neubauer et al. 
had 45 trials per condition. Felix et al. had 20. 
Parsons et al. (2004) tested participants on the paper-and-pencil Vandenberg version of the 
mental rotation test and a virtual reality mental rotation test. In the virtual reality version, subjects had 
to manipulate a ball representing a Shepard-Metzler figure to get it to match the target figure.  On the 
virtual reality task, they recorded efficiency of path and duration to “solve.”  They found that men were 
significantly better on the paper-and-pencil version, but found no sex or gender differences in efficiency 
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and duration on the virtual reality version. However, it is important to note that the tests were different, 
even aside from the motor aspect: for the virtual reality test, all stimuli matched the target figure.   
Thus, the use of wooden models and virtual reality may suggest that the mental rotation task, 
using 2-dimensional representations of 3-dimensional figures, is not “natural.” When allowed to move 
freely and to manipulate the objects by hand, women perform at the same level as men. Thus, the 
“flattening” of the task onto a surface is a skill that requires practice, and it is possible that boys and 
men receive more practice, more support, and less discouragement than girls and women. 
Since using real objects elicits no performance difference between men and women, it would 
seem that evolutionary speculations about men’s superiority on the mental rotations test is false. In 
other words, hunter-gatherer men were not gaining the ability to transform two-dimensional 
representations of three-dimensional objects when they were in hunting parties. Thus, if there is a 
performance advantage for men on the mental rotation task, then it is not something that has 
evolutionary origins but may instead be an artifact of a modern world where three-dimensional objects 
are sketched in two dimensions (such as IKEA furniture assembly directions). 
 
ii. Sports and hobbies 
A number of studies investigated the effect of various experiences, such as sports and hobbies, 
on spatial ability. Newcombe et al. (1983) developed a spatial activities questionnaire. They found 
several gender-specific correlations between activities and sores on the Differential Aptitude Test (DAT), 
which tests several domains including verbal reasoning, numerical ability, abstract reasoning, 
155 
 
mechanical reasoning, and spatial relations.3 Activities were categorized by gender as being more 
masculine, more feminine, or gender-neutral. The activities that correlated positively with DAT scores 
differed between the genders (table 4.4). There are obvious limitations to this study: they used only a 
small sample size (22 males, 23 females); the activities are middle-classed; according to current 
standards, many of the activities are outdated; and the questionnaire did not consider academic courses 
taken. 
 
Table 4.4. Activities divided by gender-coding that correlated positively with scores on the DAT for men 
and women. 
Group Masculine activities Neutral activities Feminine activities 
Men Skiing (jumping) 
Pole vaulting 
Juggling 
Ping pong 
Jewelry (mount stones) 
Disco dancing (with falls) 
Knitting (with seams) 
Knitting (multicolor) 
Women Ice hockey 
Soccer 
Glass blowing 
Building model planes 
Building go-carts 
Electrical circuitry 
Carpentry 
Sketching house plans 
Using a compass 
Jewelry (mount stones) 
Weaving (design own warp) 
Photography (adjusting 
focus) 
Gymnastics 
Embroidery (no pattern) 
Tailoring 
 
 
 The authors conclude that there “seems to be some evidence that more spatial activities tend to 
be masculine rather than feminine sex-typed” (384). However, the direction of the relationship is 
unclear: does ability influence activity choice or does activity choice affect ability? The authors note 
                                                          
3 It is unclear if they used only the spatial relations subtest of the DAT for the correlations or if they used 
the overall score. 
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that: “A sex difference in spatial ability was evident in this sample, but the sexes did not differ in their 
overall participation in the 81 spatial activities” (384). 
Lunneborg and Lunneborg (1984) also examined spatial activities and spatial test scores. They 
asked college students to assess their competence on 10 everyday spatial activities “compared to others 
of your gender and age” (109) and to estimate the number of hours they were engaged in each activity. 
The 10 activities were: Finding my way around by car; Working with machines; Working on a computer; 
Understanding math/science; Arranging objects; Setting up displays; Playing visual games; Participating 
in sports; Understanding graphs/charts; and Drafting/drawing things. Lunneborg and Lunneborg 
correlated these scores with Spatial Ability and Mechanical Reasoning subtest scores from a high school 
pre-college test program taken a year and a half earlier. 
They found different correlations between the two genders on their self-assessed confidence on 
the activities and scores on the spatial ability and mechanical reasoning tests. I report only the spatial 
ability findings here. For women, self-assessed ability on 4 activities correlated positively with spatial 
ability scores: Working on a computer; Understanding math/science; Arranging objects; and Drafting, 
drawing things. Participating in sports correlated negatively with spatial ability scores for women. For 
men, self-assessed ability on 2 activities correlated positively with spatial ability scores: Assembling 
displays and Drafting, drawing things. Thus, self-assessed proficiency on different activities is related 
differently to spatial ability depending on gender. 
 They also found different correlations between the two genders on their time spent practicing 
the activities with spatial ability scores. Two activities were positively correlated with spatial ability in 
women: Understanding math/science and Drafting, drawing things. Activities that were negatively 
correlated with spatial ability in women were: Finding way by car; Assembling displays; Playing visual 
games; and Participating in sports. Three activities were positively correlated for men: Arranging 
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objects; Playing visual games; and Drafting, drawing things. Thus, time spent engaged in different 
activities related differently to spatial ability depending on gender. 
 Baenninger and Newcombe (1989) performed a meta-analysis on studies investigating the 
relationship between spatial activities and spatial ability. They found a weak but reliable relationship 
between spatial activity participation and spatial ability, which was similar between the genders. 
Investigating the gendering of the activities reveals that for women, all types of activities (masculine, 
neutral, and feminine) were correlated with spatial ability. However, for the men, only the correlation 
between masculine types of activities and spatial ability reached significance.  The authors note, 
however, that social stigma against men’s participation in feminine activities might be contributing to 
this finding – that is, the finding could be due to men’s not participating in many feminine-typed 
activities. Additionally, there is the problem that spatial activities could be considered masculine 
because of the association between men and spatial cognition. 
 Thus, participation in spatial activities (sports and hobbies) is related to spatial ability, but 
different sports and hobbies are significant depending on gender. Some sports and hobbies are 
correlated with spatial ability in women, whereas participation in other sports and hobbies is correlated 
with spatial ability in men. Thus, spatial ability may develop differently depending on the activities 
pursued and may interact with gender. More research needs to be done to understand how different 
activities relate to spatial ability differently in men versus women. 
 
iii. Video game play 
Cherney and Neff (2004) found that computer and video game play correlated positively with 
mental rotation scores. They also found that men reported playing more video or computer games than 
women. It is possible that some of men’s performance advantage on the mental rotations task could be 
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explained by their video game play. It could be that video games provide training in mental rotation 
itself or in a related visuospatial skill that underlies the mental rotation task.  
In investigating the factors that explain variation in scores on the mental rotation task, they 
performed a regression analysis. They found that guessing accounted for 19% of the variance in mental 
rotation test scores, ACT (American College Test) score accounted for 6%, video or computer game 
hours accounted for 5% and the contribution for sex (3%) was not significant.  
Feng et al. (2007) investigated video game play on spatial task performance. In their view, 
spatial attention underlies spatial ability. In their first experiment, they investigated spatial attention 
using the useful-field-of-view (UFOV) task correlated with gender, video game-playing experience, and 
field of study (arts vs. sciences). They found that video game players outperformed nonplayers and that 
science students outperformed arts students. The gender effect was nonsignificant, possibly due to the 
heterogeneity of the groups (the scores of men and women in the video game players group were very 
similar, whereas the scores of men and women in the nonplayers group showed greater differences). 
(They didn’t report the accuracies of men and women players, but they did report the accuracies of 
nonplayers: men 64% and women 52%.) 
In the second experiment, they assessed the effect of video game play on the UFOV and 
Vandenberg version of the mental rotation task. Three men and 7 women were in the experimental 
group and played the action game Medal of Honor: Pacific Assault, a 3-D first-person shooter. Three 
men and 7 women were in the control group and played the non-action game Ballance, a 3-D puzzle 
game. Participants played the assigned game for 10 hours in 1- or 2-hour sessions in the lab. Both UFOV 
and mental rotation scores improved from pre- to post-testing in the experimental group but not in the 
control group. Women playing the action game improved significantly more than the men playing the 
action game on the UFOV test. At post-test, UFOV scores between men and women were not 
significantly different, though the mental rotation difference persisted. However, for women playing the 
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action game, their post-test scores did not differ from the performance of men in the control group. 
Thus, training on a video game can improve spatial attention and mental rotation performance and 
women’s spatial attention can benefit more from training than men’s. Specifically, women who play 
spatial video games can perform the mental rotation test at the same level as men who don’t play 
spatial video games, effectively erasing the gender difference with only 10 hours of video game play. 
Cherney (2008) assigned participants to 3 training groups, each playing a different game. One 
group played Antz Extreme Racing, a 3-D spatial game, one group played Tetrus, a 2-D spatial game, and 
one group completed non-spatial paper and pencil logic games. Cherney assessed spatial ability through 
the Card Rotation Test and the Vandenberg version of the mental rotation test. Each group received 
three hours of practice – either distributed (within 2 weeks’ time) or massed (within 3 days’ time). They 
found that when prior computer game experience is controlled for, women improved more than men. 
Men played more video and computer games than women, though men and women did not differ in 
regards to participation in sports. Women in both the 2-D and 3-D conditions improved significantly on 
the Vandenberg mental rotation test. Men’s performance did not significantly improve. Both men’s and 
women’s performance improved significantly across all conditions on the Card Rotations Test. However, 
the gender gap was not completely eliminated, as women’s posttest scores remained lower than men’s.  
This shows that just 3 hours of video game play increases women’s scores on the mental 
rotations task. Again, this suggests that an explanation for some of men’s supposed performance 
advantage on mental rotation tasks could be due to their greater time spent playing video games. Also, 
it suggests that mental rotation is not a fixed ability but instead a skill that can be developed. If men 
throughout their lives have more practice developing that skill, due to playing video games or 
participating in certain activities or taking certain math and science classes, then that may explain some 
of the supposed performance difference between men and women. 
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iv. Science and math courses taken 
Lunneborg and Lunneborg (1984), discussed above, also investigated correlations between 
spatial ability scores and number of math and science courses taken in high school. They found that 
spatial ability was correlated with mathematics and geometry courses for women. No correlations were 
found for men. There are a number of questions that remain with this finding, considering its 
correlational rather than causal nature. One is whether only women who already have high spatial 
ability take math and science courses. Another is if social processes linking science and math with men 
could explain that men are encouraged to take science and math courses regardless of ability whereas 
there is no such leniency with regard to encouraging women to take math and science courses. Another 
question is if science and math courses provide training in spatial ability. This question puts pressure on 
the assumption that spatial ability is necessary for math and science, because it may be the case that 
math and science provide training in spatial ability. Thus, perhaps we should not discourage those with 
average spatial scores (scores that women are assumed to have) from going into math and science 
because, by virtue of learning and doing math and science, spatial ability grows. 
 
v. Practice and training 
Baenninger and Newcombe (1989), discussed above, performed a meta-analysis to assess the 
hypothesis that spatial ability improves with practice or training. They compared the pretest-posttest 
effect size between controls and experimental groups under different practice and training regimens. 
They found that training significantly increases spatial ability scores, suggesting yet again that what is 
tested is not a stable ability but rather a trainable skill. Examining the data for gender, there was no 
difference in pretest-posttest effect size across both control and experimental groups. Thus, though 
men performed better than females in pretesting, both men and women benefited equally from 
training. This suggests that the hypothesis that men are already at peak performance in spatial ability is 
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incorrect because men can improve through training. In addition, it suggests that resources spent on 
training women on spatial tasks are not wasted since women’s performance can be improved. 
Interesting questions that were not addressed by this study include whether training eliminated 
sex/gender differences in performance or whether training for women eliminated the sex/gender 
difference compared with men who were not trained. 
In one experiment, Cherney and Neff (2004), discussed above, found that participants who 
reported taking the mental rotations test previously scored significantly higher than first-time test-
takers – and that the effect size for taking the test a second time was larger than the effect size for 
gender. In a second experiment, however, the finding that was not replicated. 
Given that practice and training can improve mental rotation or spatial ability scores, then this is 
another piece of evidence that shows that mental rotation is not a fixed ability but rather a skill that can 
be developed. 
 
vi. Distance traveled from home for play or work in children 
Other studies have investigated the effect of gendered differences in children’s social 
environment. Munroe and Munroe (1971) investigated spatial ability and distance traveled from home 
in Logoli children in a village in western Kenya. They found that boys ranged farther from home in their 
free time on average compared with age-matched girls. In addition, they found that the child who 
ranged further from home outperformed their age-matched, opposite-gender counterpart on a test of 
imitative block building. They note that: 
Probably the most significant aspect of the results is the fact that both of the girls who had been 
found farther from home in the observations were superior in block building to their male 
counterparts, and these were two of the only three females who outperformed their age-
matched males. (19-20) 
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However, it is unclear if the difference in distance ranged from home is due to social factors or biological 
factors in innate tendencies for boys and men to be more adventurous. 
Nerlove et al. (1971) investigated spatial ability and distance traveled from home in Gusii 
children from a village in southwestern Kenya. They did not replicate Munroe and Munroe’s Logoli 
finding in the Gusii: boys did not range farther from home than girls in their free time. However, when 
including herding activities, which involved traveling to different locations, boys were found to range 
farther from home than the girls. They also found that the children who ranged farther from home were 
better on the copying block building task. Again, the two girls who ranged farther from home 
outperformed their age-matched boy counterpart.  
I caution against reading too much into this finding. They did not use the mental rotation task, 
which may be neither age-appropriate nor culturally-relevant. In addition, work needs to be done to 
investigate if there are sex/gender-related differences in ranging from home in the Western, 
industrialized countries studied in the mental rotation neuroimaging articles of this case study. From the 
experience of my life and reflecting on the culture of the U.S., boys seem to be given more rein in 
playing outdoors in both urban and rural settings than girls. It seems that society is more protective of 
girls, limiting their range. It could be that parents or guardians think boys can take care of themselves 
better than girls can or that they are more concerned about strangers abducting or harming girls than 
boys. Other questions concern differences in free time between boys and girls. Again, in my experience 
and reflections, often, girls are recruited to help around the house more than boys, who are left to play. 
There are a number of questions that should be investigated empirically: whether boys and girls differ in 
their permitted range from home; whether they differ in how much free time they have; whether they 
differ in how long they are permitted to be away from home; and whether there are cultural differences 
in these questions. 
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vii. Confidence level 
Estes and Felker (2012) investigated the role of confidence as a potential mediator for 
stereotype effects in several experiments. They used a modified version of the Vandenberg mental 
rotation task in which each problem was presented for 15 seconds. In the first experiment, they had 
participants rate their confidence in their answer following each mental rotation trial. They found that 
men were more confident than women and the men outperformed women. Across both genders, 
confidence predicted accuracy. They found that “When the effect of confidence was taken into account, 
the sex difference in mental rotation scores was eliminated” (562). 
In the second experiment, there were two groups: those who could omit trials (omission) and 
those who had to respond on every trial (commission). They thought that forcing subjects to respond 
would eliminate the factor of confidence. They found that in the omission group, the expected 
performance advantage for men was found. In the commission group, however, there was no gender 
difference in performance. When forced to answer every item, women performed at the same level as 
men.  
In another experiment, Estes and Felker manipulated confidence by having participants 
complete a difficult task. Half the group were told they performed above average; half the group were 
told they performed below average. They then completed the omission version of the mental rotation 
task. Those in the high confidence group significantly outperformed those in the low confidence group. 
They also found that women in the high confidence group did not differ from males in the low 
confidence group. 
Thus, confidence is a better predictor than sex/gender on performance, when confidence is 
eliminated as a factor, by forcing participants to answer every time, the sex/gender difference goes 
away, and manipulating confidence results in a performance boost for men and women. 
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viii. Stereotype threat 
 Another factor that affects performance is stereotype threat. Stereotype threat is the fear of 
confirming a negative stereotype of one’s group. Wraga et al. (2006) investigated the effect of 
stereotypes on performance of a mental rotation task. They used an imagined self-rotation task in which 
a three-dimensional Shepard-Metzler figure with one textured cube was presented in the center of a 
screen with a target angle indicated by a three-dimensional T-shaped prompt. Subjects were instructed 
to imagine themselves in the position of the prompt and to answer whether the textured cube of the 
Shepard-Metzler figure was visible from that position. In the first experiment, they demonstrated the 
expected performance advantage for men.  
In the second experiment, they tested the effects of a positive stereotype on women’s 
performance. The experimental group was instructed that women perform better than men on the 
imagined self-rotation task because of their greater ease with perspective-taking. They found that the 
positive stereotype group performed significantly better than the neutral control group. (However, they 
still did not perform at the same level of men in experiment 1.) In the third experiment, they assessed 
the effect of stereotype on men’s performance using the same instructions from experiment 2. They 
found that the group primed with the expectation of women’s superiority on the imagined self-rotation 
task performed significantly worse than the control group. Comparing these results to the performance 
of women in experiment 1, they found that priming men with women’s superior performance abolished 
men’s performance advantage. They state that: “The malleability of men’s and women’s performance in 
these studies suggests that cognitive ability associated with at least some mental rotation tasks is not 
attributable solely to biological factors, but is also susceptible to environmental influences” (817) and 
“Mental rotation performance is affected by situational factors” (818). 
Ortner and Sieverding (2008) primed participants with either a “typical male” or a “typical 
female” stereotype before completing a mental rotation test. The priming consisted of reading a 
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passage describing a day in the life of a man or woman followed by a question asking “If you were the 
person described in the text, which adjectives would you use to describe yourself?” (277). The mental 
rotation test was the three-dimensional cube test, which consists of a target cube and 6 options. The 
subject is instructed to mentally rotate each of the 6 options and decide which, if any, of them match 
the target. They found a main effect of primed gender, meaning that priming a masculine stereotype 
improves spatial performance whereas priming a feminine stereotype results in lower mental rotation 
scores. There was no difference on mental rotation scores between women and men primed with the 
masculine stereotype, meaning that the gender effect disappeared in this condition. 
McGlone and Aronson (2006) presented students with one of three questionnaires designed to 
prime an aspect of identity. The three aspects were gender identity, the participant’s status as a student 
in a private school, and as a resident of the northeastern United States (the control condition). 
Participants then took the Vandenberg version of the mental rotation test. There was an effect of 
gender overall, with men outscoring the women. They found a significant difference between women’s 
scores on the mental rotation test between the sex-priming and private college student-priming groups 
(though neither group differed from the control, neutral-priming group). There was also a significant 
difference between men’s score on the sex-priming and neutral-priming group (but not private college 
student-primed group), suggesting that masculine identity effectively boosts performance for men but 
identity as a private college student does not. The authors conclude that: “This finding strongly suggests 
that both men and women are mindful of gender stereotypes pertaining to visual-spatial ability and are 
differentially affected by those stereotypes” (491). However, they did not compare the women’s scores 
primed as private college students to the men’s scores in the control condition, which would have been 
an interesting comparison to see if priming women with an achieved identity such as being a student at 
a private college eliminated the gender gap in mental rotation. 
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These results further emphasize that what is tested in tests of mental rotation is not ability but 
performance. Moreover, performance is sensitive to contextual factors, and a salient contextual factor 
affecting performance is the cultural stereotype that men are better at mental rotation and spatial 
cognition than women. 
 
ix. Group composition 
Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev (2000) tested the effect of the gender of other individuals present on 
women’s performance on math and verbal tests. They placed women with two other women or with 
two other men.  The women were instructed to complete the tests individually and the results of the 
tests would be shared with the other group members at the end of the session. Women’s performance 
on the verbal test did not differ across group settings. However, on the math test, women in the “same-
sex” condition performed significantly better than women in the mixed-gender (minority) condition. The 
authors attribute these results to women being in a threatening intellectual environment – being 
outnumbered by men on a typically masculine task. That is, the composition of the group in the mixed-
gender (minority) condition elicited a decrease in performance because the woman’s gender was made 
relevant by the composition of the group in the typical masculine task (math) but not the typical 
feminine task (verbal). This finding is consistent with stereotype threat but not tokenism theory as the 
decrement was associated only with the negatively stereotyped task, math, and not verbal. 
Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev (2003) tested the effect of the public announcement versus private 
assessment of scores on women’s math performance in same-sex (3 women) vs. mixed-sex groups (1 
woman and 2 confederate men). They found that women as the minority in mixed-sex groups 
underperformed regardless of the public vs. private evaluation of scores. Thus, women don’t 
underperform just when they’re afraid of what group members who are men think, but the very fact of 
being in a minority, even if test scores will not be made known, results in women’s underperformance. 
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This has implications for the performance of women in STEM fields when they’re regularly in the 
minority. 
 
x. Gender of experimenter 
 Around the 1970s, researchers became interested in situational factors affecting participants’ 
performance. One of the factors investigated was the gender of the experimenter. Rumenik et al. (1977) 
reviews the literature. In some cases there was a main effect of experimenter gender. In other cases, 
there was no main effect. In others, the gender of the experimenter was found to interact with the 
gender of the participant. In others, specific characteristics of the participant interacted with participant 
gender and experimenter gender. They conclude:  
Despite the sloppy methodological state of most previous research, the data do indicate that 
experimenter's sex is probably an important variable in influencing results. In one respect this 
conclusion should not be surprising. The social relationship in a brief laboratory encounter is to 
some extent a microcosm of previously learned social roles outside of the laboratory. If sex 
differences affect role relations outside of the lab, it is unrealistic to expect such influences 
suddenly to cease to exist within an experiment. (874) 
I don’t think any of the neuroimaging articles mentioned the gender of the experimenter. 
 
xi. Altering the instructions 
Other investigators examined different versions of instructions and found that the way the 
instructions were worded affected women’s performance. Sharps et al. (1993) showed that women’s 
spatial memory was no different from men in a non-map context (an abstract wooden model), but when 
a map was used, women’s performance was significantly lower from the non-map condition. In a second 
study, they manipulated the instructions of the Vandenberg version of the mental rotation task to either 
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emphasize or de-emphasize its spatial nature. They found a gender x instruction condition interaction: 
men significantly outperformed women in the spatial instructions condition, but there was no difference 
in performance between men and women in the nonspatial instructions condition. In other words, 
taking out the word “spatial” eliminates the gender difference. 
Sharps et al. (1994) modified the second experiment described above using 4 different types of 
stimuli. They replicated the finding that instruction type interacted with gender, but when they explored 
the interaction, they found it was only for the standard 3- dimensional Shepard-Metzler figures and not 
for modified, 2-dimensional Shepard-Metzler figures, 2-dimensional figures, and 3-dimensional 
common, meaningful figures. Moreover, since they included different stimuli, they demonstrated that 
common (familiar) or simpler items do not display a sex difference. They interpret this as an effect of 
stimulus complexity, as Shepard-Metzler figures are more complicated than the other figures used. They 
note: 
This finding provides a demonstration of the differential impact of familiar or simple, as opposed 
to novel or complex, stimulus items on the [mental rotation] performance of two genders; “sex 
differences” can be created or destroyed within the same task framework by means of a simple 
manipulation of stimulus characteristics. (418) 
Continuing, they state, “These results further indicated that the spatial abilities of women, at least as 
measured by [mental rotation tasks], may be significantly better than generally supposed, at least in the 
absence of socioculturally negative stimulus and instructional effects” (418). 
In a second experiment, Sharps et al. (1994) again altered the instructions of the Vandenberg 
test. Spatial cognition was not explicitly mentioned. The instructions highlighted either the feminine 
nature and application of the task or the masculine nature and application. They found that women’s 
performance did not significantly change between instruction conditions, but that men’s performance 
did: men performed significantly better when the task was framed as masculine. 
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Scali et al. (2000) tested three versions of instructions on performance on the Vandenberg 
version of the mental rotation test. One version emphasized speed, one emphasized accuracy, and the 
control version emphasized neither speed nor accuracy. Only in the accuracy condition was the 
expected performance difference for men observed.4 Both the control condition and the speed 
condition did not display the expected performance advantage for men. They also found no gender 
difference in two other measures of spatial processing: spatial visualization and spatial perception. 
These studies show that altering the instructions changes performance: taking out the word 
spatial eliminates the sex/gender difference; describing it as a masculine or feminine task affects men’s 
performance; and highlighting accuracy, speed, or neither results in different sex/gender results. Thus, 
the mental rotation task does not assess ability but performance factors interacting with other factors, 
such as sociocultural expectations regarding men’s and women’s cognitive strengths. 
 
xii. Epigenetic factors 
 Another avenue of research involves epigenetic factors. Moore (1992) summarizes research on 
maternal behavior in rats and its effects on offspring’s behavior. A female who has given birth to a litter 
is called a dam. A dam spends more time licking the anogenital region of male pups than female pups. 
Female pups injected with testosterone will elicit more anogenital licking from foster dams than female 
pups injected with a placebo control. Maternal anogenital licking also affects later behavior. Masculine 
sexual behavior can be displayed by both male and female rats. A decrease of masculine sexual behavior 
is observed in both males and females raised by dams that provided low levels of maternal anogenital 
                                                          
4 The expected performance advantage for men was found in only 1 of 4 scoring methods. 
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licking. In addition, an increase of masculine sexual behavior in females is observed when they are 
provided with extra anogenital stimulation. She concludes:  
Stimulation provided by a dam during the normal course of caring for developing young can 
contribute to the differentiation of neural mechanisms that underlie masculine sexual behavior. 
Variation among the dams that provide this stimulation can produce individual differences in 
neural mechanisms among males that may, in turn, affect their reproductive success. Finally, the 
results lead one to conclude that reliable differences in the stimulation provided to males and 
females contribute toward the sexual dissimilarity of nervous system morphology. (174) 
Thus, some “sex differences” are an effect of environment, in this case, licking behaviors by dams, and 
not “hard-wired” through genetics or hormones. Although this is an interesting finding, much more 
work needs to be done to link maternal care behavior in rats to differences in performance on mental 
rotation tasks in humans. 
 
xiii. Transsexuals 
 Some researchers have investigated transsexuals’ performance on mental rotation tasks, which 
could be used to tease apart the influence of sex from gender, though there are many problems with 
these studies that prohibit clear separation of the two. Van Goozen et al. (1994) tested 22 female-to-
male transsexuals before and 3 months after androgen treatment. They assessed spatial ability using the 
Rotated Figures test, which consists of a target figure and 5 variations that are either the same figure 
rotated or a mirror image rotated. They also tested verbal fluency (advantage for women) and verbal 
reasoning (no gender advantage). The rotated figures score significantly increased following androgen 
treatment. In addition, verbal fluency significantly decreased. The authors take these results to 
demonstrate that hormones affect cognitive ability. Specifically, they interpret their results as indicating 
that androgen administered to women results in a masculine pattern of cognitive ability. They assert 
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that “The results are hormonally caused and not influenced by stereotypical ideas of the transsexual 
group about performance of their desired sex” (1156) though they have no evidence to actually support 
this. They did not investigate how long the women had been living as men before they decided to 
engage in hormone therapy. They did not compare the transsexual women to cis-women to see if there 
was a pre-existing difference on gendered cognitive profiles. They did not include a control group to 
assess if scores differed between pre- and post-test. They did not include a placebo-treated control 
group of female-to-male transsexuals. They at least admit this shortcoming, noting the ethical 
complications that arise when denying treatment to individuals that have undergone a difficult decision 
to elect for sex reassignment. 
 Van Goozen et al. (1995) tested 35 female-to-male transsexuals and 15 male-to-female 
transsexuals before and 3 months following hormonal treatment. Improving upon their previous study 
design, they included control men and women to compare and included a gender role questionnaire to 
control for transsexuals answering based upon what they thought was stereotypical for their desired 
sex. They used the Card Rotations test to assess spatial ability (masculine), a non-gendered test of verbal 
reasoning, and verbal fluency (feminine). They found that “biological females” (women and female-to-
male transsexuals) outscored men and male-to-female transsexuals on verbal fluency but there was no 
“sex difference” in visuospatial ability.  There was a group X sex X time interaction: the male-to-female 
transsexuals scored significantly lower at posttest. There was also a group X sex X time interaction for 
the two verbal fluency tests. Across all groups, verbal fluency scores were lower at posttest with the 
exception of the sentence production test in the male-to-female group. Also, the male-to-female group 
had the smallest dip in performance on the category verbal fluency test.  
There was no effect of time on self-ascriptions of “female and male characteristics” as assessed 
by the Sex Role Questionnaire, suggesting that transsexuals did not change their gender role ascriptions 
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after hormonal treatment.5 There was an effect of sex for feminine behaviors, which was attributed to 
greater ascription of feminine behaviors by the male-to-female transsexuals than the female-to-male 
transsexuals. There was a sex x group interaction for both feminine and masculine behaviors: the male-
to-female group attributed more feminine and less masculine behaviors to themselves than the other 
groups. The authors interpret this result as showing that: 
It can therefore be concluded that the changes in different gender dependent behaviors are 
likely to be due to the effects of the hormone therapy and not to an unconscious or deliberate 
move in the direction of stereotypical ideas about personality characteristics and/or behaviors 
of the desired sex. (359) 
A number of problems persist in these studies, some of which I’ve mentioned. Most notably is 
the difficulty in interpreting pre-hormonal therapy scores on cognitive tests and gender identity. Likely, 
if an individual identifies with the opposite gender, she or he will also display a cognitive and gender 
profile identifying with that gender – it is not the hormone therapy that creates the cognitive and 
gender persona of the desired gender but the individual’s desire to be that gender that does. However, 
                                                          
5However, their analysis was problematic, as “sex” grouped control women, who presumably rated 
themselves as feminine, along with female-to-male transsexuals, who presumably rated themselves as 
masculine. The same problem occurred with the category of “group.” The group x sex interaction did not 
show an effect for control women as compared to control men, meaning that control men and women 
did not rate themselves differently in regards to masculine and feminine characteristics and behaviors 
(or if they did come up with that finding they did not mention it). This is problematic because it appears 
that the measure for gender roles does not actually differentiate the genders. I would be cautious in 
claiming, then, that sex-role attributions could be ruled out, as the authors do. 
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this is not something the researchers seriously considered. Thus, it is far from demonstrated that 
cognitive profiles result from hormones alone, despite the authors’ oversimplification that hormones 
modulate sex-typed behaviors. 
 
xiv. Summary of social and environmental factors 
 There is a variety of evidence showing the effect of social and environmental factors on mental 
rotation task performance. Using wooden models, 3-dimensional stimulus presentation and virtual 
reality eliminate the sex/gender difference, indicating that it is the 2-dimensional presentation modality 
that elicits a difference. Perhaps boys and men are better trained to interpret 2-dimensional images of 
3-dimensional figures. This finding also throws into doubt the evolutionary psychology explanation that 
men are better at visuospatial skills and mental rotation because those skills were useful to hunters in a 
hunter-gatherer society since men and women are of comparable performance on 3-dimensional 
wooden models, 3-dimensional stimulus presentation and virtual reality formats. 
 Sports and hobbies and video game play correlate with spatial ability performance. Interestingly, 
there is a gender x activity interaction, in that some activities correlate with spatial performance in men 
but not women and other activities correlate in women but not men. Moreover, since computer and 
video games have traditionally been dominated by boys and men, and such games have been shown to 
correlate with mental rotation ability and improve mental rotation ability, some of the gender gap in 
mental rotation performance may be due to such games.  
 Since mental rotation ability and visuospatial skill is correlated with science and math 
coursework, and men and boys are encouraged to take science and math courses whereas women and 
girls are discouraged, the gender disparity in science and math credits may explain some of the gender 
gap in mental rotation performance. Moreover, this reveals a vicious cycle: if girls and women are not 
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taking the science and math courses that are helpful in developing visuospatial skills, then they won’t 
have the supposedly necessary visuospatial skills for success in science and math fields. 
 Looking across the studies showing the effect of activities, classes, and training, I have indicated 
that mental rotation may not be a fixed, stable ability but instead be a trainable skill, a skill in which 
boys and men may receive more training in throughout their lives. Thus, instead of assigning a single 
visuospatial or mental rotation score to an individual as a quantification of his or her ability, psychology 
should recognize that the single score is just an approximation of an ability, instantiated in a particular 
instance, and that the mental rotation skill can be developed. 
 Social factors such as confidence level, stereotype threat, group composition, and altering the 
instructions highlight the importance of context, cultural factors, and the tasks as measures of 
performance rather than ability. Changing the experimental context changes performance. Cultural 
factors, such as the stereotype that women are bad on visuospatial cognition, affects performance. 
Given that performance can change depending on context, it is clear that the tests do not test ability but 
performance on the task in a given context. 
 Thus, the neuroimaging paradigm needs to be investigated in terms of how the neuroimaging 
context affects performance and if it affects performance differently for men and women. If a 
participant who is a woman is trained on the task by a man, and then set up in the scanner by a man – 
which involves laying on the scanner bed in a darkened room, having the head immobilized by padding, 
sliding into the scanner, which is tight, and mostly enclosed – and being watched through the glass by 
men (the experimenters and technologist) in another room, it is possible that women’s performance 
may be affected by this situation. Fausto-Sterling (1985) noted a similar problem with the rod-and-frame 
task, a visuospatial task that involves a participant in a darkened room with an experimenter. She asks, 
“What female would not feel just a little vulnerable in that situation?” (32). This is an empirical issue 
that should be tested, but it is not something that is even considered in the neuroimaging literature. 
175 
 
Instead, the one-shot testing of the neuroimaging procedure is thought to provide “natural,”  
“essential,” stable mental rotation ability scores rather than performance scores in a given context. 
 
G. Lateralization 
Several studies explicitly stated an interest in addressing the question of which hemisphere is 
responsible for mental rotation processing. Regarding the question of lateralization, it seems as though 
mental rotation is a bilateral activity (Dietrich et al. 2001; Weiss et al. 2003; Butler et al. 2006; Seurinck 
et al. 2002; Kucian et al. 2007; Halari et al. 2006). Mental rotation, regardless of gender, involves both 
left and right parietal lobe and some right inferior frontal activation. Different stimuli involve different 
areas from this core set.  The dissenters are Thomsen et al. (2000) and the 2006 reanalysis by Hugdahl et 
al., who cling to the old view that mental rotation is right-lateralized, and Schöning et al. (2007), whose 
correlation of the left inferior parietal cortex with testosterone suggests that they think mental rotation 
is a left hemisphere activity.  
Finally, Voyer and Bryden (1990) used the Vandenberg version of the mental rotation task to 
assess spatial ability and laterality. Stimuli were presented to different visual fields. Stimuli were two-
dimensional figures taken from the Primary Mental Abilities test. The figures were displayed in pairs on 
either side of a central target figure. Women were faster on the task than men. Men displayed a 
significant left field advantage (right hemisphere processors) whereas women’s right field advantage 
was not significant. Low spatial ability subjects demonstrated a significant left field advantage, medium 
spatial ability subjects showed no field advantage, and high spatial ability subjects showed a significant 
right field advantage. In other words, activation shifted from the left hemisphere to the right 
hemisphere with practice on the task or familiarity with the stimuli. There was no accuracy difference 
between men and women.  
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Voyer and Bryden take their results to confirm that men are more right-hemisphere spatial 
processers and women are bilateral. Moreover, they suggest that the right hemisphere processes novel 
stimuli whereas the left hemisphere processes familiar stimuli: “In this context, mental rotation is 
presumably a novel task for subjects with low spatial ability” (25). However, men and participants with 
low spatial ability showed a left field advantage, which throws into question the association between 
men and superiority on the mental rotation task. Though Voyer and Bryden recognize their idiosyncratic 
finding – “the left visual field advantage for males…suggests that males should be low spatial” (26) – 
they suggest that: “gender and ability contribute independently to the determination of visual field 
effects” (27). Maybe men and women do use their brains differently, but the difference is not related to 
performance. 
After Halari et al. (2006) failed to find sex/gender differences in mental rotation-related brain 
activation, they compared the 6 best performers and the 6 worst performers. They did not mention the 
sex/gender distributions of the two groups. They found that the best performers were activating the left 
fusiform gyrus (BA 19), left middle temporal gyrus (BA 19), and the left inferior parietal lobe (BA 40). The 
areas more activated by the lowest performers was the parahippocampal gyrus.6 Halari et al. 
interpreted their results to show that bilateral parietal activation may be related to better performance 
on the mental rotation task. 
The concern with nailing down the “correct” or “most efficient” brain area for mental rotation 
processing is connected with the early neuroimaging project of localizing brain functions to brain areas. 
The alternative hypothesis, that there are multiple neural patterns that are used for mental rotation 
                                                          
6 Halari et al. (2006) did not employ direct (subtraction) comparisons between groups (women and men 
and high and low performers). Instead, they defined regions of interest (ROIs) identified by the group 
analyses. 
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processing, is rarely considered in the literature, except in distinguishing a masculine way and a feminine 
way, and in Halari et al. (2006), who assess high vs. low performing individuals. Even when considering a 
possible masculine versus feminine pattern, the supposed performance advantage of men is overlaid, 
resulting in a masculine, more effective or efficient, way and a feminine, less effective or more effortful, 
way. Halari et al. state: 
Our findings showed that men and women were activating similar brain areas for the mental 
rotation task, although women were performing differently (making more response errors): this 
would suggest that women might need to use more brain resources to achieve the performance 
level shown by men. (10) 
 
H. Hormones 
Another problematic theme in this case study was the research on hormones. Dietrich et al. 
(2001), Schöning et al. (2007), Gizewski et al. (2006), and Halari et al. (2006) all investigated some aspect 
of sex steroid hormones on performance. The assumption behind this question is that women’s 
behavior is affected by the monthly hormonal changes associated with her menstrual cycle. Estrogen is 
thought to have a deleterious effect on cognitive performance, particularly for either masculine tasks or 
tasks that best require lateralized activation. Again, the assumption behind this is sexist and sex 
essentialist: women are not constant, rational beings but prone to mood swings, presumably from their 
menstrual cycles. In the section on Dietrich et al.’s work above, I indicate that men are affected by 
hormonal cycles, but men’s cognition is not thought to be affected by daily and seasonal floods of mind-
altering hormones. 
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I. Androcentrism 
The discussion of hormones also relates to charges of androcentrism. As evidenced so 
eloquently by Dietrich et al.’s figure (figure 4.2), men are the control group; they are the standard by 
which women’s changing natures should be measured. The central claim regarding androcentrism, 
however, is the connection between men performing better on mental rotation and men performing 
better on right hemisphere tasks, which leads to the conclusion that mental rotation is a right 
hemisphere task. The activation pattern for men becomes the standard. Once the associations amongst 
men, performance, mental rotation, and right hemisphere involvement are forged, a normative claim 
has been made: spatial processing of the mental rotation sort is best accomplished via the right 
hemisphere.  Variations from this androcentric standard are abnormal.  Drawing out the implications of 
this normative claim lead to the following: if women use both hemispheres to solve the task, it must be 
because (1) they don’t have a developed “spatial processing module” or (2) it’s hard for them and they 
need to recruit additional brain areas. As I indicated above, however, mental rotation is not a right 
hemisphere activity, so these associations must be questioned. Moreover, as is the case for most 
neuroimaging studies, only right-handed individuals are scanned, since there is a greater chance of 
“abnormal” or “atypical” activation patterns in non-right-handed individuals. Thus, “standard” brain 
structure is based on right-handed men; women and non-right-handed men deviate from this standard. 
 
J. Evolutionary explanations 
Some researchers read their work as contributing to ultimate explanations – why men are better 
at mental rotation processing. For example, Butler et al. (2006) note that men follow the more 
evolutionarily natural strategy, egocentric processing, whereas women do not. Gizewski et al. (2006) 
think that men’s activation of sensorimotor areas mimics the “natural way” to manipulate objects in 
reality. Jordan et al. (2002) are agnostic as to the cause of sex or gender differences, but they note that 
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“biological” evidence comes from direct sources – hormonal studies – and indirect sources – according 
to evolutionary psychology, men and women have different needs in regards to navigating in the 
environment. 
However, as I argued above, when the presentation modality is 3-dimensional, such as using 3-d 
glasses, virtual reality, or real objects, the sex/gender difference goes away. If men evolved greater 
visuospatial ability for navigating the real world, then their performance advantage should extend to 
“real world,” 3-dimensional stimuli. Since it does not, evolutionary explanations fail.  
 
Conclusion 
 The interest in sex/gender differences in the brain activation associated with mental rotation 
processing stems from two related views: 1) the gendered lateralization hypothesis and 2) the supposed 
sex/gender difference in mental rotation performance. With regards to the gendered lateralization 
hypothesis, there is no consistent evidence of sex/gender differences in mental rotation processing. 
Moreover, the traditional assumption regarding the right hemisphere as the locus for mental rotation 
processing, based on the purported masculine pattern, is not supported. Mental rotation, at least in 
right-handed individuals, is a bilateral activity involving many brain areas. Additionally, the pattern of 
activation may alter over time with the development of expertise. 
 With regard to the supposed sex/gender difference in mental rotation performance, 
neuroimaging studies fail to elicit the supposed difference. As I have indicated, the supposed difference 
is not so clear-cut: there are many ways to alter or eliminate the standard performance advantage for 
men, such as altering the instructions, manipulating confidence and stereotypes, and training on video 
games, for example. Alternatively, it is possible that the experiments are insufficiently powered. In 
either case, researchers need to consider what effect size activation differences they expect, if there are 
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different effect sizes for behavioral performance and functional activation differences, and what they 
are really finding if women are not actually worse at the task as expected. 
I have uncovered a number of methodological and theoretical shortcomings. Neuroimaging 
researchers don’t seem to recognize that their studies don’t provide information regarding stable, long-
term abilities, but are one-shot, temporary, context-sensitive readings on a given performance. 
Performance is sensitive to experience, as the cognitive psychology studies on hobbies, coursework and 
training show, as well as context, as evidenced by the cognitive and social psychology studies on 
confidence, stereotype threat, group composition, and alteration of instructions. Another shortcoming 
has to do with cross-cultural differences in cognitive abilities, including mental rotation and visuospatial 
abilities. Neuroimaging studies present their results as getting at differences between “the sexes,” but 
what they actually show are differences between men and women in a limited population (Western, 
educated, patriarchal, mostly white, middle-class, etc.) which may not translate to other populations. 
 Sex essentialism arises in a number of ways in this case study. Despite failing to find the 
supposed performance advantage for men, some researchers reject or reinterpret their findings to fit 
within the standard framework rather than questioning it, revealing their assumption that men and 
women really are essentially different. Since researchers do not engage in blind measurement or 
analysis procedures, sex essentialism could affect the way they see and interpret their data. Cognitive 
strategies is a way in which sexist stereotypes (sex essentialism) enter into science and gain scientific 
legitimacy. Also, researchers do not have a theory of sex/gender and do not use sex and gender terms 
consistently, contributing to the confusion regarding the “cause” of any found differences (nature, 
nurture, or an interaction of nature and nurture). 
Given the above – failing to consider social and environmental effects on mental rotation 
performance, insufficiently powered research designs, assuming that results generalize universally, 
failing to theorize sex and gender, and reinterpreting results to fit within the standard framework rather 
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than questioning it – the ethical implication of this work is that it contributes to the historical trend of 
finding biological differences between men and women, in some cases devaluing women’s way of doing 
things (if they even are doing something different from men), and has been used to argue against 
women’s equal participation in STEM careers. Thus, the research program is epistemically unsound for 
ignoring or disregarding evidence that contradicts the preferred view – the sex-essentialist framework 
grants only a partial or distorted view of the world – as well as being socially and morally irresponsible 
for its complicity in the continued oppression of women. 
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Chapter 5 
Feminist philosophy of cognitive neuroscience 
 
 
Introduction 
In chapter 1 I argued for tailoring feminist philosophy of science to a particular science in order 
to make it more applicable to the scientists doing the science and make an impact on scientific practice. 
Moreover, I argued that feminist standpoint empiricism is the best candidate for this project. One 
problem confronting standpoint theories is the lack of guidance by the authors as to how to do science 
from the feminist standpoint. Thus, one objective of my dissertation is to work out how to do science 
from a standpoint epistemology. The other objective of my dissertation is to develop a feminist 
standpoint empiricism of cognitive neuroscience. In service to these goals, I presented two in-depth case 
studies from the neuroimaging of sex or gender differences.  
I employed both an internal critique, which involved assessing the research according to the 
standards of science, and an external critique, which involved assessing the research based on feminist 
concerns through the feminist standpoint. Knowledge of the specific scientific practices was essential for 
both critiques. For the first prong, knowledge of the specific practices in the discipline allows for an 
assessment of the science based on its own standards. For the second prong, knowledge of the specific 
practices in the discipline, coupled with the feminist standpoint, reveals knowledge gaps and taken-for-
granted assumptions and biases within the discipline. The second prong reveals problems with the 
standards of science that are not visible from the limited perspective of science. Whereas general 
feminist criticism is possible, knowledge of the specific science is important for the critique to make 
strong, direct connections to the science – to point out specific problems in the practices and to 
articulate them in a way to be meaningful to the scientists. 
183 
 
Whereas the second prong is intrinsic to feminist standpoint empiricism, the first prong is 
merely instrumental. The second prong applies the feminist standpoint to the science to reveal 
problematic assumptions and practices. I employed the first prong for two purposes. The first purpose 
was to engage with scientists who are unable or unwilling to recognize the problems of their limited 
view of science. It reveals that the science within this research question, sex/gender differences in the 
neuroimaging of mental rotation processing and corpus callosum structure, fails to conform to the 
standards of the discipline. It is subject to bias. Thus, scientists entrenched in the traditional view of 
science as objective and value-free can see that research in this domain fails that standard. Such 
scientists may not be amenable to the feminist philosophy of science that sees science as value-laden 
and as embracing different notions of objectivity (Harding’s strong objectivity). In this way, the first 
prong functions as a rhetorical tool. 
My second purpose of using the first prong was to demonstrate in this specific domain the 
problems of traditional epistemology mentioned above (science and scientists as objective and value-
free) in order to argue for feminist epistemology. In this way, the first prong functions in an argument 
about epistemology. 
In this chapter, I combine my critiques across the two case studies with feminist standpoint 
empiricism and present a philosophy of cognitive neuroscience from the feminist standpoint. This 
philosophy of cognitive neuroscience carries positive recommendations for changes to scientific practice 
in a format that scientists can apply in their work. The outline of this chapter is as follows. First, I 
characterize three ways that feminist epistemology distinguishes itself from traditional epistemology. 
Then I discuss the problems I uncovered in the two case studies, demonstrate if and how they are 
supported by traditional epistemology, and demonstrate how feminist epistemology, feminist 
standpoint empiricism in particular, can be used to resolve the problems. Then, I briefly sketch the 
feminist standpoint: what are the lives of women like? Next, I return the elements I identified in chapter 
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1 that are needed to connect feminist standpoint empiricism to the practice of a particular discipline of 
science. Joining the elements to connect feminist standpoint empiricism with the specifics of cognitive 
neuroscience, I then present an outline of a feminist philosophy and practice of cognitive neuroscience. 
This new approach to cognitive neuroscience involves initiating inquiry from the perspective of women’s 
lives, reflecting on the differences between men’s lives and women’s lives, and incorporating the 
interests of women in the research, resulting in research that is better grounded epistemologically as 
well as being more socially and morally responsible. 
 
Feminist epistemology: a response to traditional epistemology 
Feminist epistemology is a response to traditional epistemology. I focus on three feminist 
responses to aspects of the standard reading of traditional epistemology: the separation of science and 
society; the role of values in science; and the ideal reasoner. These three aspects are all related: the 
separation of science and society prescribes the role that values are to play in science as well as 
underwrites the description of the ideal scientist. For brevity’s sake, I cannot give a full account of the 
development of these aspects in traditional epistemology. Instead, I focus on feminist epistemology’s 
limited characterization of the three aspects, which are used by feminist epistemologists to define their 
project in contrast to that of traditional epistemology.  
 In general, feminist epistemology rejects all three aspects.1 Whereas in traditional epistemology, 
according to feminist epistemologists, society is seen as limiting or polluting the pursuit of pure scientific 
                                                          
1 Feminist empiricism is the exception. Early feminist empiricism holds on to all three tenets of 
traditional epistemology. Specifically, they argue sexist science occurs when biases trickle in, as a result 
of the standards of science not being rigorously upheld. They uphold the view that non-epistemic values 
185 
 
knowledge, in feminist epistemology, science is not separate from society. Instead, science and society 
mutually influence each other in epistemically relevant ways. Science is pursued by flawed human 
beings and oftentimes for specific purposes. Science is used to investigate problems in the natural world 
and in human culture, to improve human and animal life, and to make money, to name a few objectives 
of science.  Thus, social values influence what gets studied and how, and findings from science affect 
society.  
Feminist epistemology has identified that the traditional view of science as value-free is flawed. 
According to traditional epistemology, there is a distinction between the context of discovery and the 
context of justification – a view attributed to Hans Reichenbach. Social and personal values are 
permitted a role in scientific discovery, but when it comes to scientific reasoning and justification, social 
and personal values are prohibited. In addition, values can be either epistemic or non-epistemic. 
Epistemic, or cognitive values, are thought to be socially value-free and conducive to the epistemic 
aspect of science. Examples include empirical adequacy, explanatory power, unification, and simplicity. 
Non-epistemic values, on the other hand, involve broad social views held by a group or individual 
preferences. Values can be associated with political, economic, religious and cultural views and more. 
According to traditional epistemology, the only values permitted for scientific reasoning are epistemic or 
cognitive values, which are thought to be socially value-free (McMullin 1982).  
Instead of being value-free, according to feminist epistemologists, science includes the values of 
the scientists, which for far too long were from the same social group. In the early to mid-twentieth 
century, when logical positivism and the science it was modeled on was in its heyday, scientists were 
                                                          
should play no role in science. Later feminist empiricism attempts to include a diversity of values in 
science. 
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middle-class, Western, white men, for the most part, with similar political and economic interests. The 
values were there, but the scientists were blind to them because they were widely shared, taken for 
granted and not questioned. As such, contemporary science is founded on the values of that group, 
which resulted in sometimes racist, classist, able-ist, sexist or androcentric science. 
Finally, feminist epistemology rejects the traditional picture of the ideal reasoner. According to 
traditional epistemology, the scientist is an objective, unbiased, and disembodied reasoner who sets 
values aside when reasoning scientifically. As such, science’s findings are supposed to hold regardless of 
what other social or political establishments exist. Since the scientist is merely a disembodied, pure 
reasoner, his or her body, gender, race, socioeconomic class, political affiliations, country, etc., are 
temporarily suspended when he or she is engaging in scientific reasoning – such contingencies are 
irrelevant to the practice of pure, objective, scientific inquiry. Since scientists are pure reasoners, any 
scientist can re-create the results of another, given the same set-up. Scientists are intersubstitutable.  
As indicated above, according to feminist epistemology, scientists are flawed, embodied human 
beings situated within specific cultures. Different approaches to feminist epistemology have different 
solutions to this problem, so I will be focusing on feminist standpoint empiricism, for which I advocated 
in chapter 1. Feminist standpoint theory, and feminist epistemology more generally, sees science as the 
product of imperfect humans, embroiled in conflicts and values – familial, religious, cultural, social, 
political, economic, class-based, national, international, etc. One’s interests, thus, determine what one 
studies, how one studies it, and how one uses and interprets what is found. Instead of a disembodied, 
objective, unbiased pure reasoner, as assumed in traditional epistemology, feminist standpoint 
empiricism initiates inquiry from the feminist standpoint – a perspective established by reflecting on 
social power structures (patriarchy, socioeconomic class, age, race, heteronormativity, ability, etc.). The 
feminist standpoint involves taking seriously – both in epistemology and in scientific practice – women’s 
lives, their bodies, their races, their interests, their political commitments, their values. The promise of 
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science under feminist standpoint empiricism is knowledge that is better grounded epistemologically as 
well as being more socially and morally responsible as opposed to knowledge generated from science 
under traditional epistemology. 
There is one more important aspect of good science under the traditional epistemological view 
that will factor in the discussion of my case studies later. Science is committed to empiricism, which is 
the view that knowledge must be verified by observation and empirical test rather than by pure reason 
alone. I note it separately because empiricism is also endorsed by many strains of feminist 
epistemology, including the feminist standpoint empiricism I advocate.  
 
Traditional epistemology and feminist epistemology in the neuroimaging of sex or gender differences 
 Above I identified 3 ways in which feminist epistemology differs from traditional epistemology: 
the separation of science and society; the role of values in science; and the scientist as ideal reasoner. 
Referencing my two case studies, I will demonstrate the failure of traditional epistemology to uphold 
these three tenets, as well as the standard of empiricism, and how feminist epistemology overcomes 
these problems. I will demonstrate: first, that neuroimaging research on sex/gender differences does 
not meet the standards of good science according to traditional epistemology; second, that the 
standards of good science according to traditional epistemology are impossible; and third, how feminist 
epistemology overcomes the shortcomings of science founded on traditional epistemology and makes 
for better science – science that is better founded epistemologically – and science that is more socially 
and morally responsible.  
 First, research on sex/gender differences in the corpus callosum and in mental rotation 
processing does not meet the standard of empiricism. According to empiricism, observation and 
experiment provide knowledge. However, researchers ignore empirical findings in order to continue to 
hold onto a preferred theory. In the case of the corpus callosum, researchers ignore the two meta-
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analyses and review that contradict the standard view. In the case of mental rotation, some researchers 
ignore their own findings, in which performance differences are not found, and explain their results as if 
they had found the expected performance difference for men. In this regard, research in this domain 
does not meet the standards of good science. Continuing to research a question despite numerous 
failed attempts is not supported by traditional epistemology.  
Second, this research program does not meet the traditional standard of the separation 
between science and society. Social interests regarding the proper roles and abilities of men and women 
support the continued search for sex or gender differences. Sex differences is a hugely popular topic in 
the news and in science journalism. Our society, in the early 21st century United States, and reflecting 
millennia of history, is strongly committed to separate sexes and separate gendered social spheres. As 
such, research on sex/gender differences continues a long tradition of justifying the conceptual, 
physical, cognitive, and social distinction between the sexes/genders. According to traditional 
epistemology, social interests should not affect science.  
Third, this research program also fails to adhere to traditional epistemology’s standard of 
eliminating values in science. Scientists’ conviction that there are sex or gender differences overrules 
empirical evidence to the contrary, which results in an answered question’s appearing to still be viable. I 
have identified sex essentialism influencing research all along the research pathway in both the case 
studies. I hesitate to call sex essentialism a value – I think it functions as an assumption – but I think it is 
supported by a value, heteronormativity. Heteronormativity assumes that sex, gender, and sexuality are 
bundled together such that males are associated with the masculine gender role, females are associated 
with the feminine gender role, and both are heterosexual. Heteronormativity drives sex-essentialist 
thinking and it is sex essentialism that leads to the view that differences between men and women are 
due to their distinct, sex-differentiated essences. 
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Fourth, if the scientist were an ideal, objective reasoner according to the standards of 
empiricism, he or she would recognize that the question has been answered and move on to another 
topic rather than continuing to investigate empirically unsupported hypotheses, he or she would 
identify that social interest in sex or gender differences were influencing continued research in this 
domain despite its lack of results, and he or she would not be bringing heteronormative values into 
science. 
As a result, neuroimaging research on sex/gender differences as currently pursued is not good 
science – it is not creating knowledge but instead perpetuating sex-essentialist assumptions. Moreover, 
it is socially and morally irresponsible research in that it contributes to the oppression of women. 
Thus, research on sex or gender differences in these two domains does not abide by the 
standards set forth by standard epistemology. It fails to adhere to empiricism, fails to keep science and 
society separate, and admits non-epistemic values into science, and scientists are not acting as ideal, 
objective, unbiased reasoners. Thus, as an internal critique, neuroimaging research on sex/gender 
differences in the corpus callosum and mental rotation processing fails to uphold its own standards – 
standards adopted from traditional epistemology.  
 These standards are not being upheld because they are impossible. As an external critique, the 
three tenets from traditional epistemology that I have identified are deeply flawed. First, science cannot 
be separated from society. Science’s funding comes from public funds, private funds, and corporate and 
government interests. Most of the time, scientists must justify the importance and relevance of their 
work, and the justification that is looked upon with the most favor is the one that promises some sort of 
socially-motivated improvement – be it improving treatment for medical patients, a more cost-effective 
production process, or more effective weapons. Even the “pure science” justification offers some hope 
of future application, even if it is far down the line. And science has a revered position within society, 
despite the unfortunate anti-science, anti-vaccine movement: companies invest millions of dollars on 
190 
 
marketing research to find the best way to sell products to consumers; consumers rely on increasingly 
technical and technological products, such as handheld or wearable computing devices and cars that 
integrate both mechanical and computerized components; patients rely on innovations in the 
biomedical sciences for improved treatment and recovery; laypeople consume popular science articles 
on how to be a more effective procrastinator, whether a glass of red wine a day improves cardiovascular 
health, and about the discovery of a planet that may be similar in composition to Earth. Science’s 
findings often quickly find their way into application in society.2 
And just like science and society are not separate, science is not non-epistemic-value-free. In 
addition to corporate and government interests affecting science, social and political and personal 
interests affect science. Longino (1990) discusses the development of oral contraception. An interest on 
the scientists’ part was population control, and negative consequences of oral contraceptives were 
downplayed while at the same time its other positive uses were extolled. Population control, especially 
for Third World countries, served as a social and political value for the community of (mostly male, 
Western, educated, middle-class) scientists and was possibly even a personal value for some of them. In 
contrasting the “traditional” way of studying the effects of divorce from the feminist way, Anderson 
(2004) identifies values on both sides. For the traditional approach, divorce is conceived as a loss, a 
trauma endured by family members, as a breaking up of the family. For the feminist approach, divorce is 
conceived as an event, oftentimes preceded by years of marital discord, which may be a relief from a 
difficult situation, and results in alternate conceptions of family. The traditional approach values a 
                                                          
2 Unless corporate interests work to suppress scientific findings in order to expand their profit, as in the 
tobacco industry (Oreskes and Conway 2010). 
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“traditional” family, where spousal and parental roles are one, whereas the feminist approach values 
alternate family forms where spousal and parental roles are conceived separately. 
In another paper, Longino (1996) contrasts traditional cognitive or epistemic values with 
feminist values and shows how both sets of values are supported by socio-political values. For example, 
the traditional value of external consistency, or conservatism, values theories that are consistent with 
other domains. In contrast, the feminist value of novelty values theories that open up new research 
questions. Given science’s sexist history, external consistency or conservatism values theories that 
comport with existing sexist theories. Novelty, on the other hand, values research that breaks from the 
sexist tradition. Social conservatism may not be an explicit goal in valuing external consistency or 
conservatism over novelty, but it functions to maintain the status quo – a patriarchal social structure 
and sexist science. She states: 
I’ve argued…that in specific research contexts the traditional virtues have a demonstrably 
political valence. I don't want to say the traditional virtues are always politically regressive, but 
that the fact that they sometimes are means that we cannot treat them as value-neutral 
grounds of judgement. (54) 
She stresses that the context of the virtues must be investigated to identify when they are being used in 
service of sociopolitical aims. 
Likewise, the ideal, unbiased, objective reasoner is a myth. Keller (1983) attributes Barbara 
McClintock’s discovery of transposition to the care she felt for the plants she was studying -- a “feeling 
for the organism.” Keller highlights McClintock’s passion and care, the opposite of the traditional view of 
the scientist as disinterested, cold, emotionally unattached. Haraway (1991/2004) holds that the 
idealized, objective knower in traditional epistemology is naïve and impossible. All knowledge comes 
from gendered, raced bodies situated in particular historical, sociopolitical circumstances. 
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Harding (1992/2004) points out that the ideal reasoner in the traditional account ignores the 
role that historical and sociocultural contingencies play in limiting and determining one’s perspective. 
She argues that the traditional view of the scientist as an objective, unbiased reasoner was the product 
of a homogeneous group of (white, Western, male) academics and scientists who actively excluded 
women and minorities. As such, knowledge produced by such a group is partial and distorted, as much is 
taken for granted. Instead, the perspectives of the oppressed offer new research questions unexplored 
by those in power as well as reveal unsupported assumptions held by those in power. 
Because feminist epistemology overcomes the shortcomings of traditional epistemology, it is 
preferable as a foundation for science. In what follows, I connect feminist standpoint empiricism with 
the discipline of cognitive neuroscience using the four elements I identified in chapter 1 and the details 
of practice from the two case studies in the neuroimaging of sex or gender differences. 
 
Feminist standpoint empiricism and the feminist standpoint 
Feminist standpoint empiricism combines aspects of feminist empiricism and feminist 
standpoint theory. From feminist empiricism, it retains the epistemic aspect of empirical standards. This 
affirms the positive role that the standards of empiricism have had in producing epistemologically sound 
science. In addition, feminist standpoint empiricism incorporates standpoint theory’s two important 
goals. First, by starting from the lives of the oppressed, it provides a less partial and distorted view of 
the world. It is better grounded epistemologically. Second, by starting from the lives of the oppressed, it 
provides knowledge that does not further oppress disadvantaged groups. Thus, it produces more 
socially and ethically responsible knowledge than traditional epistemology as developed by the logical 
positivists. 
Feminist standpoint empiricism proposes a new starting point for inquiry: the feminist 
standpoint. Instead of a disembodied, ideal reasoner as the starting point for inquiry, the feminist 
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standpoint comes from the experiences of women living in a patriarchal society. Their position gives 
them an alternative view of the world compared to the view of those in positions of power. The 
standpoint of the oppressed provides a stronger epistemological framework than that based in the 
position of privilege because it provides a less partial or distorted view of the world. Those in the 
position of the oppressed have perspectives different from their oppressors. They have different values. 
They are able to see problems and knowledge gaps in the traditional picture of the world that those in 
the position of privilege are unable or unwilling to see.  
In addition to being on a stronger epistemological foundation than the traditional view, feminist 
standpoint theory makes possible liberatory rather than oppressive science. As traditional epistemology 
reinforced harmful gendered and raced stereotypes, feminist standpoint theory offers an alternative 
picture, one that breaks the reinforcement of sexist or gendered assumptions from society into science 
and from science into society. Moreover, as feminist standpoint theory advocates the methodology of 
“studying up,” including the perspective of those most affected by the research, it protects research 
participants and groups from science that can harm them.  
In addition, feminist standpoint theory’s liberatory agenda and commitment to “studying up” 
further demonstrate the breakdown of the traditional distinction between science and society. Science, 
on the feminist standpoint view, is not done without regard to the social environment and who will be 
harmed by it. Rather, science should be conducted with the goal of mitigating its oppressive effects on 
minorities and those most impacted by its findings. 
  
What is the feminist standpoint? 
 In a patriarchal society, women and girls are oppressed. As a woman, I can speak somewhat as 
to the experience of women, but I am not the sole authority. Oppression can manifest in many different 
ways in different sub-cultures, socioeconomic classes, races and ethnicities, ages, and other groups. I am 
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a woman who is white, middle-class, in her 30s, and I am a first-generation college student pursuing a 
doctoral degree in a field dominated by men. From my experience and the experience of others I know, 
women and girls are subjected to a number of messages telling them what they can and cannot do. Girls 
should become nurses, not doctors. Girls should play with dolls, not Legos. Girls are good at reading, not 
math. Girls should be quiet, not rambunctious like boys. Girls don’t like frogs or bugs. Girls like playing 
dress-up. Girls like pink; boys like blue. The social environment is gendered: the world that girls 
experience is different from the world that boys experience. The Pink and Blue Project by photographer 
JeongMee Yoon (Yoon , n.d.) nicely showcases the gendered world forced on children. Children are 
pictured in their rooms with their possessions – toys, clothes, books and games. Girls live in a cotton-
candy-pink world. Boys live in a sky and royal blue world. 
 The repercussions of the early enforcement of gender expectations on children in their choice of 
clothing, toys and behavior, coupled with continued gendered advertising and policing, manifest in 
adolescence and adulthood in their behavior, dating, their choice of college major, and in their choice of 
career. It affects their relationships as women strive to be what they’ve been told men want (and men 
strive to be what they’ve been told women want) in a heteronormative culture. It even regulates how 
non-heterosexual individuals should act. The result of a gendered society is that girls and women and 
boys and men live in different social worlds. They have different experiences and their different 
experiences allow for different interests, values, and perspectives on the world. 
 Taking the feminist standpoint reveals aspects of a given issue that are unexplored from the 
dominant perspective. It reveals different experiences between men and women, such as experience on 
mental rotation problems, playing video games, or taking science and math classes, that may affect 
men’s and women’s performances on mental rotation, for example. It reveals that there are 
expectations regarding differences between men’s and women’s cognition, such that there may be a 
“standard” way to solve a problem and a “feminine” way (androcentrism). 
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 In addition to revealing knowledge gaps unexplored under the dominant paradigm, I think 
standpoint theory can also offer another source of knowledge that is specific to cognitive neuroscience 
and related fields. Being a woman, being brought up in the world I describe above, affects brain 
development. Pointing out the separate gendered messages women experience throughout their lives 
does more than just show that women’s experience is different from men’s (the standard application of 
standpoint theory); we can go further to think about how those gendered messages causally influence 
brain development. Incorporating the causal relevance of women’s lived experience is a bit stronger 
than the standard application of feminist standpoint theory and it may only be applicable to cognitive 
neuroscience and related fields. For example, being a woman changes the brain, the subject of study by 
cognitive neuroscience, but being a woman doesn’t change the subject matter of anthropology 
(artifacts) or computer science (code).  
 Finally, I should note that, given my interest in sex/gender differences, I focus on the standpoint 
of women. Other research questions, however, may better be explored from other standpoints, such as 
Hispanic women, black lesbians, Muslim women, disabled women, intersexuals, or queer-identifying 
individuals. 
 
Tailoring feminist standpoint empiricism to a particular science 
In chapter 1, I identified four elements to tailor feminist standpoint empiricism to a particular 
science. In this section I use the four elements to sketch what a philosophy of cognitive neuroscience 
influenced by feminist standpoint empiricism would be. 
 
a. Content of the scientific discipline or subdiscipline 
The first point is that one must identify what the specific discipline, subdiscipline or research 
community has focused on and what has been neglected and how the science relates to systems of 
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oppression. This has to do with the content of the science. From my case studies in the neuroimaging of 
sex and gender differences, cognitive neuroscientists have focused on sex differences, prioritizing sex 
(biology) rather than gender factors (social, experiential, environmental). What has been ignored is 
experience. This is the assumption of sex essentialism that permeates all aspects of research. The 
assumption of sex essentialism is not specific to cognitive neuroscience – it can be found in cellular and 
molecular neuroscience, many subdisciplines of biology, and some areas of psychology (evolutionary 
psychology, for example). However, other disciplines (gender studies) and subdisciplines (social 
psychology, the psychology of women, some subdisciplines of sociology, archaeology, and 
anthropology), are much better at identifying and critiquing sex essentialism. The way that cognitive 
neuroscience focuses on sex rather than gender is by indicating that men and women have different 
brains as a result of their sex without seriously considering if social factors played a major part in 
sex/gender-based differences in structure or function. 
 
b. Specifics of practice 
The second element to tailor feminist theory to the practice of a particular science is an 
understanding of the specifics of the discipline. This is necessary in order to both understand the science 
and to communicate effectively with the scientists. The specifics of the discipline consist of instruments, 
methods, standards, assumptions, analyses, models, theories (which I will collectively refer to as 
“practices”), history, and language.  
The instrument I have been focusing on for the study of sex or gender differences in 
neuroimaging is the Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scanner. In order to understand the research, 
one must understand the specifics of that tool – the differences between structural and functional 
images, what the BOLD signal measures, the subtraction method, control tasks, etc. The methods used 
involve a cognitive task and a control task for functional studies. For structural studies, the methods 
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involve tracing the corpus callosum by hand or using a computer program and the various methods for 
subdividing the corpus callosum. 
The standards and analyses involved consist of blind analysis procedures, correcting for multiple 
comparisons, alpha levels for significance testing, and analyses of functional data (the subtraction 
method, correlations, region of interest analyses, regressions, and analyses of variance). In addition, the 
data has to be “cleaned up” before it can be analyzed – spatially and temporally smoothed, time-
corrected, transformed onto a standard brain template, etc. 
Other standards involve what is normally mentioned in studies. It is not normal to mention 
social and environmental factors on the variable of interest and not to limit results to the populations 
studied. These standards have to do with publication standards for the field. 
There are a number of theories and assumptions involved in cognitive brain imaging. There is a 
background theory regarding localization – different parts of the brain are involved in different aspects 
of problem-solving. Another background assumption is the lateralization hypothesis, which holds that 
the two hemispheres of the human brain are specialized for different types of processing. The gendered 
lateralization hypothesis assumes that males are more lateralized than females. There is an assumption 
regarding efficient neural processing: expert processing involves a minimum of brain activation whereas 
novice processing involves the recruitment of many brain areas. Another assumption is that men are 
better at spatial tasks, which comes from the large-scale cognitive psychology studies. Another is that 
the small samples recruited for the neuroimaging studies would be representative of all men and 
women, regardless of generational age, education level, race, nationality, etc. Sex essentialism is 
another assumption – that the differences found are due to sex rather than gender factors. 
As for models, in the case of neuroimaging sex or gender differences, there was no model 
employed. Other scientific fields rely more heavily on modeling. With regard to history, the history of 
biology and psychology has focused on sex differences rather than gender differences.  
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Finally, there were problems in the language used by the field. As evidenced by the studies, 
cognitive neuroimaging is ignorant of the distinction between sex and gender. Moreover, the language 
employed indicated both explicit and implicit avowal of “biology” as the source of difference. 
Learning about the specifics of practice in cognitive neuroimaging leads to identifying specific 
problematic practices that need to be addressed as well as aids in communicating with scientists. Being 
able to understand what the scientist is doing and why will aid feminist critics in making specific points 
about problematic aspects of research. Specific points can be discussed and addressed, whereas general 
“this is sexist” critiques may close off dialog before it even starts. 
 
c. Culture of the discipline or subdiscipline 
The third element is to identify the culture of the science: are there unquestioned norms within 
the community that make women and minorities feel unwelcome and bar their success? It does not 
seem as if the culture is explicitly hostile to women. Many of the papers had women authors. Instead, 
the culture is more subtly hostile, as evidenced through the language used. The language reveals some 
authors’ biases for bio-centric, reductionistic, essentialist explanations of difference rather than the 
effect of social factors. Other authors were noncommittal, noting that they didn’t consider social factors 
at all. 
Race, ethnicity, and other minority groups are not generally considered or discussed in the 
neuroimaging of sex/gender differences. It may be worth considering if the research domain is racist or 
oppressive in other ways because it ignores race, ethnicity, and other dimensions of difference, but I 
focused on sex/gender differences in my investigation. 
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d. Standpoint methodology 
Finally, the fourth element to begin to tailor feminist standpoint empiricism to a particular 
science involves two steps. First one must identify if the research is disadvantaging others. Second, one 
must include the perspective of those most affected by the research in order for the science to be a 
liberatory project rather than an oppressive one. Regarding the first step, research on the neuroimaging 
of sex or gender differences is disadvantaging women (Fine 2010; Halpern 2012). Thus, for the second 
step, the perspective of women must be included in the research in order to mitigate its oppressive 
effects. If the research were disadvantaging certain races, or other social classes, the perspective of that 
social class must be included in the research in order for the research to be liberatory rather than 
oppressive. 
 
From these four elements, a philosophy of cognitive neuroscience from the feminist standpoint 
would involve an understanding of how the focus on sex differences, rather than gender differences, has 
influenced the direction of research. In order for criticism of the standard approach to be effective, a 
feminist critic would need to be familiar with the various instruments, standards, and analyses of MRI 
and fMRI, the theories and assumptions of the field, the history of the study of sex/gender differences in 
the field, and the language used in the field. The feminist critic would need to know how the culture is 
sexist or exclusive to women, as evidenced by the language used in the research articles. Finally, the 
feminist critic would need to know if research is disadvantaging women and advocate ways for the 
interests of women to be included throughout the entire project. 
Thus, a philosophy of cognitive neuroscience from the feminist standpoint would initiate inquiry 
from the perspective of women’s lives. It would recognize the difference between sex and gender and 
state clearly what is being studied, what is not, and the limits on the applications and implications of the 
research. It will address the differences between women’s lives and men’s lives and incorporate the 
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interests of women in the research. A more detailed account will be possible after evaluating the 
specifics from the two case studies. 
 
Getting into the specifics: problems in the neuroimaging of sex or gender differences 
In this section, I review the problems I uncovered in the two case studies. I show commonalities 
across the two research questions as well as some differences between them. In the following section, I 
offer solutions to the problems reviewed here by applying feminist standpoint empiricism. 
I uncovered problems at every stage of the research, from how the question was asked, to the 
background assumptions, to the methodology, to data reporting and analysis, to the interpretation of 
results. Additionally, I discuss problems in the language used in the studies. Although background 
assumptions influenced research at many stages, I attempt to discuss the problems in the order 
mentioned.  
 
Research question 
Regarding the research question, since there are no consistent sex or gender differences across 
studies in either the size and shape of the corpus callosum or mental rotation activation, the question of 
sex or gender differences has been answered: there is no evidence for sex or gender differences in the 
macro structure of the corpus callosum and there is no evidence for sex or gender differences in mental 
rotation task activation.  
The search for sex or gender differences has been a focus of research since ancient times. The 
question continues to take new shape as new theories and instruments develop. As I have identified, 
there is an assumption of difference that is driving this research in the face of countless disconfirming 
evidence across the centuries. I identify this assumption as sex essentialism. There may be sex or gender 
differences on some things, but many things that are assumed to differ actually do not. As such, I 
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recommend that research as currently conceived should not continue. Research on differences based on 
essentialist understandings of male and female should not be undertaken. For example, research that 
relies on stereotypical (and often culturally-specific) assumptions, such as women being more emotional 
or men more rational, should cease. There may be a place for continued research on sex/gender 
differences, but it must be socially and morally responsible. Given the range of effect sizes for cognitive 
abilities across countries, research on men’s superiority on math or science should be replaced with 
research on cultural differences that affect the development of math and science literacy or the effect of 
stereotype threat on brain activation. 
Problems in research with regard to sex/gender can arise both when looking for difference and 
when ignoring it. Above I described alterations to practice when we are looking for difference. When not 
looking for sex/gender differences, however, researchers should still perform a sex/gender analysis in 
order to explore possible unexpected differences. When unexpected sex/gender differences are found, 
it should be clearly stated whether it was hypothesized or just an exploratory finding. If the finding was 
not hypothesized, researchers must note the unexpectedness of the finding and call for another study to 
confirm it before overstating the significance of it. 
Thus, the research question as currently conceived should be given up or reconstrued from the 
feminist standpoint, since current research on sex/gender differences is not progressing, it essentializes 
men and women, it is poorly supported by evidence and theory, and it may be used to further harm 
women. 
 
Background assumptions 
1. Expectation of difference 
There are two ways in which the expectation of difference arises as a background assumption in 
the case studies. For the corpus callosum, since a number of studies continued to be published after the 
202 
 
Driesen and Raz (1995) and Bishop and Wahlsten (1997) meta-analyses and Fausto-Sterling (2000) 
review and since many studies disregard or ignore the meta-analyses and review, there is an assumption 
of difference that continues to fuel research even though the question has been answered. Researchers 
expect to find a difference, and that is what is driving this research.  
For mental rotation, even though the neuroimaging studies failed to show the expected 
performance advantage for men, some studies explained their results as if men were outperforming 
women. This manifested in many ways. Thomsen et al. (2000) stressed that the trend was in the 
expected direction. Butler et al. (2006) and Butler et al. (2007) interpreted women’s activation as 
involved in “effortful” processing whereas men’s is involved in “effortless” processing. These two 
examples are discussed further in the section below on interpreting results.  The two Butler articles also 
found a trend for the performance advantage in men that disappears when omitted trials are counted as 
incorrect, which is a nonstandard data analysis procedure. Schöning et al. (2007) confirmed sex or 
gender differences in mental rotation performance for one of two phases of the menstrual cycle, but 
women’s scores didn’t differ across phases, so the performance advantage for men is likely an artifact. 
The Butler papers and Schöning et al. (2007) will be discussed again in the section on data reporting and 
analysis. Kucian et al. (2007) didn’t find the performance advantage for men, but they stated that they 
would expect to find it with more complex stimuli. This is yet another example of expectation affecting 
the interpretation of data. In this case, the authors are attempting to explain away “anomalous” results. 
The one study that found men outperforming women (Halari et al. 2006) did not find activation 
differences. They reasoned that women might need to recruit more brain resources to achieve men’s 
performance level. The assumption at play here has to do with novice vs. expert activation patterns. 
Novices tend to activate larger areas of cortex than experts. In order for women to achieve performance 
levels on par with men, their reasoning goes, women need to recruit additional areas because they do 
not have expert, neurally-efficient circuits developed. 
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The expectation of difference for the corpus callosum demonstrates sex essentialism – 
researchers expect to find differences because they assume that men and women are different. They 
ignore or downplay evidence to the contrary, letting bias override rationality. This can be understood as 
an example of confirmation bias: researchers ignore or downplay evidence that contradicts their 
assumptions. The expectation of difference in the mental rotation case demonstrates sexism – 
researchers are ignoring their own findings, wherein women are not performing worse than men, in 
order to support the “standard” view in which men have superior performance. Similar to the corpus 
callosum case, bias overrides empirical evidence against the preferred view. Confirmation bias appears 
as well but takes a different form. Instead of ignorance of previous studies, such as the meta-analyses 
and review for the corpus callosum case, researchers in the mental rotation case reinterpret their own 
results to fit with the preferred view. They are either blatantly ignoring their own findings or are unable 
to see them as importantly defying the standard assumption.  
 
2. Assigning participants to groups  
Another problem with the studies was that it was not clear how researchers assigned “sex” to 
participants. Did participants self-identify as “male” or “female” or did researchers assign sex to 
participants based on the participants’ presentation? In other words, did participants check a box for 
“male” or “female” on a questionnaire or did researchers assign a participant’s sex based on his or her 
gendered name (Jane, John) and appearance (clothing, hairstyle, etc.)? Would participants have 
answered differently if they were asked to report their gender rather than their sex? Some studies took 
hormone assays and excluded participants if their sex hormone profiles deviated from the norm.  
Since it is not clear how participants were categorized, and some participants could have genetic 
or hormonal disorders or present as a different gender than their biological sex, it is unclear if the 
researchers are finding sex differences or gender differences, or, most likely, a combination of the two. 
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However, researchers do not consider the difference between sex and gender and how the two are 
intertwined, which could result in an interpretive mess. For example, some individuals may identify with 
the gender opposite their body’s assigned sex. Their answers for “sex” and “gender” may be different, 
and their assignment into a group by a researcher may not accurately reflect the individual’s sex. Or, an 
individual might have a hormonal or chromosomal disorder, wherein his or her external appearance 
conflicts with his or her hormonal or chromosomal “sex.” Standard research practice is 
heteronormative: there are two sexes and gender roles attach to their respective sex. Without 
considering the differences amongst sex, gender, and sexuality, and whether researchers are trying to 
get at sex or gender differences, results are likely confounded. They are confounded first because the 
groups could be misassigned. Secondly, they are confounded because researchers have not adequately 
theorized and identified if they are after sex or gender differences.  
 
3. Irrelevance of social and environmental factors  
Social and environmental factors are downplayed or ignored. If social or environmental factors 
were mentioned in the introduction and discussion sections, it was either to note that they were not 
considered or to state outright that they weren’t deemed relevant. Moreover, demographic information 
was not collected from the participants, further demonstrating researchers’ expectation that experience 
does not affect corpus callosum shape and development and mental rotation ability or performance. 
However, as I demonstrated in the second parts to each case study, experience and situation do affect 
corpus callosum development and mental rotation performance. The ignorance of and disregard for 
studies revealing possible social and environmental influences on corpus callosum morphology and 
mental rotation performance may suggest that researchers treat sex factors – biology, genetics, 
hormones – as the primary factor driving supposed sex or gender differences and deem social factors 
unimportant. The studies are, possibly unsuspectingly, supporting a view of sex or gender differences 
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that are a result of “nature” or “biology.” Such a view is sex-essentialist: it reduces men and women to 
their biological, natural, sex-differentiated essences.  
  
Methodology  
Twenty-one of the 38 corpus callosum studies and zero of the 11 mental rotation studies 
analyzed their data blind to the sex or gender of the participants. Blind analyses need to be used when 
investigating two groups. When blind procedures are not followed, researchers’ expectations regarding 
what should be found could affect the way they see and interpret their data. In the corpus callosum case 
study, this involved measuring whole CC and CC subarea lengths, widths, and areas and the bulbosity of 
the splenium. In the mental rotation case study, this involved interpreting subtraction activation maps 
with gender expectations, assumptions, or stereotypes in mind. This was probably a major factor in the 
hypothesis of different “cognitive strategies” between the genders (discussed under the section 
“interpretation of results” below). Bluhm (2013a; 2013b) found this in her study of emotion processing – 
it is one way in which gendered stereotypes bridge the gap between theory and data.  
 Another issue arose in the corpus callosum case study. Twelve out of the 37 studies used 
patients for some or all of their sample. Other studies used databases, some of which were from 
medical centers, which may also include patient scans. Patients may have different brain structures than 
nonpatients, and this could affect results. This is not a problem supported by traditional epistemology or 
by sexism, but a possibly outdated problem of convenience sampling. MRIs are expensive and before 
they became widely used within the research community, they were heavily associated with clinical-
based research. Researchers used what was available, which were MRI scans of individuals in clinical 
settings. Eventually, MRI became a research tool in its own right, so researchers could recruit individuals 
from non-clinical samples. Thus, the problem of patient samples is hopefully not a problem more 
recently. 
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Data reporting and analysis 
1. Expectation of difference 
Regarding data reporting and analysis, the expectation of difference arose in the mental 
rotation case but not the corpus callosum case.  I mentioned above in the section on background 
assumptions how the expectation of difference, driven by sex essentialism, affects data reporting and 
analysis. I note them again here. Thomsen et al. (2000) stressed significance trends favoring men and 
Butler et al. (2006) and Butler et al. (2007) performed a fishy data analysis to “find” the supposed 
performance advantage for men. In addition, the two Butler articles interpreted women’s activation as 
involved in “effortful” processing whereas men’s is involved in “effortless” processing, even though 
performance didn’t differ between men and women when using standard data analysis procedures. 
Schöning et al. (2007) found that women’s performance on the mental rotation task differed 
significantly from men’s in one phase of the cycle but not in another phase, as well as finding that 
women’s scores across the two phases did not differ, which suggests that the significant finding for one 
menstrual cycle phase was an artifact. However, the researchers treated their results as if women really 
do perform worse in one phase of the menstrual cycle. All of these are examples of the expectation of 
difference affecting the reporting and analysis of results. Kucian et al. (2007) didn’t find the performance 
advantage for men, but they stated that they would expect to find it with more complex stimuli. The one 
study that found men outperforming women (Halari et al. 2006) did not find activation differences. They 
suggested that women might need to recruit more brain resources to achieve men’s performance level. 
Their suggestion relies on the assumption that novices on a task recruit extra brain regions to 
accomplish the task, whereas experts demonstrate neural efficiency by displaying a smaller area of 
activation. 
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2. Correcting for multiple comparisons 
In the corpus callosum case study, only 4 studies explicitly mentioned correcting for multiple 
comparisons (Allen et al. 1991; Johnson et al. 1994; Luders et al. 2003; Luders et al. 2006a, 2006b). 
When there are a number of comparisons being made, the chance of false positives increases. Although 
not all may have needed it, depending on the type of analyses performed, but when testing multiple 
areas via t-tests, for example, correction is in order. As such, some of the differences found may have 
been false positives. Considering that the expectation is that men and women differ, not correcting for 
multiple comparisons is one way in which to increase the likelihood of finding expected differences. 
Multiple comparisons may also be a problem for the mental rotation case but I did not consider multiple 
comparisons until late in the project. 
 
Interpretation of results 
1. Samples and generalizing 
Participants from the United States, Canada, and a handful of affluent European nations were 
overrepresented. People living in different situations or from different social classes may have different 
results. Additionally, races or ethnicities of the participants were mostly unmentioned. Researchers do 
not restrict their results to the population studied. They assume that there are no non-biological 
influences affecting corpus callosum structure or mental rotation performance or activation to take into 
account, and as such, see their results as applying to all humans, in all countries and situations, across 
time. The overrepresentation of certain types of participants is problematic if participants from different 
backgrounds have different brain structures or different mental rotation performance levels or 
activation patterns. Indeed, there may be evidence that different ethnic groups have different brain 
structure (McShane, Risse, and Rubens 1984) and that cultures differ regarding proficiency on various 
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cognitive tasks (Herlitz and Kabir 2006; Reilly 2012; Lippa, Collaer, and Peters 2010; Berry 1966; 
Hoffman, Gneezy, and List 2011). 
Whereas the researchers take themselves to be describing sex (or gender) differences, what 
they are doing is adding to the historical trend of finding and defining natural, biological differences that 
exist across time and culture. The problem with this is that they aren’t finding universal sex or gender 
differences rooted in biology. The differences they are finding are relevant only to this small time 
window, a small, probably highly educated sample, within a few cultures. In other words, they’re not 
describing sex differences that have existed for millennia across cultures, but sex or gender differences 
within a WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) sample (Henrich et al. 2010) 
in the late 20th and early 21st century in a few industrialized nations. 
It is interesting to note that sex differences trump racial differences in both the corpus callosum 
and mental rotation case studies. Differences due to race or culture are not considered. Sex is treated as 
a more basic, essential category than race or culture. 
 
2. Cognitive strategies 
 I mentioned cognitive strategies above in the section on methodology. Cognitive strategies 
arose in the mental rotation studies only. Many interpreted the activation they found as evidence that 
men and women use different “cognitive strategies” to solve mental rotation problems. The “cognitive 
strategies” they suggested called upon gendered stereotypes regarding men’s and women’s processing 
styles or the expectation that men outperform women. Illustrating different “sex”-based processing 
styles, they suggested that women activate more frontal, language-related areas, which are involved in 
more serial-related processing strategies, whereas men activate more parietal, spatial-related areas, 
which are involved in processing the stimuli as a whole rather than as parts. Illustrating the expectation 
that men outperform women, they suggested that men activate the “correct” or “more efficient” brain 
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areas for visuospatial tasks, the parietal cortex, whereas women activate “incorrect” or “less efficient” 
brain areas, such as the frontal cortices. Rather than testing the hypothesis, however, it just gets 
repeated or altered by other researchers and starts to look like a finding rather than a hypothesis.  
Thus, the “cognitive strategies” problem is two-fold. First, it calls upon gendered stereotypes or 
expectations about performance differences to suggest an explanation (hypothesis) regarding the 
meaning of the observed activation differences. This is an example of a problematic background 
assumption. The problematic background assumption is that men and women have different processing 
styles and different cognitive skills: women have more developed language skills (and associated brain 
areas) whereas men have more developed visuospatial skills (and associated brain areas). It results in 
both of the types of cognitive strategies hinted at above: different cognitive processing styles, which 
results in different brain areas being called upon to solve mental rotation problems, and men’s 
performance advantage on visuospatial tasks, which results in interpreting women’s activation as 
supplementary because their visuospatial center is inadequate for solving mental rotation problems. 
Second, study after study invoked “cognitive strategies” as an explanation rather than merely as 
an hypothesis for observed activation differences. Thus, when there were activation differences 
between men and women, the differences were explained in terms of different “cognitive strategies” 
employed by men compared with women. Instead of it being suggested that women are invoking 
different strategies to solve problems than the males were, researchers were stating that women were 
invoking different strategies than the men. “Cognitive strategies” stopped being a suggestion to explain 
activation differences and started to be a factual statement of what was going on – even though no one 
actually tested it. The expectation that “sex”-based differences in cognition caused activation 
differences took the place of evidence linking different professed cognitive strategies to a) groups, b) 
patterns of activation, or c) performance. In other words, even though “cognitive strategies” was a 
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testable hypothesis to explain different patterns of activation, it wasn’t tested but reiterated as if it were 
a tested, empirical, scientific result. 
Thus, the first part of the cognitive strategies problem is the use of a gendered stereotype as a 
possible explanation for observed activation differences. This is an example of sex essentialism, which I 
discussed in the section on background assumptions and the problem of generalizing from a small 
sample. The second part of the cognitive strategies problem is the untested acceptance of the 
hypothesis as a scientific explanation, which is a case of problematic interpretation of results. It is an 
example of bad empiricism – an hypothesis is not empirically tested but instead accepted as true.  
  
3. Social relevance of the issue 
It is not standard for neuroimaging articles in the two case studies to discuss the question of 
nature versus nurture. For the mental rotation case, most studies mention cognitive psychology 
research and other neuroimaging studies showing sex or gender differences on mental rotation and 
state that men tend to outperform women. For the corpus callosum case, interest in the corpus 
callosum was mixed. Though many studies mentioned the purported association of corpus callosum 
subareas with lateralization of brain function, some discussed handedness, animal studies of sex 
differences in the corpus callosum, or developmental changes in the CC. 
Although they are not explicitly engaging in the nature-versus-nurture debate, it seems as if the 
researchers have a preference for nature. Given the pervasive sex essentialism, which influences the 
expectation of difference that spurs continued research on sex or gender differences and the choice by 
neuroimagers not to consider social and environmental factors affecting sex or gender differences, it is 
clear that researchers expect to find sex or gender differences that exist regardless of social or 
environmental factors. Thus, when researchers find differences, and do not control for experience, they 
add to the evidence on the side of nature, even if they are not explicitly engaging in the debate. Some 
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researchers may actually be advocating for nature – as evidenced by their comments lauding biology 
and downplaying social experience – whereas others may not be thinking about this debate and may not 
realize that they are contributing to it. It is hard for me to believe, however, that researchers are 
ignorant of the wider social impact and interest in their work, given the nature-nurture debate, popular 
interest in sex/gender differences, and the so-called “war of the sexes.” Regardless, the point is that 
researchers are participating in the debate whether or not they are aware of it. 
The second point is that those familiar with the nature-nurture debate on a surface level, which 
includes researchers not in this research program, journalists, and laypersons, may read this research as 
contributing to the debate and as providing evidence for the natural, biological basis of sex or gender 
differences. Notably, it is only those who are superficially aware of or interested in the debate that are 
my concern, since many people more knowledgeable about the nature-nurture debate are more 
sensitive to the nuances of the interactive effect of environmental influences on biology. The problem is 
that nuance is lost in the sensationalization and oversimplification of scientific results. 
The third point is that the methodology employed in these studies is inadequate for addressing 
the question of nature versus nurture. Since researchers are not considering experiential factors, their 
study designs do not find anything regarding the contribution of nature versus nurture. In order to study 
nature-versus-nurture, researchers must investigate both biological and social/environmental effects on 
the variable of interest – corpus callosum morphology or mental rotation activation. In order to 
establish “natural” influences, they would have to rule out experiential influences, but researchers are 
not doing that. They are not collecting and factoring in social and environmental influences. 
Thus, though researchers are not actively engaging in the nature-versus-nurture debate, their 
research gives the impression that nature is the factor at work, which misleads the non-scientific 
community. Moreover, the methodology is inadequate for addressing the question, but laypersons may 
not have the scientific expertise to see it. Because researchers often say nothing on the issue of social 
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influences on brain structure and function – most do not take a moment to explain that their results 
could be due to natural or experiential factors – they add to the assumption that difference is due to 
sex-based, natural factors. As a result, laypersons may be misled by the research and take it to 
demonstrate that nature is the main factor influencing sex or gender differences.  
 
Language 
Most studies did not differentiate sex and gender terms, oftentimes using them 
interchangeably. Failing to differentiate or define sex and gender is problematic because readers may 
interpret the researchers as saying that differences were due to “sex” factors – biology, nature, genetics, 
hormones, essences – or “gender” factors – culturally-contingent, socially constructed and enforced 
roles for men and boys and women and girls. As it stands, it is unclear whether researchers choose their 
words carefully and mean natural, biological differences when they say “sex differences” or whether 
they are ignorant of the different connotations of sex versus gender (Gentile 1993). Science’s long 
history of “proving” the biological inferiority of women has taught the importance of differentiating 
“sex” and “gender” and identifying researchers’ assumptions regarding the causes of difference. 
Science’s results are taken up by society and have been used to argue against women’s equal 
participation in society. 
Additionally, in the corpus callosum case study, the term “sexual dimorphism” is still being used. 
Recall that it refers to a trait that differentiates the sexes. However, as I demonstrated, the corpus 
callosum does not differentiate men and women. It is likely that it is still being used because of the 
assumption of sex essentialism, which I have argued above, is a result of the value of heteronormativity. 
Moreover, since the corpus callosum does not differentiate men and women, continued use of the term 
is just wrong. This is a case of the failure of this research program to uphold the standards of empiricism. 
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The empirical evidence demonstrates that the corpus callosum is not sexually dimorphic, but 
researchers continue to use the term. 
 
 
An account of feminist philosophy of cognitive neuroscience 
Earlier I discussed four elements for tailoring feminist standpoint empiricism to the specifics of a 
practice of science. These elements are: 1) What questions has the scientific discipline focused on and 
what has been neglected? 2) What are the specifics of practice in the discipline? 3) What is the culture 
of the discipline? 4) What is the power structure of the discipline, society, and research question and 
how can the method of “studying up” be employed to mitigate the harms experience by the oppressed?  
From these four elements, I noted that a philosophy of cognitive neuroscience from the feminist 
standpoint would involve an understanding of how the focus on sex differences, rather than gender 
differences, has influenced the direction of research. In order for criticism of the standard approach to 
be effective, a feminist critic would need to be familiar with the various instruments, standards, and 
analyses of MRI and fMRI, the theories and assumptions of the field, the history of the study of 
sex/gender differences in the field, and the language used in the field. The feminist critic would need to 
know how the culture is sexist or exclusive to women, as evidenced by the language used in the 
research articles. Finally, the feminist critic would need to know if research is disadvantaging women 
and advocate ways for the interests of women to be included throughout the entire project. 
 In this section I combine the feminist standpoint empiricist solutions to the problems in current 
practice along with my analysis of how to tailor feminist standpoint empiricism to a particular science to 
describe a feminist philosophy of cognitive neuroscience. Feminist standpoint empiricism involves 
initiating inquiry from the perspective of the oppressed and including their interests in the research in 
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order to create knowledge that is less partial and distorted (better grounded epistemologically) as well 
as being more socially and morally responsible (liberatory rather than oppressive). 
 In beginning research, one can start with an existing question or research program and overhaul 
it from the feminist perspective or one can start from the feminist standpoint and ask entirely different 
questions than those being asked from the traditional perspective. Regarding researching existing 
questions, one would ask: how do we do research on sex or gender differences that does not harm 
women? As a start, the answer to this question is for cognitive neuroimaging research on sex or gender 
differences to incorporate a theory of sex and gender, reject the assumption of sex essentialism, 
investigate the effect of social and environmental experience on the variable of interest, and properly 
contextualize results so that women are not further oppressed. Regarding finding new questions to ask, 
one would consider how the current method is limiting and instead break the sex dichotomy. There are 
many ways to go once the sex dichotomy is dropped: one could investigate social and environmental 
impacts on the variable of interest; attempt to connect different “cognitive strategies” with patterns of 
brain activation; investigate how different gendered messages individuals are exposed to throughout 
their lives affects their performance and confidence on gender-typed tasks; or investigate the neural 
mechanisms involved when activating or deactivating stereotypes associated with stereotype threat. 
Deciding on the research question involves the elements of adopting the feminist standpoint and 
attending to the content of the science. 
 Whether one overhauls an existing question from the feminist standpoint or asks new questions 
provided by the feminist standpoint, the question of sex and gender must be addressed. Researchers 
must face the difference between sex and gender, clearly state what they mean by sex and gender, 
decide whether they are searching for sex differences or gender differences or if their research cannot 
disentangle the two, and be consistent. In other words, researchers must include a theory of sex and 
gender, theorize what role sex and gender plays in their research, and clearly state both. Regarding the 
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differences between sex and gender, the National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine Committee 
on Understanding the Biology of Sex and Gender Differences (Executive Summary of the Institute of 
Medicine Report 2001) define sex as “the classification of living things, generally as male or female 
according to their reproductive organs and functions assigned by the chromosomal complement” (433) 
and gender as “a person’s self-representation as male or female, or how that person is responded to by 
social institutions on the basis of the individual’s gender presentation. Gender is shaped by environment 
and experience” (433). 
Theorizing sex and gender in research addresses the feminist standpoint element so as not to 
further disadvantage women. It addresses the content element regarding the questions that have been 
focused on and neglected and systems of oppression as well as the element of the specific theories and 
assumptions of the field. With no theory of sex/gender, the value of heteronormativity and the 
assumption of sex essentialism has led to the focus on “sex.” Finally, the culture element is also 
addressed: the language used has been bio-centric and reductionistic. Theorizing sex and gender and 
addressing heteronormativity and sex essentialism is relevant to all four elements I identified in 
translating feminist standpoint empiricism to cognitive neuroimaging. 
 Related to the suggestion of having a theory of sex and gender, researchers must be more open 
to different genders, “non-typical” hormone profiles, intersex individuals, and possibly different 
sexualities. Currently the research is heteronormative, which leads to the assumption that homosexual 
men have more feminine brains and cognitive profiles whereas homosexual women have more 
masculine brains and cognitive profiles. Separating sex, gender, and sexuality may result in less 
heteronormative, sex-essentialist research, may open many new avenues for investigation, and may 
overthrow the tyranny of the “neurotypical.” Sex, gender, and sexuality may have very real results in 
brain structure and function, but lumping them together may not reveal anything. Researchers will have 
to state how participants were assigned to groups and report how many participants did not meet 
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categorization requirements. Researchers may also want to assess how much individuals identify with 
each gender role. Women identifying strongly with the feminine gender role may have different 
functional activation on a masculine-typed tasked than women identifying only weakly with the 
feminine gender role. This addresses the standpoint element in that it breaks away from sex 
essentialism and may result in more liberatory knowledge. It addresses the content element because 
the focus has been on the sex dichotomy. It addresses the specifics element because it introduces a new 
theory of sex, gender and sexuality than the sex-essentialist one rooted in heteronormativity. It 
addresses the culture element because the reductionist and bio-centric language will no longer be 
relevant. 
 Next, researchers must choose to investigate both natural, biological causes and nurture-based 
social and environmental causes for the variables of interest or must have to state the limits of their 
research and contextualize it, clearly pointing out what it can and cannot answer. By this I mean not just 
discussing the literature on social and environmental factors, but including them in the research design 
– collecting demographic information from the participants and running covariate or regression analysis 
or subdividing participants into groups based upon shared experience to address or control for social 
and environmental factors. On the one hand, including social and environmental factors identifies that 
“sex” is not the prime cause of difference, which aids in the liberatory project. On the other hand, 
including social and environmental factors may exponentially increase the cost of the experiment in 
collecting and analyzing extra data or increasing the subject pool in order to achieve large enough group 
sizes for a suitably well-powered study. In such cases, it may be best to limit what is studied but to state 
clearly the limits of the research – what the study can and cannot answer – so as not to overgeneralize 
beyond what was studied or to inadvertently mislead laypersons as to the study’s results and 
implications. This addresses the standpoint element in that researchers are addressing a wider range of 
variables rather than just biological or sex-based causes or are explicitly noting that this research cannot 
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be used in ways that limit women to certain restricted biological, standard, oppressive roles. It 
addresses the content element because it no longer prioritizes sex (biology) over gender (social and 
environmental factors). It addresses the specifics element in that there is a new standard for research: 
research must include experiential factors or it must properly limit and contextualize its results. Finally, 
it addresses the culture element in that the language, which had formerly been reductionistic and bio-
centric, will become less so because researchers will have to include social and environmental factors or 
better limit and contextualize results. 
 Regardless of whether researchers include social and environmental factors in their research 
paradigms or note the limitations of their research, all will have to discuss social and environmental 
factors that affect the variable of interest in the introduction and discussion sections of their research 
articles. Depending on how popular the topic of interest is, researchers may also have to mention social 
and environmental factors in the abstract as well. This means that researchers cannot in good faith be 
ignorant of research in nearby fields that directly address the question of interest. In other words, 
researchers must step away from reductionist and bio-centric thinking and the focus on “sex”; instead, 
they must consider social and environmental factors that may be relevant. This involves two steps: 
knowing the literature from other fields that address the research question and thinking from the 
feminist standpoint to ask if the variable of interest is affected by the different worlds experienced by 
men and women. In other words, it requires knowing the literature that exists and thinking about 
knowledge that is missing. Thinking from the feminist standpoint may reveal a “knowledge gap,” 
wherein men’s and women’s experiences may differ and may affect the variable of interest but that 
there is not yet research on it. This knowledge gap must be mentioned. Knowing the literature and 
thinking about knowledge gaps address the standpoint element, in that broadening the perspective to 
include social and environmental factors moves away from research that may be taken to indicate sex 
essentialism and be oppressive to women and to create knowledge that is liberatory. It addresses the 
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specifics element in that the new standard for research involves a broader perspective rather than just a 
reductionist, bio-centric one, and it will be reflected in the new standard for publishing within the field: 
in order to publish an article, social and environmental factors must be taken into consideration in the 
introduction and discussion sections. It also addresses the culture element because reductionistic and 
bio-centric language will not be compatible with the inclusion of social and environmental research. 
 If researchers choose to include social and experiential factors in their study design, researchers 
will have to collect information from their participants in order to assess their experience. In addition to 
having more sensitive analyses that include experience, it can also assess gender-related and unrelated 
trends on experience and ability. Whereas sports and video games are thought to be highly visuospatial 
activities, and activities that boys and men participate in more, if studies started to collect this data, 
they may find, for example, that playing sports does not affect mental rotation ability but does affect 
other tasks in the visuospatial domain or that boys and men and women and girls do not differ in recent 
years on amount of time playing sports. The standpoint element is addressed because such research 
may overthrow assumptions about sex essentialism that have oppressed women. It touches on the 
content element because it challenges sex essentialist assumptions about masculine- and feminine-
coded experiences and activities. 
When comparing groups, researchers will have to start employing blind analysis procedures in 
order to eliminate expectation effects. Additionally, researchers will have to use standard statistical 
procedures. Data-mining to find a preferred result is bad research practice. When researchers are 
fishing, they must clearly express their lack of hypothesis, the exploratory nature of this research, 
correct for multiple comparisons, and note that a follow-up study must be done to confirm results. This 
addresses the standpoint element because the use of non-blind analysis procedures may be a factor in 
gendered stereotypes bridging the gap between theory and evidence, as in the “cognitive strategies” 
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explanation offered in emotion (Bluhm 2013a; Bluhm 2013b) and mental rotation tasks. This also 
addresses the specifics element regarding standards and analyses and theories and assumptions. 
When an explanation is proposed, such as cognitive strategies, researchers must test it rather 
than restating it as fact because it accords with the researchers’ views. Testing it opens it up for scrutiny: 
is there in fact a difference between men’s and women’s cognitive strategies or is it merely a cognitive 
shortcut for researchers in order to explain purported differences that may be due to other factors? 
Researchers must be aware of their preferences and biases and must interrogate them. This addresses 
the standpoint element because it involves questioning assumptions about sex essentialism and gender 
stereotyping, which have harmed women. It deals also with parts of the specifics element. Untested 
assumptions such as “cognitive strategies” will not meet the new standards of good science. Gendered 
stereotypes and assumptions will not be permitted. This revision also affects the culture of science in 
that bio-centric and reductionistic language and gender assumptions will be removed. 
If the research question is socially sensitive or a hot-button topic, researchers must be doubly 
careful of what they say, how they say it, and require strict evidential standards. Researchers must 
reflect on their perspective and engage in critical thinking. Researchers must try not to let bias, 
“common sense” – which could be a code word for gendered stereotyping – or wishful thinking mislead 
them. They must think about how the research can be used to harm oppressed groups and try to 
mitigate this harm. This addresses the standpoint element because it attempts to halt harmful effects of 
research on oppressed groups.  
Throughout the research process, researchers must analyze the power structures at play. Are 
there individuals being harmed by the assumptions in the research or by the results of the research? 
Researchers must take pains to contextualize results so as not to further harm oppressed individuals or 
groups. If research does involve oppressed groups, researchers must include the perspective of those 
most affected by the research. When applied to sex and gender differences, researchers need to talk 
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with women regarding their experiences to see how it differs from the researchers’ expectations and 
the experiences of men. Researchers must not speak for their research subjects, such as asserting that 
women are using a certain type of cognitive strategy or are “giving up” on hard problems (Thomsen et 
al. 2000). This addresses the standpoint element. It also addresses the content of the field. Research has 
traditionally stayed silent on questions of power structures affecting the research, so including an 
analysis of them is new. A power structures analysis may also result in revisions of research and 
publication standards, theories and assumptions, and language – elements specific to the science. It may 
also result in changes to the culture of the science – as it is focused on liberatory projects and power 
structures rather than reductionistic and bio-centric views. 
 Researchers must properly restrict their results to the populations studied. In sex and gender 
research, researchers have mistakenly assumed that their results translate cross-culturally and 
historically, when different cultures actually have different findings, which also suggests that the 
findings are not as “hard-wired” as assumed. Researchers must not overgeneralize their findings. This 
addresses the standpoint element: overgeneralizing contributes to the harm experienced by women 
when sex essentialism overrules empirical results and is used to justify their further oppression. The 
content of the science, focusing on universal, cross-culture, historically static “sex,” will be complicated 
by culturally-specific “gender,” resulting in research that cannot be universally applied but specified to a 
certain spatial and temporal location and population. This affects the standards, theories and 
assumptions, and language aspects of the specifics element. There will be a new standard, one where 
results are not overgeneralized, which affects theories and assumptions about sex and gender, and the 
language will have to be altered to reflect the more nuanced view regarding the limits to which 
generalizations can be made. 
 Finally, researchers will have to clearly state what is being tested and the limits of the research. 
This was partially addressed above regarding social and environmental factors in the nature-nurture 
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debate in the neuroimaging research on sex or gender differences and in restricting results to the 
population studied rather than overgeneralizing. I address it separately because I focused on the 
specifics in the two instances mentioned. The general lesson from the two instances is that if there is a 
larger cultural view that the research may appear to address, researchers must come out and state 
whether or not it addresses the question. They will have to properly limit and contextualize their 
findings rather than staying silent on the issue and allowing the results to be wildly misinterpreted. Of 
course, no one can foresee every ridiculous way a given study could be interpreted, so this requirement 
carries the caveat of “within reason” regarding addressing potential applications or implications. When 
it is clear, however, that the results are making waves in society in a way that is not supported by the 
actual study, researchers must step in and address the confusion. This addresses the standpoint element 
because it mitigates the harm experienced by oppressed members of society. It addresses the standards 
aspect of the element of specifics: manuscripts that do not contextualize their results and address the 
social implications and possible misinterpretations will not be deemed acceptable for publication. But 
it’s not just about the scientific community’s standards for publication; it’s also about researchers’ 
conduct – by engaging in community debates, by writing blogs or editorials addressing 
misinterpretations of their research, by informing the media when they have misrepresented a study. 
This addresses as well the culture element. Researchers are responsible for their research beyond the 
confines of their laboratory. Their responsibility is not just to the scientific community but to the larger 
social community of which it is a part. 
 
Cognitive neuroscience in practice re-envisioned through feminist standpoint empiricism 
 What does cognitive neuroscience through the feminist standpoint involve in practice? The 
target of my approach is individual labs or researchers. When researchers are developing a research 
question and experimental set-up, cognitive neuroscience from the feminist standpoint calls for 
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researchers to ask if there are gendered stereotypes involved or hypothesized sex/gender differences. 
Hopefully, a lab will already have a mix of senior and junior men and women in order to incorporate 
multiple perspectives on the issue. If not, they should collaborate with another lab or other individuals 
in order to have more perspectives weigh in on the question, assumptions, social and moral 
ramifications, and experimental design. Research may require pilot testing, especially involving women, 
in order to incorporate the participants’ perspectives. Continued checks must occur at every stage of the 
research to assess if assumptions are affecting data collection, analysis, and interpretation. When 
analyzing, interpreting, and writing up the study, researchers must re-assess gender stereotypes and 
hypotheses in order to identify and avoid gender stereotyping and the social and ethical implications of 
results both if sex/gender differences are found and if they are not. 
 If the research question involves other oppressed groups, such as sexual minorities, races, or 
clinical populations, researchers must include the perspective of those individuals throughout the 
research process – from formulating the study question and experimental design to data collection and 
analysis to interpretation and dissemination of results. 
 Importantly, just including women on the research team or as consultants may not guarantee 
that the feminist standpoint is included. Some women may not have the feminist standpoint – they may 
be ignorant of how patriarchy has conditioned their perspective. They may “buy into” the dominant 
view of the world and may not see how the research question or assumptions employed are privileged. 
Given the years of training they have undergone under the “accepted view” in their scientific field, they 
may have been indoctrinated into the accepted view and are unable to see the hidden assumptions and 
knowledge gaps. That is why it is important to include the perspective of those who are critical of the 
accepted view. 
 Although it is important to include women in the research, they are not the only ones who can 
employ the feminist standpoint. Men can also learn to identify sexist stereotypes and attempt to see the 
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world from women’s perspectives. Learning to see the world from women’s point of view will involve 
listening to women’s perspectives and supporting them in their interests (see Harding 1992/2004, 
Collins 1986/2004). 
 Scientists who adopt the feminist standpoint are better positioned to conduct non-oppressive 
science that provides a less partial and distorted picture of the world, but commitment to the feminist 
standpoint is not necessary provided that scientists at the very least incorporate some of the 
suggestions from feminist standpoint empiricism. Thus, there is a continuum from full adopters of 
cognitive neuroscience from the feminist standpoint to labs that reject all the recommendations or 
remain ignorant of them. In between the two extremes lies a middle ground occupied by labs that 
accept a few of the feminist standpoint empiricist recommendations. 
 The repercussions of a lab’s commitment to or uptake of cognitive neuroscience from the 
feminist standpoint and its recommendations translates to the extent to which its research will be 
better grounded epistemologically and socially and morally responsible. The labs that adopt cognitive 
neuroscience from the feminist standpoint will conduct research that produces a less partial and 
distorted picture of the world. On the other extreme, labs that continue conducting research as it is 
currently practiced will produce a more partial and distorted picture of the world. Labs in between the 
two extremes are likely to produce slightly improved science. The same relationships are expected 
between adoption of feminist standpoint empiricist recommendations and science that is more socially 
and morally responsible.  
 
Concluding remarks and next steps 
 I have addressed several projects in this dissertation. One aim was to address the need in 
feminist philosophy of science of making a difference in science. My suggestion is to connect feminist 
theory with scientific practice in cognitive neuroimaging in a way that scientists can better engage in 
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feminist science. In addition to sketching a feminist philosophy and practice of cognitive neuroscience, 
my work can be used by feminist epistemologists as a case study of how to connect feminist theory with 
a specific discipline of science. With regards to altering scientific practice to make it better grounded 
epistemologically as well as more socially and morally responsible, I have provided a new approach for 
thinking about cognitive neuroscience research. This new approach involves developing a theory of 
sex/gender, initiating inquiry from the perspective of women’s lives, reflecting on the differences 
between women’s lives and men’s lives, and incorporating the interests of women in the research. From 
this approach, I identified a number of problems in current neuroimaging practice as well as suggested a 
number of changes to address them. The result of cognitive neuroscience from the feminist standpoint 
is research that is better grounded epistemologically as well as being more socially and morally 
responsible. The benefit of this approach is that scientists do not have to independently seek out and 
apply abstract feminist principles in their science. I have used feminist standpoint empiricism and the 
specifics of practice in cognitive neuroimaging to tailor feminist standpoint empiricism to the practices 
of cognitive neuroscience.  
Two important lessons to be learned from my analysis of the case studies is that there is 
pervasive sex essentialism in cognitive neuroscience that manifests variously across the entire research 
trajectory and that changes need to be made at every step of the research path (research question, 
background assumptions, methodology, data reporting and analysis, and interpretation of results) and in 
the language used. The solution is not simple – it’s not as easy as just “add women and stir” – the 
solution involves a major reworking of how to do research. Thus, I advocate for connecting feminist 
theory with scientific practice by attending to the specifics of the discipline. 
One of the problems of standpoint theory is the difficulty in translating the directive “start 
inquiry from women’s lives” to scientific practice. As such, I identified 4 elements to consider when 
applying feminist standpoint empiricism to a specific science: the content, practices, and culture of the 
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discipline and the standpoint methodology of studying up. Only when the specifics have been identified 
can the general directive be placed in a context to show how starting inquiry from women’s lives 
provides alternative considerations – opening up new areas of inquiry and shedding light on 
unquestioned assumptions. A general feminist philosophy of science does not connect with the specific 
practice of a given discipline – it is not formulated in a way that scientists can appreciate in the context 
of their work.  
 As a result of the specifics of research, there is no handy, easily recallable cognitive 
neuroscience from the feminist standpoint catch phrase. In order for cognitive neuroscience from the 
feminist standpoint to be meaningful to the scientists doing the work, the general principles must be 
tied to concrete aspects of practice. Philosophers should not expect scientists to study philosophy and 
apply it to their science. Scientists are too busy keeping up with science to go outside their discipline to 
seek or consider alternate perspectives from untrained, non-scientific outsiders. As such, philosophy of 
science must be translated to specific practices if it is to make an impact. The changes all along the 
research pipeline may all be derived from philosophical principles, but the scientist is more likely to 
understand3 and appreciate the practice-specific recommendations. 
 As such, my practice-based approach targets individual researchers and research labs rather 
than scientific communities, subcommunities, or governing bodies. Advocating for top-down changes, 
such as those Longino (1990) supports, does not provide recommendations for those “in the trenches” 
(at the benches) doing the research. Moreover, top-down recommendations, such as requiring that 
                                                          
3 I’m not saying anything about scientists’ intellectual capacity. Rather, what I mean by “understand” is 
scientists’ training and interest and the problem with the fast-paced, publish or perish, cut-throat, grant-
grubbing institution of modern science that punishes scientists for reflecting on philosophical questions. 
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grant proposals include a sex/gender analysis, have no follow-through – there is no auditing system in 
place to check on or confirm that governing body recommendations are followed. It is from the bottom 
up that new values and standards enter communities in a sustainable way. 
Now that I’ve developed a feminist philosophy and practice of cognitive neuroscience, in order 
for it to effect change in science, I will have to disseminate it to the scientists. One way that Fausto-
Sterling’s (2000) work on the corpus callosum failed to make an impact on scientific practice was that it 
was published in a book that may not have been read by the people doing the science. In order for 
scientists to learn about my work to consider it, I take Carla Fehr’s (2012) suggestions to attend scientific 
conferences, publish in scientific journals, and join a lab. I presented a portion of my research in a poster 
at a Cognitive Neuroscience Society annual meeting and talked to a number of researchers, mostly 
young, who were interested in my work. The next step will be to submit a manuscript to a scientific 
journal. Publishing in philosophy journals will not reach the people who are doing cognitive 
neuroscience research. Finally, I hope to get involved in a cognitive neuroscience lab. In assisting in their 
research, I hope to ask questions and offer the feminist standpoint perspective to diversify their thinking 
as well as to continue to learn about cognitive neuroscience and how to make it less oppressive to 
women and other minorities and to learn more about engaging with scientists in productive ways. 
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